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Introduction
The common theme of this thesis is estimating effects of home-based reablement
(HBR) by applying micro-econometrics. Estimating cost related effects of HBR
proved challenging, mainly due to specifics of the Norwegian public health setting
and the individual tailoring of the HBR treatment. However, important results for
the Norwegian public sector have been generated through an immense data job and
by applying state-of-the-art econometric techniques. This thesis adds to the growing
literature assessing empirical effects of new health interventions. The thesis is funded
by Kristiansand municipality and the Research Council of Norway (Grant number:
247076).
HBR is a fairly new intervention, both in Norway and internationally, which aims
to restore or increase patients’ level of functioning, thereby increasing patients’ self-
reliance and consequently decrease their dependence on healthcare services (Tuntland
et al., 2014; Whitehead et al., 2015). The treatment is not standardized and content
may vary. However, all variations have a common goal and share key features as
being time-limited, multidisciplinary, home-based, goal-oriented and person-centered.
In HBR, significant resources are provided by a multidisciplinary team, focusing on
intensive rehabilitation measures in the patients’ home for a limited period. The HBR
team typically works with the patient towards a goal defined by the patient (Lewin
and Vandermeulen, 2010; Tinetti et al., 2012), usually focusing on skills needed for
daily living (Francis et al., 2011). The intervention represents an ecological approach,
taking into account patients’ preferences and resources and it is in line with the
chronic care model suggested by Meld. St. 26 (2014–2015) and W.H.O, 2002. The
typical somatic HBR patients are elderly people with a functional decline who are not
cognitive impaired.
The history of Norwegian HBR starts back in 2009, when the Norwegian govern-
ment approved The Coordination Reform — Proper treatment – at the right place and
right time, St. meld. nr. 47 (2008-2009). The reform addressed three major chal-
lenges; need for better coordinated services, an aging population with more complex
health status, and that existing services had insufficient initiatives aimed at limiting
and preventing diseases. One key step for the latter was to change the municipalities’
role, trying to fulfill the goals of prevention and early intervention while address-
ing the needs of patients with chronic diseases. The reform emphasized that early
recognition of functional decline followed by immediate rehabilitation measure, could
reduce or postpone the need for healthcare services. Building on the Coordination
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Reform the Norwegian government later published the report Future Care, Meld. St.
29 (2012-2013), where further development of HBR was recommended. These two
national reforms initiated a swift shift towards HBR in Norwegian municipalities.
Most Norwegian HBR initiatives were inspired by early results from Denmark
(Kjellberg and Ibsen, 2010). A pivotal motivation for Norwegian municipalities was
economic consideration due to the forthcoming demographical challenge, in line with a
Danish study (Førland and Skumsnes, 2016; Fersch, 2015). Interestingly, a systematic
review of peer-reviewed studies testing empirical effects HBR presented in Chapter I,
showed that only three studies discussed cost effects. This chapter also argues that
existing evidence regarding the effects of HBR is still inconclusive and to some degree
scarce, but by no means insignificant.
Studying HBR effects, current efforts tend to rely on randomized controlled trials
(RCTs). Many view the RCT approach as the gold standard while others argue that
such a standard does not exist (Cartwright, 2007). RCTs are desirable because effects
are fairly easy to compute, just difference in means between two groups, and therefore
results are often easily explained to policy-makers. However, the most important
argument in favor of RCTs is that it solves the problem of selection bias. In other
terms, the mean effect of all other causes except treatment is identical between groups,
so the net difference is zero (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). Such perfect balance
between groups is more likely when the sample size is large, an assumption that
seems to be forgotten in many practical cases.
RCT is only informative about the mean treatment effect, but does not identify
other features of the distribution, such as the median, a feature often ignored by
practitioners (Deaton, 2010). However, conducted properly, with a large sample size,
RCTs is undoubtedly able to produce good estimates of the population mean treat-
ment effect. Conducting such a large scale RCT is often not feasible in social science,
usually due to cost and ethical considerations. As an alternative to RCT data col-
lection, Chapter III provides a detailed description on how a large unique dataset is
created by merging data from several Norwegian health registers. The alternative is
not without ethical dilemmas, and alternative costs are described. On the upside, it
is beneficial that the dataset would be large, since statistical properties of regression
estimators are typically only known for the asymptotic case. The dataset created is
large enough to fulfil the assumptions needed to estimate heterogeneous treatment
effect (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran, 2006), which is ignored in RCTs.
As stated by Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 86, ...we believe regression should be
the starting point for most empirical projects, regression is the workhorse in empirical
work. The HBR treatment is implemented in a complex setting, it is executed in a
person’s home and acts as a minor puzzle piece in a comprehensive health system.
Such settings can cause regression variables and error term to be cross-sectionally (CS)
dependent, reflecting dependence between patients. This would naturally invalidate
the Gauss-Markov assumptions, and could potentially bias estimates in traditional
regression models. For the sake of reasonable inference, applied statisticians typically
try to get around the assumption that error terms have equal variances for all cross-
sections by applying robust error correction. This type of correction would however
not control for CS dependency.
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There is a growing literature on regression models designed to tackle the issue of
CS dependency. These models mostly vary with respect to the assumption concerning
the source of such a dependence (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998; Bai, 2009). The variables
in the dataset explained in Chapter III, turned out to be CS dependent, even though
they contain data from several stakeholders. Estimating HBR cost effects with CS
dependence is the theme of Chapter IV. HBR proved to reduce the monthly health
service related costs, and interestingly the largest cost reductions were found for a
stakeholder other than the municipalities, showing the importance of including all
major health providers when evaluating potential cost gains.
At first glance, the theme in Chapter II differs slightly from the others, but it is
still closely related to the topic presented above. Most of the largest populated mu-
nicipalities in Norway have authorized an administration office to allocate healthcare
services. All new applications for most healthcare services are sent to this office that
decides about an acceptance or a rejection. This type of offices could be the source
for CS dependence explained above. The employees in these offices usually have the
same background, collaborate and follow some norm, which would contribute to some
kind of connection between patients, ergo to CS dependence. Chapter II contains a
study from one such office, and investigates the impact of sick-leave on health service
provided, also in a CS dependent setting, but with a different twist compared with
Chapter IV. In addition, preliminary effects of HBR are also provided.
Summary of chapters
The review presented in Chapter I is joint work with my two supervisors, Jochen
Jungeilges and Eirik Abildsnes. The study presented in Chapter II study is joint
work with Kjetil Andersson and Jochen Jungeilges. Chapter III is also joint work
with my main supervisor Jochen Jungeilges, and the study presented in Chapter IV
is single authored.
Chapter I: Empirical evaluation of home-based reablement: A
systematic review
The increasing costs, economic and otherwise, resulting from the increased need for
care will have to be shared by a decreasing proportion of employed individuals. Since
home-based care is more cost-effective, many high-income countries are actively bol-
stering a shift from residential care to home-based care as a potentially more effective
and financially sustainable approach (Cochrane et al., 2013). The forthcoming chal-
lenges will force the healthcare industry to focus more on preventive measures, early
intervention, increased use of technology, rehabilitation and healthcare services that
are less manpower-intensive, and services that empower senior citizens to self-manage
chronic diseases (W.H.O, 2012). HBR, known as restorative care in Australia, the
USA and New Zealand, has its origin from the above background. High-quality care
is clearly an essential goal in health care services, but future resources are limited,
inevitably leading to priority setting and trade-offs (Emmert et al., 2012). Assessing
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the efficiency and effects of new interventions, including HBR, is therefore crucial.
To our knowledge, there are few comprehensive and systematic overviews of re-
search relating to the effects of HBR, and its therefore the objective of this study
to provide such an overview for studies assessing HBR through empirical evaluation.
First, we aim to provide a concise summary of relevant existing findings generated
in the course of the research process. In addition, we provide a critical constructive
assessment of the publications reflecting the extant research. The application of sta-
tistical concepts and models plays a central role in the research efforts we analysed.
Consequently, our review adopts a dual perspective: the health-economic angle is
augmented by a pronounced statistical/econometric viewpoint.
We designed and implemented a sufficiently sensitive search and selection strategy,
and to optimize our search design, we relied on the expertise of an experienced librar-
ian. Given the intrinsically multidisciplinary nature of HBR, we needed to extend our
search to multiple databases covering the fields of medicine, health care, social work
and economics. Eligibility was guided by a predefined list of inclusion and exclusion
criteria. Regarding the quality assessment, we saw the need to devise an instrument
suitable for the assessment of research papers that are related to the complex topic
of HBR. The resulting tool is rooted in the research and publication culture of eco-
nomics, econometrics, and statistics. The questions in this instrument target four
different aspects of a research effort: i) general introduction, ii) data sampling and
description, iii) statistics and iv) external validity. Our checklist contains 15 different
questions, each checking for a specific attribute of the study scrutinized. Given the
binary scaling, the total score of a paper will range from 0 to 15 points.
The largest score observed (7) also constitutes the modal score, and the mean
and median total score were estimated as 5.4 and 6.0, respectively. The assessment
scheme revealed one specific common pattern among the studies. In our view, none of
the papers scrutinized provided sufficient information about the data or the statistics
employed. Almost all studies lacked external validity. For data description, statistics,
external validity, only three points were given. We do not believe that this evidence is
indicative of the quality of the underlying research process. More likely, our findings
reflect an established publication standard idiosyncratic to the health and medical
journals where these studies were published. Failure to provide full information on
data and statistics can create uncertainty in an informed reader.
Twelve articles met our eligibility criteria and where included in the study, five
were conducted in Australia, three in New Zealand, three in Norway and two in
the US. Physical functioning or independence were the potential benefit categories
where we found the most studies, and often these focused on ADL. There is no clear
evidence supporting the notion that HBR significantly increases physical functioning.
Encouragingly, in the studies that produced no significant difference, HBR tended to
lead to superior results on the selected instruments. A general pattern for all different
measures and existing evidence regarding the effects of HBR is still inconclusive.
However, so far it has not been established that HBR renders negative effects.
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Chapter II: Absenteeism and care provision: Evidence from a
Norwegian cross-sectional dependent panel
Reflection on the phenomenon of absenteeism from the workplace readily produces a
list of non-beneficial correlates that could be interpreted as costs. Such cost might
be severe for the employee, family members, co-workers and the health system as
such. According to Barmby et al., 2002, the absence rates due to sickness are quite
substantial in several industrial countries, and they vary significantly across gender.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that workers in the public sector tend to have
more days absent than employees in the private sector (Winkelmann, 1999). The di-
rect cost of absenteeism is found to be substantial, and a Norwegian study (Markussen,
2012) shows that on average, a 1% increase in an individual’s sick leave rate reduces
individual earnings 2 years later by 1.2 %.
In general, absence can either be valid, if due to sickness, or invalid, if due to
shirking. So absenteeism is important since it provides information concerning the
determinants of worker behavior (Brown and Sessions, 1996). There exist theoretical
positions linking productivity to social activities in the workplace. For instance,
Rotemberg, 1994 argues that more (less) opportunities to socialize promote (impede)
altruism among co-workers which, in turn, tends to increase (decrease) productivity.
Another strand of the theoretical literature emphasizes links between productivity
and peer pressure.
This study, first of all, examines the effects of increased sick leave on indirect
expenses experienced by a public-health entity. That is, we scrutinize cost associ-
ated with absenteeism occurring over and above the direct costs as, for instance, the
wage rate. A unique 36-month panel from a micro environment in a large Norwe-
gian municipality is utilized to estimate the variation in the amount of additional
home-nurse hours provided due to changes in administrative workers sick leave occur-
ring in different organizational units of the care providing entity. Secondly, since we
deal with idiosyncrasies of the panel data set at hand, using unique insights into the
administrative background of the municipality studied, the current effort constitutes
an informative case study in applied econometrics. In particular by concentrating
on the effects of techniques designed to correct standard errors of estimates for het-
eroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence on inference, we touch
upon a technical matter that has recently received considerable attention in applied
statistics.
The findings concerning the effects of sick leave are in line with theoretical (Pauly
et al., 2002) and empirical (Nicholson et al., 2006) findings, implying the cost of work
loss will exceed wages if the firm has difficulties substituting the absentee with an
equally productive worker. In the case at hand, the administration office has little
personnel slack and the typical job responsibilities are fairly specialized. Therefore
replacing an absent worker by one of equal competence and productivity is close
to impossible. Interestingly, we find the opposite effects of increased sick leave in
the home-nurse areas. In contrast to the administrative unit, the management of
these areas can rely on a pool of potential substitute nurses temporarily replacing the
nurse(s) on sick leave.
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Apart from health-care related results, we put forward a case study in applied
econometrics. We demonstrate how knowledge about the basic ”architecture” of the
system designed to order and provide home-nurse hours helps to choose an adequate
estimator in the context of our linear model of home-nurse service provision. We
argue below that due to key features of the system, we can assume that unknown
common factor(s) generating cross-sectional correlation in the variables are uncor-
related with those factors causing correlated errors. As a consequence, fixed effects
estimation will guarantee unbiased and consistent parameter estimates. Moreover,
we rule out endogeneity by considering the design/organization of the administrative
system in place to facilitate home-nurse hours in combination with empirical evi-
dence. And finally, in the context of correcting standard errors in the presence of the
triad ”heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence”, our study
reveals that ”no-correction” is no reasonable alternative. We substantiate that sim-
ply relying on default correction options of standard software can lead to suboptimal
inference with respect to the effects of our variables of interest on home-nurse hours.
Chapter III: Creating a unique panel from Norwegian health
register data: Technicalities and difficulties
Over the past decades we have witnessed an explosion in the quantity and quality of
data bases holding information about individuals. The public discourse resonating this
development has generated a wide spectrum of views on the phenomenon. Portrayed
by some as a curse, others see a blessing in our ability to amass individual-level data.
For science in general, and for social scientists/economists in particular, such rich
datasets provide additional opportunities to answer new relevant economic research
questions. In response to the growing availability of individual data, distinct subfields
of statistics/econometrics have developed.
The panel-data methodology developed in microeconometrics, for example, pro-
vides the methodological backbone of a project which tries to asses an innovative care
intervention (home based reablement HBR) offered in Norwegian municipalities. Our
effort to address a new research problem in the context of health economics involves
a large dataset. The insight into the economic aspects of the care strategy that we
provide today might be considered by policy makers in designing an economically
viable and sustainable future care sector. We believe that society might benefit from
the use of a large set of individual patient data in the case at hand. This paper
documents the construction of the dataset we used in the HBR study. Focussing on
the various dimensions of the construction process - institutional matters, legal as-
pects, organizational issues, IT-problems and statistical issues - we hope to provide a
guideline/orientation for researchers planning this type of work in the future.
Finally, we intent to provide a unique view of the statistical technique of data im-
putation as a solution to an apparent dilemma experienced by many researchers.
Owners of sensible private information (individual data) have to adhere to legal
rules protecting the private sphere of individuals when data are made available to
researchers. Therefore data are anonymized. The datasets received by the researcher
often allow, at best, for suboptimal statistical inference. Thus the information avail-
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able for the policy maker will not be optimal. The subsequent decision making may
not be in the best interest of society. We demonstrate how statistical imputation
techniques can be used to reconstruct a research dataset with the goal to improve the
precision of statistical inference.
The dataset we constructed is large in terms of both N and T. It was created
based on information held in several separate Norwegian health registers. Norway is
in a rather rare situation that key services as schooling, social welfare, and health,
are exclusively provided by the public sphere. All national register data is therefor
often mandatory, of high quality, and covers almost the entire Norwegian population.
These features definitely characterize the four health registers that delivered the data
which, after being merged, constituted an unique individual monthly panel covering
the time-period from 2011 to 2015.
Legal requirements needed the dataset to be anonymized. In the course of this
process some observations had to be deleted or suppressed. An algorithm based
on four variables was used to mark observations for suppression, and thereafter the
associated service data where deleted for the suppressed observations. We tried to
counter the negative statistical effects of data suppression by applying imputation
techniques.
The operational characteristics of the imputation techniques to be employed were
carefully assessed. All test imputation proved accurate for the mean and standard
deviation. The accuracy is so high that for instance on binary variables, the mean
and standard deviation is identical up to the fourth decimal. However, all techniques
underestimate the frequency of service usages, resulting in an overestimated ”within”
standard deviation. With a large dataset, it is argued, that it is beneficial to have only
one complete dataset. Interestingly, with great variable insight, simple interpolation
proved to work remarkably well for ceratin variables. Test results for the latter,
showed that one is able to perfectly estimate the true value in 97% of the case with
a 50% missing rate. When applied, the imputation strategy is used on 1.9% of the
total 7,951,682 observations on 154,839 patients.
Documenting the process of constructing the dataset, we naturally focus on the
HBR context. However, the process could be replicated for other new interventions of
special interest, like new home-based e-health services. Apparently the value-added
of our contribution can be derived from the fact that the process described below
can be implemented in a wide range of health care related research problems. Future
researchers can benefit from the experiences we outline.
Chapter IV: The health cost effects of home-based reablement:
Empirical evidence from Norway
The Western world is facing significant demographic change, and Norway is no excep-
tion. For the last decade, the Norwegian population growth rate has exceeded that of
other European countries, a trend that will continue in the near future (Leknes et al.,
2018). Norwegian population projections indicate that by 2060, every fifth citizen
will be 70 years of age or older. As the population of older adults grows, the number
of individuals facing age-related diseases, along with the number of diseases occurring
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simultaneously within the same person, i.e., multimorbidity, will increase (Barnett
et al., 2012). In a recent paper by Eckardt et al., 2017, it is shown that health care
costs tend to increase with the number of comorbidities. The estimated cost of long-
term care to people over 65 years of age will double or triple by 2050 in countries in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Oliveira Martins and
Maisonneuve, 2007).
In this paper, I examine the individual cost effect of HBR, compared to usual
care. The present study is the first large-scale attempt to estimate the cost effects
of HBR, including services from all key Norwegian healthcare providers. This is
made possible by merging three national health registers in Norway at the individual
level, creating a unique monthly panel explained in Chapter III. Estimating the cost
effect of HBR based on individual data poses some interesting econometric challenges.
Due to the individuality of the treatment, one should allow for heterogeneous effects
in a dynamic model because current overall health costs naturally are affected by
previous costs. This needs to be addressed in a setting where variables and the
error term are cross-sectionally dependent. Since it is difficult to argue that the
factors driving the cross-section dependence in the variables and error term are not
correlated, standard estimators might contain bias. To avoid this problem, a recent
large N and T estimator developed by Chudik and Pesaran, 2015 is used, and an
introduction to the estimator is provided.
The results indicate that HBR patients on average have lower costs after treatment
than non-HBR patients. For the main treatment variable, the estimated monthly
short-run total cost savings varies between -4,875 and -6,007 NOK. This includes
the first period of HBR and the entire subsequent period. On average, the mean
length of the main binary treatment variable is over 15 months. The short-run effect
translates into a predicted long-run cost reduction effect between -4,637 and -6,373
NOK. Moreover, the cost reduction increases as the time horizon between the first
HBR period and the observation period increases. The effect is mainly found in
specialist health services, which is a different area from where the intervention is
implemented. Interestingly, especially for policy-makers, no effect is shown for men
when regressions are conditioned on gender. Explaining the gender difference could
be of interest for future research. All results pass a series of robustness tests.
The present study is not without limitations. One limitation, is that one are
not able to use the function group variables in the regression because of endogeneity
issues. Both groups have equal scores the period before the first entry into the service.
However, the function scores prior to first entry are based on only the few patients
who received some other service, such as a support person. Most persons in the sample
actually have a zero function score prior to the first entry. The dataset therefore does
not contain any good measure of the function level prior to first entry. Lagged costs
are potentially the best measure available in the dataset. Costs should reflect service
usage, and service usage should to some degree reflect function or sickness level. The
model used controls for all unobserved time-invariant factors and potential trends,
so a large degree of uncertainty could be captured. However, one cannot completely
rule out the possibility that the effects observed above are solely due to HBR itself;
they might also capture some unobserved pre-treatment functional differences or other
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unobserved time-varying changes. Such a change could be motivated by HBR patients
changing their motivation for living more healthfully with increased knowledge after
treatment. The effect could therefore be caused by a change in the mental state and
not due to HBR training per se. Either way, HBR had a positive effect, what causes
the effect would just differ.
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Home-based reablement (HBR) aims to restore or increase a patient’s level of functioning,
thereby increasing the patient’s self-reliance and consequently decreasing their dependence
on healthcare services. To date, the evidence on whether HBR is an efficient method has not
been comprehensively reviewed. The aim of this study was to provide a concise summary
of relevant existing findings. In addition, we provide a critical constructive assessment of
the publications reflecting the extant research. The relevant literature on this topic was
identified through a systematic search of appropriate databases. Thereafter, we screened
the studies, first by title, followed by abstract and then by assessing full-text eligibility. A
checklist of 15 criteria was developed and used as the basis for the quality assessment. In
total, 11 studies from Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Norway were included in the
full-text review. The studies reported estimated cost differences between HBR and usual
care after the intervention. All the studies indicated lower costs for HBR, but not all of
them reported a significant difference. The same pattern was also found for other measures
of physical functioning and quality of life. The assessment revealed one specific common
pattern: None of the papers scrutinized provided sufficient information about the data or
the statistics employed, and all lacked external validity. Some promising results have been
reported with respect to HBR reducing the need for specialist or residential care. In short,
the existing evidence regarding the effects of HBR is still inconclusive. The findings from
the quality assessment should motivate a multidisciplinary approach for future research on
HBR.
Keywords: Reablement, economic/econometric evaluation, rehabilitation, RCT tech-
nology, assessment tool
JEL classification: I19, C18




The western world is facing a significant demographic change in the years to come.
These forthcoming developments are expected to lead to a persisting change in the
age distribution of the population. As the elderly population grows, the number
of individuals facing age-related diseases and multimorbidity will increase (Barnett
et al., 2012). Costs of healthcare services increase with age and with the degree of
multimorbidity (Yoon et al., 2014). According to Oliveira Martins and Maisonneuve,
2007, the costs of long-term care for people over 65 years old are predicted to double or
triple by 2050 in countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). Along with these upcoming demographic challenges, the
number of participants in the workforce per senior citizen in OECD countries will
decrease (OECD).
The increasing costs, economic and otherwise, resulting from the increased need for
care will have to be shared by a decreasing proportion of employed individuals. The
upcoming challenges will increase the demand for long-term services as home-based
care (Ryburn et al., 2009). Since home-based care is more cost-effective, many high-
income countries are actively bolstering a shift from residential care to home-based
care as a potentially more effective and financially sustainable approach (Cochrane et
al., 2013). Another incentive for this shift is that older people prefer to ‘age in place’
(Wiles et al., 2011). The forthcoming challenges will force the healthcare industry to
focus more on preventive measures, early intervention, increased use of technology,
rehabilitation and healthcare services that are less manpower-intensive, and services
that empower senior citizens to self-manage chronic diseases (W.H.O, 2012).
Home-based reablement (HBR), known as restorative care in Australia, the USA
and New Zealand, is one fairly new way of providing homecare services. The main goal
of HBR is to restore or increase a patient’s level of functioning, thereby increasing
the patient’s self-reliance and consequently decreasing their dependence on health-
care services. Even though HBR is not a standardized treatment and the content of
HBR varies, all such interventions intend to restore or increase the level of function-
ing (Tuntland et al., 2014; Whitehead et al., 2015). This type of intervention has
gained significant prominence internationally in recent years (Cochrane et al., 2013).
HBR represents an ecological approach, taking into account patients’ preferences and
resources. The main features of being time-limited, multidisciplinary, home-based,
goal-oriented and person-centred are homogenous across HBR programmes. Patients
are mainly senior citizens with or at risk of functional decline (Aspinal et al., 2016).
Typically, a multidisciplinary team works towards a patient-defined goal that focuses
on everyday activities important to the patient (Tuntland et al., 2014). When de-
veloping an HBR model, Baker et al., 2001 learned that several traditional homecare
routines created barriers for functional independence in older patients. They also
agreed that involving the patient in goal setting was essential. One might expect that
HBR may lead to increased risks of falling, injury or other adverse events. There is
evidence that reablement in nursing homes does not have such effects (Gruber-Baldini
et al., 2011). We are not aware of similar evidence concerning HBR. A Danish study
concluded that policy-makers mainly motivated by economic considerations were piv-
4
I.2. METHODS
otal for the implementation of HBR (Fersch, 2015). High-quality care is clearly an
essential goal in health care services, but future resources are limited, inevitably lead-
ing to priority setting and trade-offs (Emmert et al., 2012). Assessing the efficiency
and effects of new interventions, including HBR, is therefore crucial.
To our knowledge, there are few comprehensive and systematic overviews of re-
search relating to the effects of HBR. Interestingly, no HBR studies were included in
an overview of systematic reviews on economic evaluations of health-related rehabili-
tation (Howard-Wilsher et al., 2016). Five HBR studies were included in a systematic
review identifying interventions that aimed to reduce dependency in activities of daily
living (ADL) (Whitehead et al., 2015). The latter review had two objectives, of which
the second was to determine the effect an intervention had on improving a person’s
ADL. HBR could have effects on factors other than ADL. The two studies most similar
to our paper are those by Legg et al., 2016 and “Effectiveness of Reablement: A Sys-
tematic Review”, both systematic reviews from 2016. “Effectiveness of Reablement:
A Systematic Review” examined the effectiveness of HBR and factors that might
contribute to successful implementation for Canadian policy makers. They focused
on three outcomes, function, health-related quality of life (HRQoL) and service uti-
lization, concluding that there is good evidence supporting the effectiveness of HBR,
especially regarding HRQoL and service utilization. Interestingly, Legg et al., 2016
studied whether publicly funded HBR affects patient health or use of services. They
found no data suitable for evaluating the effects of HBR and concluded that there is
no evidence that HBR fulfils its goals. In sum, previous reviews either focus on minor
aspects of potential benefits of HBR alone or do not include studies on HBR, as such
studies failed to meet the inclusion criteria defined by the respective reviewers. It
is therefore the objective of this paper to provide a comprehensive and systematic
review of current literature assessing HBR through empirical evaluation. First, we
aim to provide a concise summary of relevant existing findings generated in the course
of the research process. In addition, we provide a critical constructive assessment of
the publications reflecting the extant research. The application of statistical concepts
and models plays a central role in the research efforts we analysed. Consequently,
our review adopts a dual perspective: the health-economic angle is augmented by a
pronounced statistical/econometric viewpoint.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section I.2, we outline the
methodological basis for the systematic review. The main findings from relevant HBR
research are summarized, and the results of our literature assessment are presented
in Section I.3. Section I.4 provides a thorough discussion of the results. A short
selection of concluding remarks in Section I.5 finalizes the paper.
I.2 Methods
I.2.1 Systematic search
With the aim of providing a comprehensive systematic review of the relevant scientific
literature on HBR, we designed and implemented a sufficiently sensitive search and
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selection strategy. To optimize our search design, we relied on the expertise of an expe-
rienced librarian. Given the intrinsically multidisciplinary nature of HBR, we needed
to extend our search to multiple databases covering the fields of medicine, health care,
social work and economics. Thus, the search algorithms were applied in the digital
databases Scopus, EBSCOhost, CINAHL Plus (with full text), MEDLINE, Academic
Search Complete, SocINDEX, Social Work Abstracts, Business Source Complete and
Econlit. The development of the search syntax reflects the terminological uncertainty
concerning HBR as well as our goal to allow for the location of publications that assess
the economic dimension of the care strategy studied. The search results discussed be-
low are based on the string “(reablement OR re-ablement OR restorative W/3 (home
OR care)) AND (economic* OR cost* OR evaluation*)”, where the sub-command
“restorative W/3 (home OR care)” indicated that we were looking for instances in
which either the term “home” or the term “care” can be found within a three-word-
neighbourhood of the term “restorative”. No search filters were applied, and the same
search string was used on all databases. The initial search was performed on 2016-03-
17. It resulted in a total of 554 records. Consecutive updates were run on 2016-08-03,
2017-11-15 and 2019-09-04. All databases were searched on the same search date.
Figure I.1 shows the main steps of our sequential search and selection process.
I.2.2 Eligibility criteria
While the first stage of the literature search relied on algorithms, the second stage
involved the authors functioning as “human classifiers”. Our work was guided by a
predefined list of inclusion and exclusion criteria. A study qualified for inclusion if it
(i-1) contained at least a partial evaluation on some quantifiable economic measure,
both direct and indirect, of HBR, i.e., concepts like “effectiveness”, “benefits” and
“costs” of the treatment were considered, and (i-2) was published in a peer-reviewed
academic journal. To maintain focus on the HBR intervention and to consider only
original research satisfying reasonable design standards, two sets of exclusion criteria
were defined. While the first set centres around characteristics of the intervention
itself (related to particular branches of medicine and institutional/organizational as-
pects), the second set refers to features of the respective research study. Specifically,
we agreed to exclude studies of reablement (e-1) closely linked to dental health or
paediatrics or (e-2) provided by and in hospitals or nursing homes. Moreover, an
article was excluded if (e-3) it could be classified as a “conceptual article”, “review
article” or “research protocol”, or if (e-4) it did not assess well-defined comparator in-
terventions, as traditional care or other. Titles, abstracts and full texts were checked
against the inclusion and exclusion criteria by at least two authors independently.
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I.2.3 Selection and categorization
One reviewer (TB) organized and carried out the initial search and eventually re-
moved duplicates in sporadic coordination with the co-authors. Following this initial
stage, a stepwise elimination procedure based on (e1)-(e4) was performed. First, two
reviewers (TB, JJ) collaborated to filter records by keywords appearing in the title
and the journal name. The keywords used for this purpose were ”dental”, ”dentist”,
”caries”, ”children”, ”oral”, and ”surgery”. For all matches, titles were screened and
records removed if required. In the second stage, two reviewers (TB, JJ) indepen-
dently screened the remaining titles. In almost 80% of those cases, the reviewers came
to a unanimous decision. As a rule, a split decision lead to inclusion of the article in
question. In the following stage, all reviewers independently screened the abstracts
of all remaining records before discussing full-text eligibility. Subsequent searches
and elimination exercises, i.e., those referred to as ”updates” in Figure 1, followed
an analogous procedure with different roles assigned to the reviewers. During the
update(s), one reviewer (TB) performed the filtering process on all new titles. Subse-
quently, the reviewers (TB, EA) screened the remaining titles for abstract eligibility.
While the first update lead to the inclusion of five new records, no additional articles
could be identified during the second update. Next, each reviewer independently read
and analysed the articles identified in the previous stages to decide on their full-text
eligibility. Finally, following a discussion, the team of reviewers reached a consensus
on the pool of studies to be included in this review.
We chose to categorize the final included studies. The categorization of Emmert
et al., 2012 is constructive, since, in addition to providing an overview of the types of
studies included in this review, it also generates the structure for the presentation of
our results in Section I.3. Studies that focus on cost and other consequences regarding
economic efficiency were grouped into Category 1. If studies analysed the impact of
HBR on both cost and consequences but did not clearly differentiate between the two,
they were still included in this category. Studies evaluating health benefits for patients
were placed in Category 2. Category 3 includes articles that assess the consequences of
HBR on health-service usage. One could argue that reduced service usage is beneficial
for the patient and should therefore be a part of Category 2. However, an effect on
service usage could also have a direct monetary effect. The latter argument motivates
the consideration of an additional category. Studies with multiple outcome measures
were categorized by their primary outcome measure.
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Figure I.1: Flow chart that captures the main steps of our sequential search and selection
process
I.2.4 Quality assessment
A 35-point checklist from Drummond and Jefferson, 1996 is often used as a quality
assessment tool for health-economic evaluations. These guidelines contain 10 sections
under three headings: study design, data collection and analysis, and interpretation
of results. A similar instrument has been proposed by Drummond et al., 2005, p. 27.
In our view, these tools are particularly suited for the assessment of classic economic
evaluation studies focusing on cost-effects analysis. Not all of the studies included
in our review were designed for this purpose. Therefore, we saw the need to devise
an instrument suitable for the assessment of research papers that are related to the
complex topic of HBR. The resulting tool (c.f. Table I.1) is rooted in the research
and publication culture of economics, econometrics, and statistics. Those areas of
expertise are represented by two of the reviewers (TB, JJ). The questions in this
instrument target four different aspects of a research effort: i) general introduction,
ii) data sampling and description, iii) statistics and iv) external validity. By describing
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the scheme of this instrument to the reader, we will allow our review process to be
transparent and comprehensible. Moreover, the instrument serves as the basis of a
rough scoring scheme applied to the papers included in this review. Our checklist
contains 15 different questions, each checking for a specific attribute of the study
scrutinized. Given the binary scaling (yes (1) or no (0)), the total score of a paper
will range from 0 to 15 points. The scores reflected in the remainder of the paper
were generated in a 2-stage process. After independently scoring the HBR studies,
two reviewers (TB, JJ) discussed their decisions and agreed on a final score.
Prior to presenting results, a caveat should be mentioned. The scores described
should be interpreted in a sensible manner. A low score is not necessarily indicative
of a low quality of the research reported; it may just reflect the fact that the article
assessed by means of our instrument came from an area of science in which publication
standards differ from those in economics, econometrics and statistics or was published
in a journal that does not emphasize certain standards to reach a specific clientele. It
should be evident that our tool is not intended to denigrate the valuable work of our
colleagues but instead is of a constructive nature, which should be emphasized. Use
of this tool is meant to support the transparency of our review process and help to
reveal differences in the publication culture across disciplines. In that sense, the tool
might produce a rough indication regarding the state of HBR literature.
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1 Does the research question
identify the outcome(s) of
interest?
A well-formulated question clearly identifies the
type of effects the study seeks out to investigate.
This clearly informs the reader about the aim of
the study.




The research question should identify the alter-
native treatment(s) being compared. It will in-
form the reader about the relevant sphere of the
health services studied.
3 Are the important stake-
holders identified?
Health systems vary across countries. One fac-
tor that causes this variation is the incorpo-
ration of different stakeholders. The reference
to the major stakeholders in the study con-
text makes the reader aware of a key institu-
tional characteristic of the health system under
scrutiny. Important stakeholders include pa-
tients, health service providers, institutes, in-
surance companies, municipalities and govern-
ments.
4 Is the study context clearly
defined?
The motivation for and the background of the
study should be understood by the reader. This
includes the motivation for implementing and
testing HBR.
5 Are the alternatives be-
ing compared clearly de-
scribed?
Detailed descriptions of the treatment alterna-
tives will enable the reader to comprehend the
typical service profiles provided. The natural
baseline for HBR is ‘usual care’ which will vary
across individuals, and therefore cannot be de-
scribed in every case. We expect that the au-
thors provide a clear description of the most
common service provided to the reference group.
6 Are methods for evaluat-
ing health states and other
benefits described?
The readers should be able to understand all
methods used for evaluation. Authors should
not assume that every reader is familiar with all
existing instruments for measuring health. It
is therefore essential that a short description of
each instrument is provided.
Continued on next page
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7 Are the necessary scales
for the methods used de-
scribed?
A description of an evaluation method is incom-
plete without information about the scales of the
methods. Only a reader who knows the scaling
will be able to fully comprehend and appreciate
the results of the study.
8 Is the sampling procedure
clearly described?
The sampling procedure should be described in
detail. If different instruments where used, then
the interview setting should be described. Are
data extracted from different databases, then
the content of each source should be described.
Authors should provide details of the dataset
used and inform the reader on aspects such as
timeframe, frequency, number of observations
etc.
9 Does the paper provide a
clear data description?
All empirical economic papers should provide a
table of descriptive statistics and describe the
data based on the table. Providing a table of
baseline descriptive statistics without describing







10 Is the choice of statisti-
cal methods used discussed
and justified?
Statistical models are based on assumptions,
that implies that they have strengths and weak-
nesses. Most of these models are designed for
different settings and types of data. As the
choice of statistical methods could have a direct
influence on the results, authors should explain
their choice of methods based on the sampling
procedure and their research setting.
11 Are assumptions under-
lying statistical methods
used discussed and ad-
dressed explicitly?
Typically, the operational characteristics of sta-
tistical methods are known conditional on a set
of assumptions being fulfilled. A violation of
such assumptions might seriously affect statisti-
cal validity. Ramifications in the context of the
study should be discussed and addressed when-
ever possible.
12 Are alternative statistical
estimators discussed?
The researchers should carefully motivate the
statistical estimators used. Notably they should
reflect the main drawbacks of potential alterna-
tive estimators in the specific research setting.
13 Is the data analytical part
of the study replicable?
Replicability is regarded as an important re-
quirement for studies published in the field of
economics. Given the dataset and the methodi-
cal description in the paper, an independent re-
searcher should be able to replicate the results.
Continued on next page
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14 Has the study a large de-
gree of external validity?
External validity is essential for a policy-maker
who is considering the implementation of HBR.
Several studies are not designed for providing
information beyond their study setting. Studies
with low degree of external validity should not
be the basis of a policy-makers’ decision. Stud-
ies lacking external validity may still be inter-
esting in terms of learning about and developing
HBR.
15 Is the study grounded in
the relevant theory?
Research procedures are often designed to re-
veal treatment efficacy rather than unsheathe
the causes leading to the efficacy of a treat-
ment. Deaton (2010) argues that RCTs focus-
ing on “whether”, are not informative about the
mechanisms that cause a treatment to work. He
suggests that learning about theory, or mecha-
nisms, requires that the investigation should be
targeted towards that theory. Studies, RCTs
or non-experimental, that are not theoretically
grounded are unlikely to provide any external
validity.
I.3 Results
The search strategy identified 338 potentially relevant studies after discarding dupli-
cates. The fulltexts of 22 studies were assessed after screening titles and abstracts.
The 12 articles that met our eligibility criteria are presented in Table 2. Three stud-
ies were associated with Category 1. Two of these evaluate cost and consequences
separately. Five studies were assigned to Category 2. Category 3 included four stud-
ies, but three of them had secondary outcome measures that fit Category 2. Of the
12 studies identified, five were conducted in Australia, three in New Zealand, three
in Norway and two in the US. All studies included in this review had a maximum
intervention period of three months. The Australian HBR model specifically targets
patients with low to medium levels of need (Lewin et al., 2008), whereas the HBR
interventions in other cases target frailer, older patients on the verge of residential
care (Senior et al., 2014). The other studies included did not have a directly specified
target group in terms of needs. In all reviewed studies, the multidisciplinary teams
were composed of a physiotherapist, occupational therapist and a nurse. One of the
team members functioned as a care manager for each client (Lewin et al., 2016).
For data synthesis, a narrative qualitative synthesis of the eligible studies was exe-
cuted. HBR is a personalized intervention and studies included have a heterogeneous
range of outcome measures, we were therefore unable to do a meta-analysis.
12
I.3. RESULTS
I.3.1 Category 1 - Costs and consequences
Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016 carried out a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of HBR
using data from the first randomized controlled trial (RCT) on HBR conducted in
Europe (Tuntland et al., 2015). The recruited sample consisted of 61 participants
randomized to HBR (n = 31) or usual care (n = 30), but the CEA was conducted on
a sample of 46 participants (HBR = 25 and control = 21). All participants were fully
assessed at baseline, 3 months and 9 months. Self-perceived activity performance and
satisfaction with performance were chosen as effectiveness measures. Cost data were
based on individual registrations of the number of home visits, duration of each visit
and profession of service delivered. There was no significant difference in the mean
cost per participant during the intervention period (3 months), but the HBR group
had, on average, fewer but longer visits compared to the control group. At the 9-
month follow-up (6 months post-intervention period), the authors found a significant
difference in mean cost per visit in favour of HBR. However, the difference of 1.5 e1
(14.7 NOK) was modest. There was no statistically significant difference in mean cost
per participant. The mean changes between baseline, 3- and 9-month follow-up for
both effectiveness measures were significant. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
for the intervention period were -89.5 e1 (-868.2 NOK) for the activity performance
measure and -68.7 e1 (-666.3 NOK) in terms of satisfaction with performance.
Using data from an Australian RCT (Lewin et al., 2013a), Lewin et al., 2014
examined the use of healthcare services and the associated costs of HBR compared
to conventional care. Participants were compared at baseline and after 1- and 2-year
follow-ups. Seven hundred fifty participants were included, with 375 in each group
for the intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis. For the actual treatment (AT) analysis,
310 participants were included in the HBR group, 395 were in the control group,
and 45 participants were excluded. The mean homecare costs per participant were
different over the first year and the overall 2-year period in favour of the HBR group.
The differences were 959 e2 (745 e2) and AU$1,511 (AU$1,174) for the AT (ITT)
analysis after the first year and 1,886 e2 (1,613 e2) and AU$2,971 (AU$2,541) overall.
A significantly lower proportion of HBR participants compared to conventional care
patients were approved for residential or equivalent homecare at the end of the study.
The HBR group had a 30% reduced risk for emergency department presentation in the
AT analysis. Over the 2-year period, the AT (ITT) analysis indicated that total costs
per participant for all hospital admissions were 825 e2 (194 euro2) and AU$1,299
(AU$306) lower for HBR participants than control patients. Additionally, the HBR
group had a reduced risk for unplanned hospital admission in the AT analysis. Over
the 2-year period, the mean aggregated cost per participant was lower for the HBR
group, and the difference was 1,821 e2 (AU$2,869) in the ITT analysis and 2,754 e2
(AU$4,338) in the AT analysis. The HBR group was significantly less costly in the
first year and over the total 2-year period in the AT analysis only. The results for the
1Exchange rates from 06.02.2018. Collected from the Norwegian national bank, 1 e= 9.7005
NOK.




second year alone did not show a significant difference. Randomization of participants
was compromised, and there was some measurement bias in hours of service.
In a retrospective study, Lewin et al., 2013b investigated whether individuals using
HBR reduced their need for ongoing services and had lower homecare costs compared
to those receiving usual care. By linking several data sources, the authors created
a dataset with 10,368 individuals and a time period of 57 months. The individuals
received usual care or either of two different HBR versions. In the first HBR version
the patients were referred from the community, and in the second version patients were
discharged from the hospital. For the second HBR version, the maximum intervention
period was 8 weeks and not the standard 12 weeks. The need for ongoing services was
measured by a binary yes/no variable and used as an outcome variable in a regression
framework. HBR users referred from either the community or a hospital were less
likely to use ongoing services over the first 3 years compared to those getting usual
care. This effect persisted over the whole time period for HBR users who were referred
from the community. Quantile regression was used when making cost comparisons at
3, 12, 24, 36, 48 and 57 months. The costs for both HBR groups were substantially
less than that for conventional care over the observation period. The median savings
per HBR participant after 57 months amounted to more than 7,935 e2 (AU$12,500)
in both HBR groups.
I.3.2 Category 2 - Health benefits
A cluster RCT conducted in New Zealand by King et al., 2012 examined the im-
pact of HBR versus usual care and applied HRQoL as the primary outcome. The
following secondary outcomes were included: functional mobility, sense of control and
social support network. All outcome data were collected at baseline and at 4- and
7-month follow-ups with structured face-to-face interviews. In total, 186 participants
were included at baseline with 93 participants in each group. At the final 7-month
assessment, 157 participants remained, 76 in the HBR group and 81 in the control
group. HRQoL was measured by the 36-Item Short Form Health Survey (SF363), an
instrument that generates an overall score between 0 and 100, with larger numbers
indicating better HRQoL. The instrument also provides separate mental and physical
subscores. After adjusting for baseline demographics, the SF36 overall score differ-
ences were statistically significant at the 10% level in favour of the HBR group. The
mean difference in SF36 score from baseline to 7 months was 3.8. Splitting the SF36
into the two different components indicated significant results for the mental subscore
only. This suggests that HBR may improve HRQoL. For all the secondary outcomes,
no evidence for significant differences between the groups was found.
The study by Lewin and Vandermeulen, 2010, which used data collected from
2001 to 2003, is the first Australian evaluation study included in this review. Using
a non-randomized design, they investigated whether HBR participants had better
personal and service outcomes compared to those receiving usual care. Data were




confidence and well-being. All participants were assessed at baseline, 3 months and
1 year. One hundred participants were included in each group at baseline. At the
1-year follow-up, there were 67 HBR participants remaining and 73 participants in
the control group. The HBR group scored significantly worse on all measures at
baseline compared with those getting usual care. At both follow-ups, the HBR group
showed improvements in all measures, whereas the participants receiving usual care
remained mostly the same. These differences were significant when examined by the
Mann-Whitney U-test. The regression analysis also confirmed these results for all
measures except the Philadelphia Geriatric Morale Scale4. HBR participants also
had a statistically significant decrease in the probability of needing ongoing services.
The latter analysis was adjusted for baseline differences between the two groups. The
authors pinpointed three major limitations: some potential selection bias, a lack of
independent data to confirm the service outcomes and a lack of clinical information.
Parsons et al., 2013 used a clustered RCT to determine whether HBR improves
physical functioning and social support compared to standard care. The study in-
cluded 205 participants at baseline, and 197 remained at the 6-month follow-up (106
HBR patients and 91 traditional care patients). The researchers who completed the
assessments were experienced and were blinded to group allocation. Physical function-
ing was measured by the Short Physical Performance Battery (SPPB5). The SPPB
test contains three elements: standing balance, timed walk and timed rising/sitting
from a chair. The results were interpreted conservatively, because the p-values were
not corrected for multiple testing. Therefore, a 1% significance level was used in the
primary analysis, and all evaluations followed the ITT principle. The HBR group had
a significantly greater mean increase in overall SPPB score and in the walk component
over time compared to the usual care group. There was no difference between the two
groups in the balance or chair-stand components. Social support showed no difference
over time between the two groups. In addition, there was no evidence for a significant
relationship between allied health referrals and improvement in physical functioning
over time. The authors argue that there is considerable ambiguity in determining
whether a clinically meaningful change in physical function can be associated with
HBR.
Tuntland et al., 2015 carried out the first RCT on HBR in Europe. The goal
was to evaluate the effect of HBR compared to usual care on self-perceived activity
performance and satisfaction with performance. Secondary outcomes were physical
functioning and HRQoL. Sixty-one participants were randomized to HBR or usual
care, and assessments were done at baseline and at 3- and 9-month follow-ups. At the
last follow-up, 25 participants remained in the HBR group and 26 in usual care. The
main outcome was measured by the Canadian Occupational Performance Measure
(COPM6), and all analyses followed the ITT principle and used a significance level
of 5%. There was a significant mean difference in COPM-Performance at both the
3- and 9-month follow-ups. For COPM-Satisfaction, there was only a significant






were adjusted for baseline values. The 9-month mean difference was 1.4 for both
performance and satisfaction, which is below the cut-off value of 2. According to the
COPM manual, this indicates a clinically relevant change. The authors acknowledge
this value but also argue that there is a lack of evidence supporting this cut-off
value. All the secondary outcomes were insignificant after 3 and 9 months. The
study constraints rendered it inevitable that the same healthcare personnel provided
services to both groups.
Langeland et al., 2019 presents the results of a multicentre, clinical controlled trial
involving 47 municipalities in Norway. Primary outcome was self-perceived activity
performance and satisfaction with performance measured with COPM, and the ITT
principle was followed for all analyses. At baseline, 707 participants were in the HBR
group and 121 participants received usual care. The remaining participants at 12-
month follow-up was 294 and 54 respectively. Significant mean effects were found in
favour of HBR on COPM-Performance and COPM-Satisfaction, both at 10 weeks and
6-moth follow-up. The 6-month mean difference was 1.4 for both COPM-Performance
and COPM-Satisfaction. A series of secondary outcomes was measured with different
instruments. Physical function, measured with SPPB, showed significant treatment
effect in favour for HBR at both 6- and 9-month follow up. Health-related quality
of life was measured with The European Quality of Life Scale (EQ-5D-5 L7), which
contain a questionnaire and a visual analogue scale. The latter test showed significant
treatment effect in mobility, personal care, usual activities and current health at the
6-month follow-up. Sense of coherence, measured with Sense of Coherence Question-
naire8, showed at 6-months follow-up significant effect in favour of the HBR group.
Interestingly, all measures, except SPPB, were insignificant at the 12-month follow-up
using a significance level of 5%.
I.3.3 Category 3 - Health services usage
An Australian RCT carried out by Lewin et al., 2013a investigated whether individu-
als receiving HBR had less need for ongoing services compared to those getting usual
care. In the follow-up study by Lewin et al., 2014 that is based on the same RCT
data, the main outcome was a binary variable (yes/no) representing the need for on-
going personal care services. Data were collected at baseline and at 3 months and 12
months. The study also included secondary outcomes by examining functional status
and quality of life (QoL) in a subgroup recruited within the RCT group. For the AT
(ITT) analysis, 294 (300) participants were recruited to this subgroup at baseline.
At the 12-month follow-up, 192 (198) participants remained, and 100 (88) of these
received HBR. Using logistic regression adjusted for baseline covariates, HBR was
found to significantly reduce the probability of using ongoing services. These results
hold for the ITT and AT analyses in both follow-ups. Regarding functional status,
there was a significant difference between the groups at the 12-month follow-up. Func-
tional dependency increased for the usual care group between the 3- and 12-month





for baseline covariates and were only significant in the AT analysis. QoL showed no
significant difference between groups.
Using an RCT design, Senior et al., 2014 examined whether HBR participants
reduced their need for permanent residential care over a 24-month period. The study
also included secondary outcomes focusing on functional and social health, which
were measured at the 18-month follow-up. Patients received HBR either at home
or in a short-term facility, and results were not presented separately for the different
locations. A total of 105 participants were recruited, with 52 in the HBR group and 53
that received usual care. Only 17 participants were included in the 18-month follow-
up, with 11 in the HBR group and 6 receiving usual care. All patients included were at
high risk of residential care placement. Research assistants performed randomization
and data collection. Data were collected on a laptop either at the older person’s
residence or at the respective short-term care facility. The ITT principle was used
in all analyses. A Cox proportional hazard model with covariates was used for the
primary outcome. For the combined primary outcome of death or residential care,
there were no statistically significant results. The insignificant result was a 24%
reduction in favour of HBR regarding the probability of residential care or death.
Additionally, all the secondary outcomes showed no statistically significant differences
after 18 months. The authors also argued that the lack of blinding constituted a
limitation.
Tinetti et al., 2002 investigated functional status and the likelihood of remaining
at home for persons receiving HBR versus usual care in a real-world setting. This
controlled clinical trial compared usual care with HBR in areas like functional status,
likelihood of remaining at home, duration and intensity of the homecare episode,
emergency visits to a physician and emergency department (ED) visits. There were
691 HBR users included, and from a pool of potential control participants, 691 pairs
were created using an algorithm based on several covariates. A subset of 382 pairs
was created for patients remaining at home after the completion of either HBR or
usual care. Data on functional outcomes were only available for this subset. The
descriptive and outcome data used were based on patient records. HBR patients were
significantly more likely to remain at home after completion of the homecare episode.
The study showed no significant difference in the likelihood of visits to a physician’s
office. HBR patients were less than half as likely to have an ED visit during the
homecare episode. Patients in the HBR group had significantly shorter homecare
durations compared to those getting usual care. All these results were adjusted for
baseline covariates. Discharge scores for self-care, home management and mobility
were all slightly significantly higher for HBR users.
Tinetti et al., 2012 aimed to analyse the frequency of hospital readmissions for
HBR compared to usual care after an acute hospitalization. Based on data from
the original clinical trial study (Tinetti et al., 2002), 864 participants were admitted
to homecare after discharge from an acute hospital stay and were therefore eligible
for this study. In total, 770 participants were included, comprising 341 matched
pairs and 88 additional unmatched participants. Outcome variables were hospital
readmission and length of homecare episode. The algorithm previously used in Tinetti
et al., 2002 was applied to generate matched pairs. All descriptive and outcome data
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came from the patient records of the original study. The main outcome variable,
hospital readmission, was measured using a binary (yes/no) scale. The mean length of
homecare episodes was significantly different between the two groups. The HBR group
mean length was shorter than that of the control group. According to a conditional
logistic regression analysis, HBR participants were 32% less likely to be readmitted
than participants receiving usual care in the matched pair analysis. For the unmatched
analysis, the corresponding result was 29%. The statistical significance was only











Table I.2: Characteristics of the included studies













Norway RCT May 2012
to Feb
2014
Applying or referred for
homecare service (18+)
and had functional de-
cline in one or more daily
activities of living (ADL)
Not able to understand
Norwegian, were in need
for residential care or re-
habilitation, terminally










Australia RCT Jun 2005
to Aug
2007
Assessed and eligible for
homecare service (65+)
due to ongoing difficul-
ties with ADL and re-
ferred for personal care
Not able to communi-
cate in English, require
acute or post-acute care,
known diagnosis of de-
mentia or terminal ill-
ness, complex care need








Australia RLS Jan 2004
to Dec
2008
Assessed and eligible for
homecare service (65+)
due to ongoing difficul-
ties with ADL. Referred
from the community or
discharged from hospital
Not able to communicate
in English, known diag-
















sistance (65+) from the
agency included in the
study
Unable to participate
in the interview due
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Australia PLS 2001 -
2003
Assessed and eligible for
homecare service (60+)
due to ongoing difficul-
ties with ADL and re-
ferred for domestic or
personal care
Not able to communi-
cate in English, require
acute or post-acute care,
known diagnosis of de-

















new referrals for home-
care (65+)
Severe cognitive impair-
ment and referral for as-
sessment for admission
to residential care, care
support, or short-term
service




Norway RCT May 2012
to Feb
2014
Applying or referred for
homecare service (18+)
and had functional de-
cline in one or more daily
activities of living (ADL)
Not able to understand
Norwegian, were in need
for residential care or re-
habilitation, terminally

















Were in needed for
institution-based re-
habilitation or nursing
home placement, or ter-
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Australia RCT Jun 2005
to Aug
2007
Assessed and eligible for
homecare service (65+)
due to ongoing difficul-
ties with ADL, and re-
ferred for personal care
Not able to communi-
cate in English, require
acute or post-acute care,
known diagnosis of de-
mentia or other progres-
sive neurological disor-














clinical team or regional
geriatric assessment





tial care or unable to
communicate in English
Data collected





USA PLS Nov 1998
to Apr
2000
Person at risk of func-
tional decline after acute
illness or hospitalization
(65+), but with poten-




ment, requiring total as-
sistance with care and
not bedridden
Client database 3 6
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USA PLS Nov 1998
to Apr
2000
Person at risk of func-
tional decline after acute
illness or hospitalization
(65+), but with poten-




ment, requiring total as-
sistance with care and
not bedridden
Client database 3 5
Abbreviation: RCT = Randomized controlled trail; RCS = Retrospective longitudinal study; MCT = Mulitcenter controlled trial;




Next, we discuss the results rendered by the application of our assessment tool (cf.
Table I.1, in Section I.2.4) to the papers reviewed above. The detailed scores reflecting
our assessment are presented in Table I.A.1 of the Appendix I.A.
For our sample of 12 papers the range of observed total scores was 0 to 7. The
largest score observed (7) also constitutes the modal score, which was assigned to
5 papers (Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016; Lewin et al., 2013a; Lewin et al., 2013b;
Tuntland et al., 2015; Langeland et al., 2019). Apparently, even the strongest papers
reached only 47% of the maximum possible points. The mean and median total score
were estimated as 5.4 and 6.0, respectively, while the standard deviation was 2.2.
Approximately 83% of the papers received scores of 5, 6 or 7. Two papers were
assigned 2 points or less.
Figure I.2: Total scores for studies by category. Y-axis represents our defined study cate-
gories, and the X-axis represents total scores from our assessment scheme. Maximum possible
score = 15. The triangular symbols represent the total score obtained for different studies,
whereas the red multiplication sign indicates category means. Total scores is presented in
Appendix I.A.
Figure I.2 illustrates the differences in the distribution of scores between the three
categories defined in Section I.2.3. The highest average score (6.3) and the highest
minimum score (5) were found in Category 1 – Costs and Consequences. In Category
2 – Health benefits and Category 3 – Service Outcomes, the average scores were 5.6
and 4.5, respectively. In those categories, the spread of the overall scores around the
mean score exceeded the spread observed for Category 1.
When presenting the total scores of the studies by country of origin and year of
publication as done in Figure I.3 , pronounced differences in means (x) and variances
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across countries became apparent. Two of the studies from Australia received a score
of 7, but since two papers scored less, the Australian studies had an average score
of 6.3. The mean score for the two studies carried out in the US was 5.5. Since two
of the studies originating in New Zealand constitute the lower end of the range of
total scores, the average score for New Zealand was only 2.7. In contrast, the three
Norwegian studies received a score of 7.
Figure I.3: Total scores for studies organized by country. Y-axis are countries of the in-
cluded studies, and the X-axis represents total scores from our assessment scheme. Maximum
possible score = 15. The triangular symbols represent the total score obtained for differ-
ent studies, whereas the red multiplication sign indicates country means. Total scores is
presented in Appendix I.A.
Figure I.3 does not provide evidence for a clear time trend. Nonetheless, it should
be pointed out that the Norwegian studies represent fairly recent efforts. Thus, the
authors of these studies had the chance to learn the shortcomings of earlier publica-
tions, and they effectively avoided them in their subsequent work.
Our descriptive analysis of the total scores attests that the existing HBR literature
contains some heterogeneity but has an overall mediocre quality level. An inspection
of the detailed scores given in Table I.A.1 (cf. appendix) readily reveals the reason
for this assessment. All the papers accumulated scores of 0 on items 10-13 (Statistics)
and items 14 and 15 (External validity). According to our assessment, virtually all the
studies failed to be informative about key aspects of statistical modelling and lacked
external validity. With respect to the former trait, we found only two exceptions.
The study by Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016 scored a 1 on item 10 for their explicit
and careful motivation of the “bootstrap” strategy. The study by Langeland et al.,
2019 scored a point for external validity.
A consequence of the previous observations is that all the existing heterogeneity
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can be attributed to differences in scores for items 1-5 (General introduction) and
items 6-9 (Data).
The aggregated scores for the General Introduction (items 1-5) section ranged be-
tween 0 and 5. The average score was 3.5, which corresponds to 70% of the maximum
possible score. Scaling the standard deviation of 1.4, we obtain a coefficient of varia-
tion of 41%. The modal score of ‘4’ was received by 4 of the studies. On items 1 and
2, which relate to the explanation of the research question, 10 studies received a point
on item 1 and 9 studies received a score of ‘1’ on item 2. In contrast, only 6 studies
were found to identify and describe important stakeholders in an adequate way. Sum-
ming the scores for items 6-9 resulted in scores varying between 0 and 3. The mean
score of 1.8, equivalent to only 44% of the maximum score attainable, indicates that
one can expect a paper from the HBR literature to show deficits in the data focus
area of sampling and description. Note that on item 9, which relates to a clear data
description, only the study by King et al., 2012 received a score of ‘1’. Moreover, only
5 studies were found to describe methods evaluating health states or other benefits
(item 6) in a satisfactory way. Scaling the standard deviation of scores for this focus
area (1.1) by the mean results in a coefficient of variation of 65%. Moreover, 3 studies
(Lewin and Vandermeulen, 2010; Lewin et al., 2013a; Lewin et al., 2013b) with scores
on items 1-5 that exceeded their respective mean scores also had scores larger than
the overall mean for items 6-9. The correlation coefficient between the two sets of
scores was 0.4.
Analysing the outcomes of the assessment process suggests that while a typical
HBR paper describes the motivation and all aspects of the research question in a sat-
isfactory manner, the documentation of data-related issues could clearly be improved.
The latter issue also seems to contribute slightly more to the heterogeneity in quality.
The most striking outcome of the assessment so far is that the majority of the
HBR papers under review failed to be informative about key aspects of the statistical
modelling. This is surprising, since due to the nature of our selection process, all
papers under review appear to rely on statistical methodology. One can group the
techniques implemented into two groups, i) mean comparisons, both parametric and
non-parametric, and ii) regression analyses. Table I.3 lists the different models and












































































































































































































































































































































































































































Apparently, various types of regression models feature prominently in the HBR
literature. According to our assessment, it is a prominent feature of the published
HBR literature that the choice of such a model is virtually never justified. Alternative
modelling approaches are not explicitly discussed. Models are not presented explicitly.
Underlying key assumptions are not documented and it is typically not substantiated
that they hold in light of the data collected. The ‘path’ leading from the data to the
model is not made explicit. This, of course, has negative ramifications for the reader’s
ability to critically appraise the results as well as for the replicability of the research
documented. To be clear on this point, we do not believe that the authors ignored
the stated aspects of statistical modelling in the research process. We simply point
out the fact that, for whatever reason, there is not sufficient space allocated to such
considerations in the publications under scrutiny.
The almost homogenous ‘0’ responses to item 14 regarding external validity sug-
gest that the HBR studies existing so far still lack external validity. Three reasons for
this drawback were typically identified and discussed: (i) small sample size and short
timeframe, (ii) only one service provider or region and (iii) various methodical issues.
These methodical issues arose from selection bias and manipulation of the random-
ization process. Langeland et al., 2019, who received a point for external validity,
differs from other studies as it was conducted in several different areas of Norway
and in a natural setting. However, one would ideally have more patients included
in the control group. Finally, the fact that all studies were assigned a ‘0’ score on
item 15 regarding theoretical foundation does not come as a surprise. Here, we see
the manifestation of a common trend stated by Deaton, 2010 (p. 425), “Econometric
analysis has changed its focus over the years, away from analysis of models derived
from theory toward much looser specifications that are statistical representations of
program evaluation.”
I.4 Discussion
The application of our assessment scheme revealed one specific common pattern
among the studies. In our view, none of the papers scrutinized provided sufficient
information about the data or the statistics employed. Almost all studies lacked
external validity. For questions 9 – 15 (data description, statistics, external valid-
ity), only three points were given. We do not believe that this evidence is indicative
of the quality of the underlying research process. More likely, our findings reflect
an established publication standard idiosyncratic to the health and medical journals
where these studies were published. Failure to provide full information on data and
statistics can create uncertainty in an informed reader. For example, knowledge of
the sampling procedure and the process of data generation is essential for choosing
an identification strategy. Without this information, the reader will not be able to
fully understand the data or the strengths and weaknesses of the study. Ten out
of twelve studies used regression models. The models were not presented. None of
the studies provided information regarding the estimation technique used or possible
adjustments of the standard errors. Not providing this type of essential information
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leads to a lack of transparency that in turn will reduce the replicability of a study.
Thus, our assessment detects a trait of the publication culture that runs counter to
two values we believe should be promoted in social sciences in general and in health
economics in particular.
Since seven of the included studies are RCTs, i.e., randomized experiments, it is
interesting to discuss RCTs more explicitly. The ideal RCT is often considered the
“gold standard” approach for establishing causality. In biostatistics, RCTs are often
viewed as the only credible approach, while experimental evaluations have tradition-
ally been less common in economics (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). One might,
however, argue that a “gold standard” does not exist (Cartwright, 2007). The pri-
mary benefit of an experiment lies in the fact that it solves the selection bias problem,
not by removing the bias but by balancing the bias between the experimental groups
(Heckman and Smith, 1995). Experiments also provide a generalizable estimate of the
treatment effect for the population when the sample size is large (MacLeod, 2017).
The lack of sufficient sample size in the RCT studies reviewed contributes to their
rather low external validity. In the design phase, all studies use power calculations for
determining the target sample size. If one compares those targets to the numbers of
participants included at the last follow-up, only Parsons et al., 2013 meets the num-
ber of participants indicated by their respective power calculation. Providing power
calculations and meeting the indicated estimates does not necessarily translate into a
possibly causal estimated treatment effect. Power calculations are also based on as-
sumptions, and substantial guess work is needed (Duflo et al., 2007). Computing the
results of an RCT is fairly straightforward, as it simply involves comparing the group
means. However, for statistical inference one needs to estimate the standard errors,
which is more complicated (Deaton, 2010). There are several alternatives for testing
the significance of differences in means, but the workhorse for these computations is
regression. As Table 3 indicates, most of the studies included used regression, and six
of the seven RCT studies relied on regression.
Freedman, 2008a points out that it is common practice to adjust data from clinical
trials using regression models and the like, which is also confirmed by the observations
in this study. The standard way of performing a regression on data from clinical trials
is to regress the outcome variable on one assignment variable, including a constant,
and often control for baseline covariates. Freedman, 2008a analyses this model in
detail and concludes that this standard way is nothing like a standard regression. He
shows that the main issue is the dependence between the assignment variable and
the error term, which violates key OLS assumptions. This could bias the estimated
treatment effect substantially in small samples. The bias tends to decrease as the
number of participants increases, but it is possible that a regression without covari-
ates may render superior results. It is difficult to identify the studies in our analysis
that use regression and OLS, but there are clues pointing at two studies (Lewin et
al., 2013a; Parsons et al., 2013). Freedman, 2008b also discuss the issues of using
logit/probit regression on experimental data. His key finding is that randomization
does not justify the assumptions underlying these models because the outcome value
is deterministic given the assignment value. Under a logit model, the outcome vari-
able is interpreted as being random. Consequently, the usual maximum likelihood
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estimates could be inconsistent. The main problem here is not necessarily that these
models have been used, as there are ways to solve the apparent problems, but rather
the lack of discussing potential drawbacks. Freedman, 2008a (p. 13) states this issue
quite sharply: “Practitioners will doubtlessly be heard to object that they know all this
perfectly well. Perhaps, but then why do they so often fit models without discussing
assumptions?” There are some non-technical problems with experiments, and these
are more difficult to solve. Randomized experiments in the social setting often rest on
unstated assumptions, especially considering the behavioural response of the partic-
ipants, whose behaviour is often altered due to the randomization (Heckman, 1991).
Randomization bias, or deviations from assignment, cannot necessarily be treated as
random measurement error and can therefore influence the results (Deaton, 2010).
None of the RCT studies discussed the latter aspects. The RCT technology may
constitute a powerful tool in applied situations when the underlying assumptions are
met. Often these assumptions are not arguably better than assumptions found in
non-experimental econometrics and statistics (Heckman, 1991).
One of the objectives of this paper is to provide an overview of economic evalu-
ations of HBR. Previous reviews either found no data evaluating the effects of HBR
or only concentrated on a few outcome measures (Legg et al., 2016; “Effectiveness of
Reablement: A Systematic Review”). Our review effort differs from earlier attempts,
especially in terms of “wider” inclusion criteria with fewer limitations on study type
and outcome measures. Each of the twelve studies found to be eligible for our review
was assigned to one of three categories. Three studies estimated the cost differences
between HBR and usual care after the intervention, and all showed lower costs for
HBR participants (Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016; Lewin et al., 2013b; Lewin et al.,
2014). However, these results are not clearly significant. In the Norwegian study, the
mean cost difference was not statistically significant (Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016),
and one study did not report significance (Lewin et al., 2013b). For one of the stud-
ies, the significant differences in mean cost differed between the ITT and AT analysis,
with AT showing a significant difference (Lewin et al., 2014). Like the former, the
latter study also includes cost for ED and hospital admissions along with homecare
costs. If one focuses on homecare cost alone, then the potential yearly cost reduction
for HBR seems to range from approximately 800 – 1,700 eper participant. Here,
we have to stress that this is only a rough estimate, and the results of the study
vary greatly with time. This might explain the wide range of potential cost savings.
It seems that the potential savings increase with the length of the post-intervention
period (Lewin et al., 2013b).
Table I.2 exhibits some general information about the studies included in this
review. Scrutinizing columns five and six of the table, one finds similar inclusion and
exclusion criteria defining the pool of participants in the various HBR studies. The
main exclusion criterion was that participants are not in need of residential care and
not significantly cognitively reduced. Most studies applied narrow inclusion criteria
requiring that patients eligible for care are older than 65 years. An exception is the
Norwegian studies, in which the minimum age was set to 18 years. There are, however,
only small variations in the mean age of included participants. For the HBR group,
the mean age was between 76 and 82, while for the usual care group it was between 77
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and 83. An additional trait common to the studies reviewed is the length of the HBR
intervention itself, which was a maximum of 12 weeks. In the New Zealand version,
in which participants were referred from the hospital, the length was limited to 8
weeks. In the most recent Norwegian study, the intervention length varied between 4
to 10 weeks (Langeland et al., 2019). Two studies (King et al., 2012; Parsons et al.,
2013), failed to be informative with respect to this aspect. The homogeneity with
respect to this feature increases the comparability of the studies. In fact, according
to our observations, the length of the intervention itself was hardly ever explicitly
explained. Neither the actual amount of HBR administered to the participants nor
the possible effects of a variation in treatment duration on treatment outcome was
discussed. Studies examining potential health benefits from HBR do not use one
standardized instrument. In fact, to establish different types of health benefits, one
may require different instruments, but often there are several instruments used for
the examination of the same type of benefit. Directly comparing the results then
becomes difficult. We will therefore focus the discussion on whether there were some
common trends in terms of statistical significance for potential health benefits.
Physical functioning or independence were the potential benefit categories where
we found the most studies, and often these focused on ADL. The study by Lewin and
Vandermeulen, 2010 is the first study to use functional gain as the primary outcome.
This study produced some promising results. The HBR group scored significantly
better on all physical measures after 3- and 12-month follow-ups. These results are
consistent with earlier studies examining short-term effects (Tinetti et al., 2002). A
more recent study also indicated improvements in physical functioning for the HBR
group (Parsons et al., 2013). Less clear are the results of an Australian study, in
which statistical significance in instrumental ADL could only be established in the
context of the AT analysis. The latter study used a 12-month follow-up period. In
contrast, three studies showed no statistical significance in either functional mobility
or ADL (King et al., 2012; Senior et al., 2014; Tuntland et al., 2015). The follow-
up periods in these three studies lasted between 7 and 18 months. This is longer
than the respective period in the studies reporting positive statistical significance in
favour of HBR. A common pattern for all the results is that there were no significant
or clear effects on physical functioning. These studies all included physical gain as
a secondary outcome. They were not originally designed for detecting any effect on
physical functioning. This may influence the results. However, this argument partially
also holds for the studies reporting a positive significant effect. The exception from the
above finding was the study from Langeland et al., 2019, which found significant effect
on the secondary outcome physical functioning. The study by Parsons et al., 2013
defines physical functioning as the primary outcome, but it relies on data collected
from another study (Parsons et al., 2011). There is no clear evidence supporting the
notion that HBR significantly increases physical functioning. Encouragingly, in the
studies that produced no significant difference, HBR tended to lead to superior results
on the selected instruments.
Increased HRQoL or QoL is often used as a measure of increased health benefits,
and three studies in our review relied on this measure. However, only one study had
change in HRQoL as the primary outcome (King et al., 2012). This study showed
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a promising result, with the HBR group scoring significantly better at the 7-month
follow-up. The mental health component of SF36 was the main driver for the increased
score for the HBR group. For the mean difference between baseline and 7-month
follow-up, both the overall score and the mental component had a p-value of 0.05. The
three remaining studies looking into HRQoL or QoL reported insignificant differences
between HBR and usual care (Lewin et al., 2013a; Langeland et al., 2019; Tuntland
et al., 2015) at the final follow-up period, which varies between 9 – 12 months. If
one examines the result table in Tuntland et al., 2015 and Langeland et al., 2019,
most of the HRQoL components are in favour of HBR. To summarize, there is no
convincing long-term evidence that HBR increase HRQoL or QoL. Again, the studies
that report insignificant differences had HRQoL or QoL as their secondary outcomes.
With respect to other self-perceived health benefits, the results are also not definite.
Two studies (King et al., 2012; Parsons et al., 2013) reported no significant difference
in social support measured with the Duke Social Support Index (DSSI) (Koenig et
al., 1993). The end follow-up periods for these studies only differed by 1 month, and
both were conducted in New Zealand, making these studies highly comparable. The
p-value associated with the change in the DSSI score between usual care and HBR
was found to be 0.09 in the study by Parsons et al., 2013. However, the authors argue
for the use of a significance level of lower than 0.05 because of the risk of type-II
errors. Regression results from assessing the state of psychological well-being of older
people also showed no significant difference at the 12-month follow-up (Lewin and
Vandermeulen, 2010). Self-perceived activity performance and satisfaction with that
performance was analysed in (Tuntland et al., 2015, Langeland et al., 2019). Both the
performance and satisfaction measures were significantly better for the HBR group
at the 6 or 9-month follow-up. However, the treatment effect was below the clinically
relevant change cut-off.
Postponing the need for residential care is an obvious potential benefit for a patient
and for the policy-maker, as residential care is, in general, costly. In an unadjusted
analysis, it was demonstrated that HBR users were significantly less often assessed
and approved for a higher level of care in a 2-year perspective (Lewin et al., 2014).
Senior et al., 2014 observed that HBR reduced the probability of death or perma-
nent residential care, but their observations lacked statistical significance. It was
also shown that HBR users were less than half as likely to have an ED visit during
the home care episode (Tinetti et al., 2002). Over a 2-year period, HBR recipients
had significantly less ED presentations compared to individuals receiving the baseline
treatment, though these results only hold for the AT analyses and were unadjusted
(Lewin et al., 2014). The latter findings also hold for the number of hospital admis-
sions. Moreover, an earlier study concluded that HBR participants were less likely to
be readmitted to the hospital compared to subjects under usual care, a result that
was only significant at a 10% level (Tinetti et al., 2012). In addition, HBR is showing
some promising results with respect to reducing the need for specialist or residential
care. As discussed earlier, HBR seems to reduce homecare costs, and therefore one
would expect a decline in the volume of homecare services. In the first study included
in this review, it was shown that HBR participants were significantly more likely to
remain at home after a homecare episode (Tinetti et al., 2002). This effect seems to
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hold in a 12-month perspective, as it was shown that HBR participants were signifi-
cantly less likely to need ongoing services (Lewin et al., 2013a). There is evidence for
the fact that relative to usual care, HBR significantly reduces the number of homecare
hours and visits as well as the general duration of homecare episodes in the long-term
(Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016; Lewin et al., 2014; Tinetti et al., 2002; Tinetti et al.,
2012).
I.5 Conclusion
This review summarizes and assesses the currently available literature on empirical
evaluations of the modern care concept of HBR. In short, the existing evidence re-
garding the effects of HBR is still inconclusive. The results are inconsistent, as some
studies report a significant positive effect of HBR versus usual care, while others fail
to establish such an effect. However, so far it has not been established that HBR
renders negative effects. On one hand, this review is concerned with a concise sum-
mary of relevant existing findings generated by research focusing on HBR. On the
other hand, it tries to provide a critical, constructive assessment of the associated
publication process. Having worked on this project, we understand that HBR is a
complex intervention implemented in an equally complex setting. Out of this under-
standing grows the utmost respect for all current research efforts aimed at estimating
the effects of HBR. The research reviewed provides a basis to build on. With com-
plex interventions in social settings, there might also be a need for different “eyes”
to capture this complexity. To ensure successful future research efforts, the multidis-
ciplinary spirit of HBR needs to be reflected in the diversity of the research teams
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Table I.A.1: Results of the quality assessment
Question
Author 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Score
Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
Lewin et al., 2014 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Lewin et al., 2013b 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
King et al., 2012 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Lewin and Vandermeulen, 2010 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Parsons et al., 2013 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Tuntland et al., 2015 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Langeland et al., 2019 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
Lewin et al., 2013a 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Senior et al., 2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tinetti et al., 2002 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Tinetti et al., 2012 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
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Reflection on the phenomenon of absenteeism from the workplace readily produces a
list of non-beneficial correlates that could be interpreted as costs. Such cost might
be severe for the employee, family members, co-workers and the health system as
such. According to Barmby et al., 2002, the absence rates due to sickness are quite
substantial in several industrial countries, and they vary significantly across gender.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that workers in the public sector tend to have
more days absent than employees in the private sector (Winkelmann, 1999). The
direct cost of absenteeism is found to be substantial. According to Chatterji and
Tilley, 2002 the direct cost of absenteeism in the UK has been estimated to exceed
1% of GDP. Barham and Begum, 2005 estimate the direct cost of days absent at
£11.6 billion for 2003 which amounts to 0.928% of GDP1. According to Norway’s
national budget 2018 public sick pay amounts to 42.6 billion NOK which equals 1.2%
of Norway GDP estimated for 20182. A Norwegian study (Markussen, 2012) shows
that on average, a 1% increase in an individual’s sick leave rate reduces individual
earnings 2 years later by 1.2 %.
In general, absence can either be valid, if due to sickness, or invalid, if due to
shirking. So absenteeism is important since it provides information concerning the
determinants of worker behavior (Brown and Sessions, 1996). There exist theoreti-
cal positions linking productivity to social activities in the workplace. For instance,
Rotemberg, 1994 argues that more (less) opportunities to socialize promote (impede)
altruism among co-workers which, in turn, tends to increase (decrease) productiv-
ity. Considering this relationship, and assuming that temporary employees cannot
be hired, one predicts that sick leave reduces productivity: An increase in sick leave,
reduces the number of potential participants in social activities. Simultaneously, the
workload of the attendees typically increases. In consequence, those individuals can
devote less time to socializing. As altruism is less likely to be promoted in such a situ-
ation, productivity will be affected negatively. Another strand of the theoretical liter-
ature emphasizes links between productivity and peer pressure. Kandel and Lazear,
1992, for example, argue that peer pressure plays a role in creating incentives for
increased effort and thereby influences firm productivity. Significant spillover effects
in absenteeism among peers at work have been established by Godøy and Dale-Olsen,
2018 on the basis of high-quality Norwegian matched employer-employee data. The
effect is substantiated for self-certified absence as well as physician-certified absence
from work. Conditional on model specification the authors find that a 1% increase
in absence rate for focal workers increased the peer workers absence rate by as much
as 0.41%. The significant role of peer effects for absenteeism has been documented
for Sweden and Italy, where the findings lie within the range stated in the Norwegian
study (Hesselius et al., 2009; Paola, 2010).
This study, first of all, examines the effects of increased sick leave on indirect
expenses experienced by a public-health entity. That is, we scrutinize cost associ-
1The 2003 UK GDP in current market prices equaled £1.25 trillion (or 1250 billion).




ated with absenteeism occurring over and above the direct costs as, for instance, the
wage rate. A unique 36-month panel from a micro environment in a large Norwe-
gian municipality is utilized to estimate the variation in the amount of additional
home-nurse hours provided due to changes in administrative workers sick leave occur-
ring in different organizational units of the care providing entity. Secondly, since we
deal with idiosyncracies of the panel data set at hand, using unique insights into the
administrative background of the municipality studied, the current effort constitutes
an informative case study in applied econometrics. In particular by concentrating
on the effects of techniques designed to correct standard errors of estimates for het-
eroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence on inference, we touch
upon a technical matter that has recently received considerable attention in applied
statistics.
The findings concerning the effects of sick leave are in line with theoretical (Pauly
et al., 2002) and empirical (Nicholson et al., 2006) findings, implying the cost of work
loss will exceed wages if the firm has difficulties substituting the absentee with an
equally productive worker. In the case at hand, the administration office has little
personnel slack and the typical job responsibilities are fairly specialized. Therefore
replacing an absent worker by one of equal competence and productivity is close
to impossible. Interestingly, we find the opposite effects of increased sick leave in
the home-nurse areas. In contrast to the administrative unit, the management of
these areas can rely on a pool of potential substitute nurses temporarily replacing the
nurse(s) on sick leave.
In addition, we examine the short-term effect of a fairly new health-care inter-
vention referred to as home-based reablement (HBR). The main goal of HBR is to
restore or increase a patient’s level of functioning and self-reliance to decrease the
individual’s dependence on health-care services such as home-nurse services. HBR is
time-limited, multidisciplinary, home-based, goal-oriented and person-centered. Typ-
ically, a multidisciplinary team works towards a patient-defined goal formulated in
terms of everyday activities important to the patient. Seen from a public policy per-
spective such care strategies represent an attempt to provide support to the elderly
in a community while keeping the strain on health/care budgets in check (Fersch,
2015; Bauer et al., 2019). The research area ”economic evaluations of HBR” is still
in its infancy. Yet two studies are of special relevance for us. Lewin et al., 2014 and
Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016 showed - on the individual level - that HBR recipients
needed fewer hours of personal services, such as home nursing, than comparable in-
dividuals subjected to a standard care treatment. Our study supports these findings.
Implementing HBR in the municipality has significantly reduced home-nurse hours.
Apart from health-care related results, we put forward a case study in applied
econometrics. We demonstrate how knowledge about the basic ”architecture” of the
system designed to order and provide home-nurse hours helps to choose an adequate
estimator in the context of our linear model of home-nurse service provision. We
argue below that due to key features of the system, we can assume that unknown
common factor(s) generating cross-sectional correlation in the variables are uncor-
related with those factors causing correlated errors. As a consequence, fixed effects
estimation will guarantee unbiased and consistent parameter estimates. Moreover,
41
II.2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND SICK-LEAVE DYNAMICS
we rule out endogeneity by considering the design/organization of the administrative
system in place to facilitate home-nurse hours in combination with empirical evi-
dence. And finally, in the context of correcting standard errors in the presence of the
triad ”heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence”, our study
reveals that ”no-correction” is no reasonable alternative. We substantiate that sim-
ply relying on default correction options of standard software can lead to suboptimal
inference with respect to the effects of our variables of interest on home-nurse hours.
Accordingly, the paper augments two fields of the empirical literature in eco-
nomics: health-care economics and applied econometrics. With respect to the former,
its ”value added” extents to the role absenteeism plays for the provision of socially
highly valued care services. With respect to the latter, the paper delivers a unique
demonstration of the role(s) knowledge about organizational features of a real-life
system can play on different stages of the econometric modelling process. To our
knowledge this is the first paper that compares state-of-the-art techniques of stan-
dard error correction on real life data.
Section II.2 discusses the design and the organizational structures of the system of
care provision in the Norwegian municipality and outlines some basic features of the
sick leave dynamics measured throughout the observation period [2014, 2016]. Vari-
able definitions along with information about the respective measurement processes,
and a first descriptive analysis of the data panel are provided in Section II.3. Our
model for the provision of home-nurse hours is specified in the subsequent Section
II.4. In the following Section II.5 we establish cross-sectional dependence (CSD) as a
phenomenon relevant in our situation. Alternative conceptualizations of the sources
for CSD are discussed. Adopting the factor-structure approach for our own purposes,
we finally justify our key identifying assumption. Section II.6 introduces a portfolio
of currently available techniques suitable for the correction of standard errors if a
panel data setting is potentially ridden by heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and/or
CSD. The performance of these methods will be assessed in the sequel. In Section
II.7, we point at the features of the administrative system which allow us to rule out
endogeneity. Our results are presented in Section II.8. To underline that our findings
are robust we perform a robustness check by employing the SUR modelling approach
in Section II.9. A discussion of our results, given in Section II.10, concludes the paper.
II.2 Institutional background and sick-leave dynam-
ics
In Norway, unlike in many other OECD countries, the provision of health care to the
population is an exclusive public sector responsibility. Primary care and specialist care
are, however, organized differently. Primary services are administered and supplied
under the auspices of the atomic unit of local government in Norway referred to as
municipalities. While these units administer a wide spectrum of health services, e.g.
rehabilitation, physiotherapy, preventive medicine, and health promotion, typically a
main focus area is long-term care provided either in nursing homes or at the patient’s
home. Municipalities are mainly financed by grants from the national government
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and through local taxes. The allocation of funding for services provided lies in the
responsibility of the highest legislative body, i.e. the municipality council.
We observe data from one of the most populous municipalities in Norway. In this
municipality, one administrative office decides on applications for primary care mainly
in long-term homes or nursing homes. In a sense, the office functions as the gate
keeper for access to care services. The municipality operates under an organizational
structure referred to as order-execute model. In particular, the administrative office
orders home-nursing hours from home-nurse areas. The personnel of a home-nurse
area executes these orders by providing the respective care services to the patients.
Home-nurse areas are financed by the amount of home nursing provided in a pay-
for-performance system3. Eleven home-nurse areas have been established within the
geographic boundaries of the municipality considered.
The administrative office scrutinized manages more than 90% of the incoming
home-nurse applications4. Those are approximately randomly allocated to the case
workers via the applicants’ birth dates. The special importance of this feature will
become apparent in Section II.5. Within this group approximately half of the employ-
ees have additional responsibilities. They function as contact persons (CPs) to one
or more of the eleven home-nurse areas5. In this function they hold regular meetings
with representatives of the home-nurse areas, and handle the so-called ”need-change”
(NC) notes. Those notes are a key element of the order-execute structure. Monitoring
the patients regularly, home nurses will notice changes in patient needs. By initiating
NC notes the home-nurse area indicates that a patient’s amount of home nurse hours
ought to be modified. The rule is that the need for change is filed only if the absolute
value of the relative change in home-nurse hours exceeds 25%. The NC notes are
then sent to the CP’s for approval. Given the experience of the case handler and the
evident nature of many cases, the NC notes are typically approved. Should the CP’s
object the amount of hours indicated in a NC note, then they start a special profes-
sional dialog with the home-nurse areas to determine an acceptable level of hours. In
this matter, the CPs have the sole decision making authority. The NC related flow of
information between the administration office and the home-nurse areas is illustrated
in Figure II.1. In regular meetings between the CP and representatives of the home-
nurse areas, the parties discuss the NC-notes practise as well as complicated cases.
This system has been has been in place for more than a decade. Since personnel
turnover is low, each employee knows her/his role in this largely trust-based system.
3Although several Norwegian municipalities follow the same organization, they often differ with
respect to the home-nurse financing mechanism.
4The office consists of two groups. In what follows we focus on Group 1 (GR1) which handles
applications from patients with somatic health challenges. The second group is responsible for all
non-somatic cases.
5In 2016, eight of the sixteen full time employees worked as contact persons.
43
II.2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND SICK-LEAVE DYNAMICS
Administrative office CP
Home-nurse area
Approved applications specifying number
of home-nurse hours per week
NC notes signalling change in care status
NC note rejection triggers professional
dialog
Figure II.1: Information flow related to NC notes
From an institutional point of view, two types of paid sick leave have to be distin-
guished in Norway: physician-certified sick leave and self-certified sick leave. General
practitioners act as gatekeepers for paid sick leave, as all sickness related absence
lasting longer than 3 days must be approved by a physician (Godøy and Dale-Olsen,
2018). If a sick employee is absent for less than 4 days, then a self-declaration is
sufficient. Employees of the municipality studied have up to 52 days of self-certified
sick leave at their disposal.
Throughout the investigation period the administration office was experiencing
internal difficulties which were apparently reflected in an abnormal inflation of absence
due to sickness. To be able to track this development, we operationalize ”absence due
to sickness” by the number of sick leave days as a fraction of work days per month that
an individual has to deliver according to her/his employment contract. For groups,
the individual measures are adequately aggregated. Prior to our sampling period,
absenteeism did not seem to have been a problem, neither in GR1 nor among the
CPs. The development of sick leave over the sample period for the home-nurse area,
GR1 and its CP subgroup is illustrated in Figure II.2. Leaving aside the unsystematic
”spike” observed in February 2015, from 2014-m1 to 2015-m6, the sick leave for GR1
and its subgroup CP was fairly stable below 4%6. From July 2015 on, one observes
a pronounced cyclical motion - of period 4 and increasing amplitude - for the sick
leave series among GR1 employees. The series for the CP group, exhibits the same
type of dynamics, although for this group sick leave is more stable until it eventually
escalates throughout the last quarter of 2016. In contrast to this pattern, Figure II.2
shows a fairly persistent downward trend in home-nurse-area sick leave throughout
the observation period. A pronounced decrease in sick leave occurs over the first
quarter of 2015.
6The spike occurring in February 2015 reflects the fact that three CP’s were on partial leave
simultaneously (50%, 25%, 15%).
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Figure II.2: Monthly sick-leave rates for GR1, CPs and Home-nurse areas (2014m1-2016m12)
Since it is typically difficult - if not impossible - to find substitutes for a CP on
sick leave, the respective employee will face an inflated workload once she/he returns
to the workplace. Since employees do not get paid overtime, they have an incentive
to prioritize the time allocated to different tasks. Patients’ needs always comes first,
so treating new applications gets first priority. The CP’s additional responsibilities,
facilitating the regular meetings and treating the NC notes, are then put into second
place. The NC notes will be treated, but more swiftly, less frequently, and less time
is allocated to this task. During spring 2016, the regular meetings between CP and
home-nurse areas also where dropped because of time constraints. Being pressed for
time might increase a decision makers preference for those alternatives that minimize
post-decision cost. In the case at hand, the acceptance of a NC note is less time con-
suming than a rejection, since there is less need for post-decision communication with
the home-nurse areas after an acceptance. Moreover, as a consequence of less process-
ing time per NC and the partial suspension of regular meetings, the CPs knowledge
concerning individual NC notes will decay. In the light of these considerations one
would expect that the acceptance rate for NC notes goes up as sick leave in the CP
group increases. In line with the theory of Pauly et al., 2002, increased CP sick leave
should lead to an inflation in home-nurse hours.
The municipality considered had implemented HBR already prior to 2014. A
single HBR team operated as a pilot in two home-nurse areas. By January 2014 only
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two areas offered HBR type services. Subsequently, HBR was implemented gradually
in all eleven home-nurse areas. This process was completed in November 2015. Only
four different teams operated simultaneously in all of the eleven home-nurse areas.
As mentioned in the introduction, due to the nature of HBR we expect that the new
care treatment will tend to decrease home-nurse hours.
II.3 Data collection and description
Our study is based on data collected from different data systems used in the mu-
nicipality. The observations on the dependent variable amount of home-nurse hours
per month (HOURS), have been directly collected from the municipality’s balanced
scorecard system. This system uses a data format that is aggregated on a monthly
level based on the electronic patient journal (EPJ) system. The amount of home-
nurse hours is defined as the sum of all hours provided to patients during a given
month. If a patient has been absent, and/or needed more than one employee to pro-
vided the indicated amount of hours per week, the hours are adequately adjusted.
The same balance scorecard system provides the data source for home-nurse-area
sick leave. Those observations were generated by the municipality’s human resources
(HR) system. A common account code was used to link the respective records.
All socio-demographic variables have been extracted from the EPJ system at an
individual level. Originally provided in the form of a weekly panel, those observations
had to be aggregated into monthly home-nurse area data. This is possible since there
are defined service codes that are included in the definition of home-nurse hours.
Only these codes where included in the individual level data to avoid unnecessary bias
from other service types in the socio-demographic variables. Each individual is also
registered at the home-nurse area under the same common account code mentioned
above. Therefore it was possible to link the different data sources.
The variables HBR and CP sick leave had to be collected manually. To construct
the HBR variable, one researcher met with the municipality’s HBR project leader and
retrieved the information about the timing of home-nurse areas’ HBR implementa-
tion. Moreover, in collaboration with colleagues and leaders of GR1, the subgroup
of employees serving as CPs was identified and the home-nurse areas served by each
CP were recorded. Since personnel turnover was low, and only minor organizational
changes occurred throughout the sampling period this procedure is likely to have
produced reliable observations. The CP sick leave information was collected at the
employee level directly from the HR system. In discussion with the Norwegian Center
for Research Data7 the CP’s common account codes were rendered anonymous in line
with the requirements of current data protection legislation.
In addition, data on a dummy variable substitute leader where generated in the
course of a procedure similar to the one implemented in the HBR context. The two
top managers of the home-nurse areas functioned as our source of information. Among
the eleven different home-nurse areas, only two areas were managed by a substitute
7The Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (NSD) is Norway’s leading authority for privacy concerns
arising in research data.
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leader during 29 month. For a period of 2 months substitute leaders were in place in
both areas simultaneously.
Moreover, three dummy variables are included to capture the potential effects of
some minor organizational changes which occurred during the sample period. One
variable captures a reduction in hours for two areas, since their responsibility for
serving some small service apartments was moved to other institutions. In October
2014, a change in the municipality’s traffic infrastructure affected the geographical size
of two neighboring home-nurse areas. While one area was extended (by one street)
the other shrank (by one street). To capture the effects of this change we introduce
two binary variables, one for each of the respective home-nurse areas.
Table II.1 presents descriptive statistics for all time-varying variables included in
our panel data set which includes observations for N = 11 home-nurse areas over
T = 36 months. The monthly average of home-nurse hours per home-nurse area
has increased by 3% from 2014 to 2016 after a slight drop in 2015. In contrast, the
monthly average number of patients receiving home-nurse services grew monotonically
at a rate of 3%. In 2016, the monthly home-nurse hours per user (15.08) where on
average higher than in any other year, especially compared to 2015 (14.48). The
home-nurse areas vary in general size, measured in amount of home-nurse hours and
number of users. The within and between variation in home-nurse hours is reflected
in Figure II.3.
Table II.1: Summary statistics
2014 2015 2016 2014-2016
Mean Mean Mean Mean SD within SD between
Homenurse hours 2,484 2,434 2,565 2,494 199.1 668.4
CP sick-leave in % 2.60 1.97 5.47 3.35 9.13 3.44
Area sick-leave in % 11.47 8.68 9.35 9.83 4.51 2.55
HBR 0.33 0.58 1 0.63 0.41 0.27
No. home-nurse patients 165 168 170 168 9.6 30.7
Substitute leader 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.17
Average age 74.8 74.7 74.8 74.8 0.60 3.75
Proportion of Men 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.03 0.01
Married or in partnership 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.03 0.06
Function score 2.56 2.63 2.66 2.62 0.12 0.20
Observations 132 132 132 396
N 11 11 11 11
T 12 12 12 36
As can be seen in Table II.1, monthly average CP sick leave has more than doubled
throughout the sample period. The average sick leave in the home-nurse area has
decreased during the period, but there is a large within variation. There is a possibility
for multi-collinearity between substitute leader and area sick leave. When the daily
leader is on long-term sick leave, the leave is registered on the home-nurse area.
Mainly, the reason for having a substitute leader is typically the long-term sick leave
for the daily leader. The values of the binary substitute leader variable in Table II.1
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indicate that the fraction of time during which provisional management was in place
has been monotonically decreasing over the time period considered8. The average
value on HBR was one in 2016, meaning that all home-nurse areas had implemented
HBR by the end of 2015. Scrutinizing the fraction of male patients in the sample
indicates that the gender composition of the patient population has been fairly stable
across time as well as across areas. The latter observation also holds for the average
age of approximately 75 years. A slight upward trend in the proportion of patients who
do not live alone can be detected. The variable function score measures a patient’s
health status. Realizations of the index take values in the interval [1, 5] with increasing
scores reflecting a decay in the individual’s health status. Due to data quality issues,
the marginal increase in the means of the overall function score should be viewed with
care9. Full variable list is provided in Appendix II.A
Figure II.3: HOURSi• versus area i augmented by grand mean and time averages
8We have rerun our regressions including only one of these two variables in turn. There was no
effect on the results.
9When trying to match function scores with patients registered at the home-nurse areas, we
noticed that the scores for many patients were missing. So the aggregated scores on home-nurse
areas do not include all patients that get home-nurse service. If this is a common trend between all
home-nurse areas, then this weakness should not effect average scores.
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II.4 A linear model for the provision of home-nurse
hours
We assume the following relationship between home-nurse hours provided and our
variables of interest




where i = 1, 2, . . . , 11 indexes home-nurse areas and t = 1, 2, . . . , 36 serves as the
time index. In equation (II.1), HOURSit denotes the number of home-nurse hours
provided in area i in time period t. The binary variable HBRit equals 1 if home-based
reablement is offered in the i’s area in period t and 0 otherwise. CP-LEAVEit (×100)
represents the sick leave for the contact person working with area i in period t and
AREA-LEAVEit (×100) denotes the sick leave in the respective area in period t. θ
and zit are l× 1 vectors, where zit includes a set of up to six time-varying covariates
listed in Table 1, and uit denotes the random disturbance associated with area i at
time t.
The parameters of interest are the β’s in equation (II.1). The monthly effect of
implementing HBR on the expected supply of home-nurse hours is captured by β1.
The effect of a ceteris paribus one percentage point change in the CP’s sick leave on
the expected amount of home-nurse hours is captured by β2. The analog effect of a
variation in sick leave in areas is reflected by β3.
In (II.1), possible unobserved area heterogeneity is captured by ai, while γt ac-
counts for unobserved time effects. In our context, sources for potential unobserved
heterogeneity could be, for instance, the CP’s age, gender and/or education. The
distribution of these characteristics is hardly independent of the regressor CP-sick
leave. Consequently, we rely on the fixed-effects (FE) approach. Performing a Wald
test on time dummies we reject the null that all time dummies are jointly equal to
zero. We therefore estimate a two-way fixed effects model where γt in equation (II.1)
will account for unobserved time effects (Baltagi, 2013, p. 39). The two-way fixed






The standard argument against the FE estimator is that one only uses the within
variation. This objection is indeed valid if the within variation is smaller than the
between variation. As substantiated in Table II.1, our three variables of interest all
have larger within variation than between variation. Thus, in the case at hand, there
is no strong argument against using the FE estimator.
II.5 Cross-sectional dependence
We can write the regression in (II.1) more compactly as
yit = α+ x
′
itβ + ai + uit, (II.2)
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where yit = HOURSit, x
′
it includes our variables of interest, z
′
it and T − 1 time
dummies. The coefficients to be estimated are contained in the K×1 parameter vector
β, α denotes the constant, and area specific unobserved heterogeneity is captured by
ai as described in Section II.4. It is well known that if the strict exogeneity assumption
holds,
E(uit|xi1,xi2, ...,xiT ) = 0, (II.3)
holds, then the traditional FE estimator (or two-way FE estimator if we include
a set of T − 1 time dummies in x′it) will result in unbiased and consistent estimates
of β even if the errors, uit, are not identically independently distributed. Below we
will argue that (II.1) is neither subject to common correlated effects, nor is it likely
to be violated by reverse causality (cf. Section II.7).
It is now commonplace in applied empirical research to adjust the standard errors
of the parameter estimates for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) of an
unknown form by the HAC procedure10. Less attention has been directed towards
a possible cross-sectional dependence in the errors however, even though, as pointed
out by Chudik and Pesaran, 2013, p. 2
...the presence of some form of cross-sectional correlation of errors in panel
data applications in economics is likely to be the rule rather than the
exception.
Cross-sectional dependence (CSD) in our setting means that the error component
in equation (II.1) is correlated in the cross-sectional dimension, implying that
cov(uit, ujt) 6= 0 for some t and some i 6= j. (II.4)
That is, at each time t the errors may be correlated across some home-nurse areas.
With a small N , large T sample, as in our case, we can use either the Breusch and
Pagan, 1980 LM test, hereafter referred to as CDBP , or the test developed in Pesaran,
2004, hereafter CDP , to test for cross-sectionally correlated errors. As demonstrated
in Pesaran, 2004, the CDP has good small-sample properties, and is robust both to
structural breaks and unit roots11.
10This adjustment is facilitated by the standard robust option in STATA’s xtreg, fe environment.
11The CDP test is applicable also for large N moderate T samples. As shown in Pesaran, 2015,
in this case the test is really a test of H0: weak cross-sectional dependence.
50
II.5. CROSS-SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE
Table II.2: p-values for various diagnostic tests
Regression modela
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Breusch-Pagan LM testb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pesaran CD testc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified Wald testd 0.000 0.001 0.050 0.008 0.033
Wooldrige auto-correlation teste 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
a The 5 model specifications are given in Table II.5 in Section II.8.1.
b Breusch-Pagan LM test; H0: cross-sectional independence
c Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence test; H0: independence
d Modified Wald test; H0: homoscedasticity
e Wooldridge auto-correlation test; H0: zero auto-correlation
We report the results of the diagnostic testing for the regression model (II.1) in
Table II.2. The estimated coefficients will be presented and discussed in Section II.8.
The evidence presented in the 3rd and the 4th row of the table suggests that at
conventional α levels, we have to reject the null of homoscedastic errors as well as the
null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the errors. Moreover, both the CDBP and
the CDP test indicate the presence of CSD in the errors at the 0.01 significance level.
To complement the results concerning Pesaran’s test we report the CDP statistic for
each variable in xit in Table II.3 to check whether the right-hand side variables in
the regression are CSD. The results in Table II.3 suggest that apart from substitute
leader and the first difference of the function score, all covariates included in our
model exhibit CSD.
Table II.3: Variable specific Pesaran CD-test for cross-sectional dependence
CD-test? p-value
Homenurse hours 2.201 0.028
CP sick-leave 4.880 0.000
Area sick-leave 4.206 0.000
HBR 17.918 0.000
No. home-nurse patients -1.752 0.080
Substitute leader -0.229 0.819
Average age 7.128 0.000
Proportion of Men 5.754 0.000
Married or partnership 17.608 0.000
Diff. function score 1.102 0.270
? The CD-statistic is N (0, 1) distributed.
? Extreme values indicates strong correlation
Given these findings, the choice of an appropriate estimation technique will largely
depend on how we conceptualize the sources and the nature of CSD. As outlined in
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Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012 and Chudik and Pesaran, 2013, two dominant ap-
proaches have recently evolved and are currently dominating the literature: The spa-
tial approach and the factor structure approach (or residual multifactor approach).
The spatial approach assumes that CSD is related to some measure of ”distance”
between the cross-sections. In our setting, for instance, it might be a common un-
measured shocks generating a spatial connection. In general, the spatial approach
requires a pre-specified weight matrix to account for such distances (Anselin, 2001).
The factor structure approach assumes that, at each time, there exist a finite number
of unobserved common factors affecting the cross-sectional units with diverse unknown
intensities. As noted by Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012 and Chudik and Pesaran, 2013
this general modelling approach is likely to capture cross-sectional correlation gener-
ated by a variety of spatial processes. For that reason we adopt the approach in this
paper.
To illustrate, assume errors are subject to the following single-factor error struc-
ture:
uit = λift + εit. (II.5)
Here, ft is an unobservable common factor, λi is the unknown, unit specific factor
loading and εit is a random disturbance distributed independently from xit, λi and
ft. Then cov(uit, ujt) = λiλjσ
2
f 6= 0, where V[ft] = σ2f and we have cross sectional
dependence as defined in (II.4). A key question now is whether the cross-sectional
correlation observed in the right-hand side variables reported above, is also generated
by ft (albeit with different factor loadings). If so, the strict exogeneity assumption in
II.3 could be violated without some further restrictions on the factor structure12.
Figure II.4: Each dot represents a new case applying for home-care services. When entering
GR1, a case is allocated to a caseworker (smileys) by patients’s birth day. Thus the allocation
appears to be random for the caseworker, and the decisions of each caseworker will be directed
to several different home-nurse areas in an unsystematic way
To solve our estimation problem, one might consider the use of Pesaran’s com-
mon correlated effects (CCE) estimator (Pesaran (2006)) which yields consistent and
12As shown in Chudik and Pesaran, 2013, the presences of common factors does not affect con-
sistency of the conventional fixed effect estimator, as long as the common factors are not strong,
meaning that the potential unobserved factor affects either only a fixed number of units, or a subset
of units is affected by a factor growing slower than N (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012). However,
inference is affected since the asymptotic variance is affected by the factor structure of the error
term.
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asymptotically normal estimates of β even if ft affects the regressors. Unfortunately,
the estimator’s asymptotic properties have been established under the assumptions
that T is fixed, N → ∞, and (N,T ) → ∞ jointly. Hence, this estimator is not ap-
plicable in our small N case. To escape the apparent dilemma, we set out to identify
traits of the real-life order-execute system under scrutiny that may imply a unique
(specific) factor structure. We found that the institutional nature of the system in
which home-nurse hours are ordered and provided (cf. Section II.2) allows us to make
the following identifying assumption: The unknown common factor(s) that generate
the CSD in the errors are uncorrelated with the unknown common factor(s) that
generate CSD in the regressors.
The institutional background described in Section II.2 motivates the conjecture
that the CSD in the errors is primarily generated by each individual case worker
allocating hours for different home-nurse areas during a given time period. If the
propensity to allocate orders differs between case workers, then errors will be cross-
sectionally correlated. However, as illustrated by Figure II.4, cases are distributed
to the case workers by the patients’ birth day, the pattern of these cross-sectional
correlations are likely to be totally independent of the cross-sectional correlations in
the regressors. The fixed effects estimator applied to (II.1) will then give unbiased and
consistent parameter estimates. Moreover, for robust inference, we may make use of
the nonparametric covariance matrix estimator developed by Driscoll and Kraay, 1998
that produces standard-error estimates robust to general forms of heteroscedasticity,
autocorrelation, as well as cross-sectional dependence (HACSC).
II.6 Techniques for the correction of standard er-
rors
One of the objectives of this paper is to demonstrate alternative adequate robust
inferential procedures in an applied setting. In particular, we will focus on the p-values
implied by different algorithms for standard error corrections. To this end, we review
three procedures for the correction of standard errors. Proofs will be suppressed, as
they can be found in the respective original papers as well as in graduate textbooks
as, for instance, Baltagi, 2013, Green, 2003 and Wooldridge, 2002. Our notation is
in line with the one established in these references. To obtain the model in equation
(II.1) one typically includes T − 1 dummy variables if the number of variables is not
too large (Green, 2003, p. 291). Performing the ”within” transformation and adding
the grand averages - to be able to estimate the intercept - on equation (II.2) we get,
ỹit = α+ x̃
′
itβ + ũit, (II.6)
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where

















































Performing OLS on equation (II.6) would provide the FE estimates from STATA’s
xtreg, fe. By stacking the panel as an equation for each individual, one obtains
ỹi = αjT + X̃iβ + ũi, (II.7)
where ỹi is T × 1, X̃i is T × k, ũi is T × 1, α is a scalar and jT is T × 1 vector of
ones. Under appropriate regularity conditions, the following asymptotic distribution
for the within-group estimator of a linear regression is well known,
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where ui is not observed and needs to be estimated. Assuming homoscedasticity,
the standard fixed-effect asymptotic variance-covariance (Avar) without any correc-


















where ûi is the fixed effects residual ûi ≡ ỹi − X̃iβ̂.
II.6.1 Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
Arellano, 1987 presented a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
standard error robust estimator, based on results due to White, 1984. This estimator
is often used as it is generated by the standard robust option in Stata’s xtreg,
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fe environment. Using a White estimator V , Arellano shows that the HAC robust













This HAC robust estimator will be valid in the presence of any type of het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 275). Since the result
has been derived under the assumption of a fixed sample size T and N → ∞, the
result only holds for panels with fixed, moderate T and large N .
II.6.2 Heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-section de-
pendence
As shown by Driscoll and Kraay, 1998, one can obtain standard errors in panel data
that are robust to very general forms of correlation in the cross-section, combined with
HAC robustness (HACSC). Driscoll and Kraay proposed a simple modification of the
standard nonparametric time series covariance matrix estimator relying on large T





where ST follows the Newey and West structure,
ŜT = Ω̂0 +
m(T )∑
j=1
w(j,m(T ))[Ω̂j + Ω̂′j ], (II.10)
where












The residuals may be autocorrelated in m(T ) lags in equation (II.10), and equation
(II.11) gives the modified Bartlett weights (Hoechle, 2007). The lag m(t) has to be
chosen. According to Green, 2003, p.200, one typically uses the closest integer to
m(T ) ≈ T 1/4. Stata’s xtscc program, which implements Driscoll and Kraay standard
errors, uses the following rule when no lag is specified: m(T ) = floor[4(T/100)2/9]
(Hoechle, 2007). In our case, we use lag 3, the lag implied by these two methods.
Results for 8 lags are presented in Appendix II.C and the p-values for 8 lags are
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presented in Section II.8. Alternatively, one could have used xtivreg2, a user-written
program provided by Schaffer, 2005, with the dkraay option13.
Note that the Driscoll and Kraay covariance matrix is general and not limited to
linear panel models. For the linear case though, one finds
hit(β̂) = x̃itûit = x̃it(ỹit− x̃′itβ̂).
This estimator is precisely the Newey and West HAC consistent covariance matrix
applied to the sequence of cross-sectional averages of hit(β̂) (Driscoll and Kraay,
1998). The result holds also for large N > T as long as T is sufficiently large.
II.6.3 Fixed-b asymptotics
Kiefer and Vogelsang, 2005 introduced a new asymptotic theory for HAC robust tests.
When providing results for the usual asymptotic behavior for time-series, it is assumed
that the sample size T tends to infinity alongside with the truncation point M . This
truncation point is typically defined as, M = 1+ lags where lags refers to the number
of lags chosen for the autocorrelated variance adjustment. The standard assumption
is that M goes to infinity at a slower rate, such that M/T tends to zero. As Kiefer
and Vogelsang point out, in practice there is a given sample size, and even if the
practitioner chooses a fraction that goes to zero with increased sample size, the fact
is that a positive fraction is used.
Therefore Kiefer and Vogelsang derive the asymptotic distribution for nonpara-
metric HAC estimators under the assumption that M = bT where b ∈ (0, 1] is a
constant. They refer to the asymptotics obtained under this assumption as ”fixed-b
asymptotics”. To make fixed-b asymptotics ”user-friendly” they provided new critical
values for the t-statistic which depend on b. The fixed-b framework is implemented
for the HACSC robust standard errors by Vogelsang, 2012 in a linear panel regression
estimated by fixed-effects. Vogelsang arrives at the result that the HACSC robust
standard errors by Driscoll and Kraay, 1998 follow the fixed-b asymptotic distribution
established in Kiefer and Vogelsang, 2005. One can therefor use fixed-b critical values
for t-statistics and the associated confidence intervals in the HACSC setting. The
main benefit attributed to fixed-b is, that it delivers test statistics depending on the
choice of kernel and bandwidth required to implement the HACSC robust standard
errors (Vogelsang, 2012)14. The fixed-b critical values (CV) for our regressions will
be presented in Section II.8 together with our comparison of p-values.
13The xtscc and xtivreg2 programs use different critical values for creating confidence intervals
and the reflecting p-value. The standard asymptotic critical value of 1.96 for the 5% significance
value is used in xtivreg2 independent of the sample size. Therefore we prefer to use the xtscc
program.
14The Stata code for calculating fixed-b critical values, associated confidence intervals, and p-values
using HACSC robust standard errors due to Driscoll and Kraay, 1998, is available on Vogelsang’s
web page.
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II.7 Ruling out endogeneity
At first glance, one could argue that our model suffers from endogeneity due to re-
versed causality. An increase in the amount of home-nurse hours could have an effect
on the sick leave of CPs. Expert opinion, though, is at odds with this position. When
interviewed on the issue, the new incumbent manager of the administration office,
as well as his predecessor who had been in the position for 10 years, unanimously
expressed the opinion that sick leave effects home-nurse hours but not vice versa. Be-
low, we will present our argument ruling out such reversed causality. Our argument
rests on organizational features of the administration office described in Section II.2,
the NC notes system.
Two circumstances can lead to an unexpected increase in home-nurse hours: i) an
unexpected increase in number of patients and ii) existing patients use more home-
nurse hours than planned. As shown in Table II.1, the average number of patients has
not increased over the sample period. Thus, (i) is not relevant. The cause for increased
home-nurse hours in our case is ii). The hours per patient have increased over the
sample period. As mentioned in Section II.2, a change in any patient’s service hours
has to pass through the NC-notes system. In the case of reversed causality, there
should be a connection between sick leave and the NC notes. For an unexpected
increase in hours per patient the NC notes could either be more frequent, or home-
nurse areas demand more hours in each NC note. We are not able to test the latter.
Still it seems reasonable to assume that a change in the content of the NC notes
will not necessary influence CP sick leave. Just a change in content will not generate
more NC notes, so the number of NC notes per patient would be the same. Unless the
content is significantly more complicated, the NC note related workload for the CP’s
would not change. It is difficult to argue that NC notes would affect sick leave, if the
workload is not changed. However, an increased amount of NC notes would change
the workload and could therefore affect sick leave. We were able to obtain the yearly
amount of NC notes per home-nurse area from the municipality at hand15: 6,976 NC
notes were registered in 2014, 8,758 in 2015 and 9,075 in 2016. A fairly large increase
occurs between 2014 and 2015, although the amount of hours actually dropped in this
period. If NC notes where to influence CP’s sick leave, we would expect an positive
correlation between sick leave and NC notes.
Table II.4 presents different correlation coefficients based on yearly data from the
eleven home-nurse areas. None of the coefficients is significant and the correlation
coefficient in 2015 is negative, which runs counter to what we expected. The changes
in NC notes from one year to the next is also not significantly correlated with CP sick
leave, and here again one coefficient is negative. Meaning that, for example, increased
NC notes compared to the year before will decrease the sick leave compared to the
year before. This is opposite to what one would expect under reversed causality. Sim-
ilar findings surfaced when we focused on the correlation coefficients between yearly
changes in CP sick leave and NC notes. This evidence clearly supports our model
and notions expressed by the CPs during interviews16. During turbulent times the
15Unfortunately, we are not able to check the data quality.
16To provide statistical evidence in line with our argument we performed variants of a Granger
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employees tend to ”pushed” away the NC notes to focus their resources on handling
standard duties.
Table II.4: Correlation coefficients
Sum NC notes ∆ Sum NC notes
2014 2015 2016 2014 - 2015 2015 - 2016
CP sick-leave 2014 0.218
(0.519)
CP sick-leave 2015 -0.342 0.023
(0.304) (0.947)
CP sick-leave 2016 0.128 -0.068
(0.708) (0.842)
∆ CP sick-leave 2014 - 2015 -0.028
(0.935)
∆ CP sick-leave 2015 - 2016 0.049
(0.887)
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
II.8 Results
In line with the dual motivation underlying the paper, we present two sets of results.
The first set reveals the findings with respect to the problem of absenteeism in care-
service provision, while the second subsection focuses on the use of alternative HAC
technologies in the case at hand.
II.8.1 Provision of care hours: Estimation results
The FE estimation results for equation II.1, with Driscoll and Kraay HACSC adjusted
standard errors and p-values reflecting the fixed-b critical value, are presented in
Table II.5. Before commenting on the results for our variables of interest, we observe
that none of the coefficients associated with the socio-demographic control variables,
average age, proportion of men and patients’ partnership status, differ significantly
from zero. These results are not surprising, since we do not use patient-level data.
Our measurements are aggregated to home-nurse areas. There is little variation in
the measurements for these variables and average age, number of males, and patients
in partnership are stable in all of the home-nurse areas. Taking into account evidence
hinting at the fact that the overall function score is I(1), we include its first order
difference which reduces the number of observations to 385. The results for unit-root
tests on all variables are presented in Appendix II.B.
Only one of the three binary variables introduced to capture the potential effects
of some minor organizational changes - the variable accounting for the reduction in
non-causality test for panels due to Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012. A Stata program written by Lopez
and Weber, 2017 was used.
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area size, cf. Section II.3 - is associated with a coefficient that differs significantly
from zero.
Table II.5: Regression results - Fixed-b, lag 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours hours
HBR -126.5*** -136.6*** -154.8*** -147.9*** -146.0***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
CP sick-leave 2.047** 1.807** 1.939** 2.277*** 2.238***
(0.013) (0.030) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Area sick-leave -5.882** -6.546** -9.581** -9.153** -9.584***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011)
No. homenurse 13.21*** 12.62*** 13.58*** 13.98*** 13.29***
patients (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age 43.20** 29.36* 18.90 18.16
(0.013) (0.066) (0.216) (0.254)
Proportion men -573.8 -604.8 -849.0 -1264.8
(0.530) (0.505) (0.355) (0.169)
Married or 242.2 -256.7 -118.2 334.3
partnership (0.762) (0.757) (0.883) (0.691)
Substitute leader 190.5** 174.1** 199.8**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.017)
∆ Function score 348.4** 337.2**
(0.028) (0.035)
Org. dummies Yes
Constant 308.6** -2667.4** -1649.8 -784.9 -559.5
(0.035) (0.032) (0.183) (0.506) (0.643)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
Within R2 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.547 0.553
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
As expected, we find a negative significant relationship between amount of home-
nurse hours and HBR. The coefficient changes marginally when introducing different
covariates and the p-value always stays below 0.01. Our estimates suggest that HBR
decreased the expected amount of home-nurse hours, approximately by 127 - 155
hours per month per home-nurse area from the month HBR where implemented.
As seen in Table II.5, the monthly average hours per area during 2014 - 2016 was
2,494 hours, so the HBR reduction is in the region of 5.5% - 6.3%. Moreover, we
find a positive significant effect of the CP sick leave variable with stable p-values and
coefficients across alternative specifications. Estimates indicate that a one percent
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point ceteris paribus variation in CP sick leave, leads to a variation of the expected
amount of home-nurse hours by 2 hours in the same direction. Based on the dynamics
described in Section II.2, this finding confirms the expected effect. At a first glance
the coefficient seems to be fairly low. But one has to consider that we only assess the
sick leave for CPs. Several employees are actually working with verdicts for home-
nurse hours. As was pointed out in Section II.2 the CPs hold the direct contact with
the home-nurse areas and work on NC notes. The overall CP sick leave during 2014
- 2016 was 3.4%, so the large jumps during some months will increase the amount of
hours substantially.
Interestingly, the sick leave in the home-nurse area has a negative significant effect
on home-nurse hours. Everything else fixed, a one percentage point increase (decrease)
would decrease (increase) the expected total hours by 9-10 hours per month. The
main explanation for this finding is that with increased sick leave home nurses have
less time to write NC notes. This leads to less adjustments in home-nurse hours.
Since most NC notes aim at an upward adjustment, less time to spend on NC notes
will reduce the total amount of notes issued. For the home-nurse area this is quite
costly. High sick leave will increase cost, but also as shown here, reduce potential
income. It is also logical that most of the NC notes are upward adjustments, since
one would expect a decrease in health status as patients gets older. Finally, the first
difference of the average total function score also has the expected positive significant
effect on home-nurse hours. Increasing function scores reflect a patient’s decaying
health status. A positive (negative) first difference in the average total function score
indicates a negative (positive) change of health states in the patient population of the
respective home-nurse area. Marginal changes in the first difference should trigger
changes in the expected home-care hours in the area in the same direction.
II.8.2 A comparison of HAC correction techniques
After reviewing our results concerning the role of absenteeism for the supply of a
care service, we present the related secondary findings demonstrating the effect of
alternative HAC techniques on the inference in the case at hand.
Our results are summarized in Tables II.6 - II.8. The information contained in
each table refers to the parameter estimate associated with a specific variable. In
particular, each table exhibits the p-values associated with the alternative standard
error correction methods reviewed in Section II.6: Arellano’s HAC, HACSC due to
Driscoll and Kraay, 1998, and Fixed-b which refers to HACSC adjusted standard
errors with fixed-b critical values proposed by Vogelsang, 2012. For the HACSC
version two columns have been included, one for each lag order selection (3 and 8).
The rows of the tables refer to the five model specifications corresponding to the
columns of Table II.5.
The detailed regression results for the different standard error correction methods
are presented in Appendix II.C. To facilitate an easy comparison the tables in the
appendix have the same structure as Table II.5. Given one table for each variable of




As indicated in Table II.3, there is cross-sectional dependence in CP sick leave. The
CD-statistic is not extreme, but high enough to be significant at the 1% significance
level. Given the fact that some CPs work with several home-nurse areas, one would
expect some dependence. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional dependence found, is not
severe. Since all p-values are less than 0.05, all correction techniques unanimously
imply a ”reject H0” decision. But we find convincing evidence for increased precision
with HACSC adjusted standard errors. The HACSC adjustment leads to smaller
standard errors and p-values, even with 8 lags and fixed-b critical value. Of course the
p-values increase in the fixed-b framework because of a higher critical value. The cross-
sectional dependence is not severe in this variable, and the HAC works reasonable well
in this case. But it still is associated with a loss of precision. The base line strategy
of ”no-correction” leads to the largest standard errors on this variable.
Table II.6: p-values and standard errors for contact person sick-leave
No HAC HACSC, HACSC, Fixed-b, Fixed-b,
correction 3 lags 8 lags 3 lags 8 lags
(1) 0.029 0.020 0.005 0.003 0.013 0.024
(0.931) (0.737) (0.689) (0.632) (0.689) (0.632)
(2) 0.053 0.029 0.015 0.013 0.030 0.057
(0.930) (0.710) (0.709) (0.691) (0.709) (0.691)
(3) 0.033 0.039 0.007 0.005 0.017 0.035
(0.905) (0.817) (0.682) (0.654) (0.682) (0.654)
(4) 0.012 0.027 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.015
(0.903) (0.881) (0.715) (0.636) (0.715) (0.636)
(5) 0.014 0.014 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.013
(0.902) (0.750) (0.698) (0.607) (0.698) (0.607)
Fixed-b 2.284 2.737
CV
Standard errors in parentheses
The pattern in p-values for the area sick leave closely resembles the one for CP
sick leave just described. This does not come as a surprise, once we take into account
the fact that the CD statistics given in Table II.3 for area sick leave (4.21) and CP
sick leave (4.88) only differ by 0.67.
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Table II.7: p-values and standard errors for area sick-leave
No HAC HACSC, HACSC, Fixed-b, Fixed-b,
correction 3 lags 8 lags 3 lags 8 lags
(1) 0.002 0.081 0.014 0.010 0.028 0.048
(1.859) (3.031) (2.276) (2.148) (2.276) (2.148)
(2) 0.001 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.033 0.063
(1.916) (2.461) (2.623) (2.571) (2.623) (2.571)
(3) 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.045
(1.981) (3.425) (3.351) (3.436) (3.351) (3.436)
(4) 0.000 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.044
(1.992) (3.368) (3.257) (3.232) (3.257) (3.232)
(5) 0.000 0.023 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.032
(2.017) (3.580) (3.148) (3.124) (3.148) (3.124)
Fixed-b 2.284 2.737
CV
Standard errors in parentheses
The p-values associated with the cases [specification (1), HAC] and [specification
(2), Fixed-b 8 lags] exceed the threshold value of 0.05. All other p-values lie below
0.05. The HACSC adjusted standard errors still tend to increase precision relative to
HAC adjusted errors. If no correction is carried out, the standard error seems to be
underestimated - the strength of evidence appears to be inflated. The opposite was
true for the case of CP sick leave. This shows how problematic regular FE model
standard errors are when standard assumptions are not fulfilled. HACSC with the
fixed-b values do produce slightly higher p-values compared with HACSC due to the
new critical value. Still with fixed-b and three lags adjustment, the values are lower
than those for HAC.
Compared to the CD statistic on the other two variables of interest, the CD-
statistic for home-based reablement turns out to be high. The value of 18.1 indicates
strong cross-sectional correlation. Such strong correlation is in line with the informa-
tion concerning HBR, its implementation and practice (four teams work across several
home-nurse areas), outlined in Section II.2. Thus, by design, the HBR variable will
exhibit quite severe cross-sectional dependence. One would therefore expect some
variation in the p-values once we control for the phenomenon.
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Table II.8: p-values and standard errors for HBR
No HAC HACSC, HACSC, Fixed-b, Fixed-b,
correction 3 lags 8 lags 3 lags 8 lags
(1) 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
(30.17) (94.66) (27.51) (28.95) (27.42) (29.41)
(2) 0.000 0.217 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.027
(30.94) (103.73) (38.46) (43.30) (38.40) (43.30)
(3) 0.000 0.151 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.026
(30.36) (99.55) (43.07) (48.63) (43.93) (49.92)
(4) 0.000 0.173 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.030
(30.57) (100.69) (43.09) (47.54) (43.72) (48.29)
(5) 0.000 0.168 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.028
(31.04) (98.11) (42.08) (46.38) (42.35) (4.58)
Fixed-b 2.284 2.737
CV
Standard errors in parentheses
The standard errors estimated with no-correction are considerably lower than the
ones obtained under some type of correction. One detects the same pattern in the
case of the p-values. Economists - almost by default - implement the HAC adjusted
standard errors, i.e. they report the output from STATA’s robust option. In the case
at hand, this alternative results in the largest standard errors and p-values among all
of the alternative correction strategies. If an analyst had based the inference on the
HAC option, her/his conclusion would have been completely at odds with the decisions
implied by all other alternatives. When one uses the HACSC correction, standard
errors and p-values drop, even with an 8 lags adjustment. It seems that the HAC
option struggles to handle the strong cross-sectional dependence in the HBR variable.
A second reason for the clear difference between HAC and the others can be related
to the fact that the HAC is based on large N and small T asymptotics. As with
others, one can see how the fixed-b critical values increases when the lag adjustment
increases. This is reflected in the higher p-values for the HACSC standard error with
the fixed-b critical values implemented.
II.9 Robustness check
Most graduate econometric textbooks like, Wooldridge, 2002 and Cameron and Trivedi,
2005, focus on short panels, where N → ∞ and T is fixed. The asymptotic proper-
ties of standard panel estimators, such as FE, hold for these short panel dimensions.
Asymptotic analysis is valid for arbitrary time dependence alongside distributional
heterogeneity across t with fixed T (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 250). Wooldridge, p. 250
points out that it is suitable to view the cross-section observations as independent and
identically distributed with large N asymptotics, i.e. one would not have to consider
CSD. As argued above, CSD could be controlled for using HACSC adjusted standard
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errors in the standard FE model. Based on simulated data exhibiting traditional
HACSC problems, Vogelsang, 2012 presents results for an FE model with HACSC
adjusted errors, with and without fixed-b critical values. According to his findings,
the FE model with HACSC adjusted errors alongside fixed-b critical values provided
superior results. This holds for long panels (T > N), and even for fairly small sam-
ples. As described by Vogelsang, with fixed T there is not enough information in
the time dimension relative to the cross-section dimension for Driscoll and Kraay’s
approach to work.
Some econometricians would argue that choosing the FE estimator for a long
panel is not appropriate, even if the standard errors are corrected using a technique
based on long-panel asymptotics. An alternative estimator, which is based on fixed
N and T → ∞, is Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Zellner,
1962; Zellner, 1963; Zellner and Huang, 1962). The SUR model specifies one linear
regression equation for each of the N home-nurse areas, each with T observations
and an individual error term. For our case that would imply 11 equations, with 36
observations. One stacks these N equations to obtain the SUR model. The equation
specific error terms are assumed to have a zero mean, to be i.i.d and homoskedastic
for each (across) home-nurse area. The individual errors, however, are assumed to be
correlated across home-nurse areas (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, p. 163). Typically,
the feasible generalized least-squares (FGLS) principle is invoked to estimate the
parameters of the SUR model.
SUR models are often estimated with heterogeneous treatment effect, but in Sec-
tions II.2 and II.4 we argue for and present a regression model with a homogeneous
treatment effect. To ensure comparability between the model presented in Section
II.4 and the SUR model used in the robustness check, we impose linear coefficient
constraints on the SUR model. In the SUR context one cannot not use time dum-
mies, because the full rank assumption would not be fulfilled. Our FE model has time
dummies to capture potential seasonal effects. To allow for some seasonal effects in
the SUR model, heterogenous quarterly dummies have been included.
The estimation results for alternative specifications of the SUR models are pre-
sented in Table II.9. All parameters of interest are significant on the 5% level. The
estimated effects of both sick leave parameters are of the same magnitude as the results
presented in Section II.8.1. The estimated effect of HBR is, however, smaller in the
SUR model. Still the parameter estimate from the SUR model suggests that HBR has
lead to a reduction in expected home-nurse hours. Our findings from the SUR model
are in line with our results presented in Section II.8.1. They clearly support our initial
findings. The SUR model will not necessary capture the potential auto-correlation
within each home-nurse area and as mentioned, it assumes homoskedasticity within
equation variance. This assumption is not necessary unrealistic in our case, but in
case this assumption is not fulfilled on can bootstrap the standard errors for the SUR
model.
Table II.9 also presents our SUR model with bootstrapped errors. The significance
level associated with HBR drops for specification (1), and the respective levels drop
for CP sick leave for regression models (2) and (3). By and large the results presented
replicated and all parameters of interest are still significant at the 10% level.
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Table II.9: SUR model results - with linear constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours
HBR -45.13*** -60.04*** -55.95*** -60.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
[0.017] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000]
CP sick leave 2.226*** 1.746** 1.764** 1.841**
(0.000) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013)
[0.035] [0.071] [0.068] [0.036]
Area sick leave -5.002*** -4.934*** -5.519*** -5.943***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001]
No. home-nurse patients 12.23*** 11.38*** 11.54*** 12.03***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Average age 47.15*** 38.68*** 29.61***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002
[0.000] [0.002] [0.009]
Proportion of Men -2.508 94.97 97.70
(0.995) (0.816) (0.825)
[0.997] [0.872] [0.860]
Married or partnership 879.3*** 841.3*** 762.8**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
[0.019] [0.028] [0.036]
Substitute leader 86.36*** 62.94**
(0.009) (0.048)
[0.052] [0.144]
Diff. function score 338.4***
(0.001)
[0.008]
Heterogeneous constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385
p-values in parentheses
p-values in brackets based on bootstrapped errors, 400 repetitions, seed = 1234
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, based on standard errors, not bootstrapped
II.10 Discussion and conclusion
In the course of their theoretical investigation of absenteeism, Pauly et al., 2002 find
for the case of team production and substantial team-specific human capital, that
the value of output lost due to absence will exceed the wage per day of the absent
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employee. I.e. the employer faces a cost component to absenteeism which exceeds
that of wages lost. Our empirical findings support this prediction. For the case of
an administrative office/agency in the Norwegian health sector which organizes its
care service production in teams relying in a crucial manner on team-specific-human
capital, we find that due to a ceteris paribus increase in CP sick leave one can expect
an inflation in the amount of home-nurse hours allocated.
Our findings with respect to CP sick leave are in line with empirical results pre-
sented by Nicholson et al., 2006. The authors approximate job-specific multipliers
that reflect cost of sick leave which goes beyond the employees daily wage. For in-
stance, a registered nurse at a physician’s office and a receptionist at a physician’s
office, have estimated 3-day cost of absence multipliers of 1.28 and 1.27 respectively.
That is, 3 days of absence cost 28% more than daily wages alone.
Even though our CP’s job profiles do not match the profiles for the jobs considered
in Nicholson et al., 2006 exactly, we may calculate a CP specific multiplier. For the
CP’s, 3 days of absence in one month is equivalent to 13.6% sick leave. If the expected
monthly sick leave value is zero, based on result in Table II.5, 3 days extra absence for
one CP would translate into 27 extra home-nurse hours for the specific month ceteris
paribus. With cost per home-nurse hour of approximately 600 NOK, the extra month
specific cost over and above daily wages would be 16,400 NOK, which translate into
a multiplier of 1.3017. The order of magnitude of this estimate closely matches the
multipliers for health related jobs reported in Nicholson et al., 2006.
When interviewed on the topic, the management of the administrative office
pointed out that the unit had operated under a stationary, yet barely sufficient staffing
level throughout the sample period (despite the challenges coming from the demo-
graphic development). This fact alone may have contributed to the observed level of
sick leave. In addition, in a setting where it is difficult to substitute absentees due to
the relevance of team-specific-human capital, the negative effects of sick leave will be
severe. In such a situation, even a slight increase in manpower could actually reduce
sick leave, and allow the unit to respond in a robust manner to additional stressors
as, for instance, sick leave.
The latter results are especially interesting in the light of our finding that increased
sick leave in the home-nurse area tends to reduce the amount of home-nurse hours.
Unlike in the case of the administrative unit, the management of the home-nurse area
can rely on a pool of back-up employees in the case of unexpected sick leave notices.
Even if the stand-in is a close substitute for an experienced nurse, (s)he might still
have to operate under more severe time constraints (e.g. due to the time elapsing
between the registration of a sick leave note and the time at which the substitute
becomes available). Given the reduced time frame, a nurse will most likely prioritize
the care function over the administrative effort associated with writing the note. In
any case, the substitute may not be perfect. Often stand-ins are younger home-nurses
with little prior exposure to the NC note system. They might therefore act extremely
careful, in addition to being even more time constrained than a perfect substitute
17Based on an annual salary of 500,000 NOK, which is multiplied with 30% to account for public
pension and Norwegian payroll tax. After adjustment, annual cost equals 650,000 NOK, and monthly
54,167 NOK. Cost due to extra hours (16, 400/54, 000) + 1 = 1.3. All cost are based on 2018 NOK.
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simply due to a lack of familiarity with the cases (s)he is assigned to. As a result
such substitutes will be biased against writing NC notes. If no substitute is available,
then the work schedules of nurses currently on duty will be readjusted such that the
appropriate level of care can be received by all patients. Also in this case, it is likely
that the administrative chore of writing NC notes will not be high on the list of a
home nurse’s priorities. Thus, one should expect a reduction in home-nurse hours as
a consequence of sick leave.
The findings presented in Table II.5 also show that, everything else being equal,
the introduction of HBR leads to a reduction in expected home-nurse hours. One
might think of this result as being indicative of the fact that the new care strategy
(treatment) works as intended, and therefore patients need less home-nurse hours.
However, we cannot rule out the reduction in home-nurse hours overstates the re-
duction in need for home-care services. The multidisciplinary HBR team typically
consists of a physiotherapist, an occupational therapists, a nurse and a home helper.
Once such teams become operational in a home-nurse area they might absorb some
functions/chores that previously had been administered by home-nurses. For in-
stance, a physical therapist might pay an extra visit to see how the patient is doing.
Thereby (s)he fulfills a function typically performed by a home nurse. Since certain
occupations in the HBR teams are not financed by the pay-for-performance system
introduced in Section II.2 but operate under a regular budget, the available data do
not allow us to account for such phenomena.
The use of HAC adjusted standard errors seems to be the ”norm” in applied
research using FE estimation. Table II.2 clearly shows that our standard error is
CSD alongside with HAC. Failing to take this into account and base inference on the
”norm”, would yield less convincing results. As clearly shown in Tables II.6 - II.8,
all HACSC adjusted standard errors produce lower p-values compared to the ”norm”
HAC. This usually also holds when applying HACSC adjustment with more restrictive
fixed-b critical values. For the most restrictive fixed-b setup, lag 8, one could see a
slight tendency for higher p-values, but overall they are still lower than those of the
HAC version. Using the standard ”norm” would not yield different inference for
the two sick leave variables, but the evidence would be less convincing. Using the
”norm” on HBR would, however, yield totally different inference. Seen in Table II.3,
the HBR variable has an extreme CD statistic and the two others have not. The
”norm” apparently fails to take this strong dependence into account. We are able to
identify the above because of the randomness in case allocation illustrated in Figure
II.4. Without this key feature, one could not necessarily rule out that the factors
causing CSD in the variables and the standard errors, are not correlated. If such a
relationship existed, the above method would yield inconsistent coefficients. The case
at hand demonstrates that, in the context of applied econometrics, the knowledge of
the underlying system is crucial for the choice of an adequate statistical technique.
Intricate system knowledge is essential for the modelling process as well as for optimal
inference.
To our knowledge, there does not exist any applicable method handling CSD with-
out the randomness for a small N large T case. This is something we would like to
see in the future, but also acknowledge the difficulties developing such methods. For
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future research it would be intriguing to develop theoretical models for such adminis-
tration offices based on traditional principal-agent-theory. Extending theoretical work
from Pauly et al., 2002 to also include the effects of non-comparable substitutes would
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II.A Appendix A: Variable list
Table II.A.1: Variable list
Variable Comment
Home-nurse hours Sum allocated home-nurse hour per month for each area
CP sick leave Contact-persons sick leave, originally measured in per-
centage, but multiplied with 100 for easier interpretation
Area sick leave Area sick leave, adjusted as above
Number of home-nurse pa-
tients
The number of home-nurse patients per month for each
area, whom generated the sum hours
Average age Average age for patients in each area
Proportion of Men The percentage of male patients for each area
Married or in partnership The percentage of patients whom are married or in a
partnership for each area
Substitute leader Binary variable equal 1 in the periods for the areas using
substitute leader
Function score Mean function score for each area per month
Organizational dummy -
zone1
Binary variable capturing increase in geographical size
Organizational dummy -
zone2
Binary variable capturing decrease in geographical size
Organizational dummy -
apartments
Binary variable reduction in responsibility for service
apartments
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II.B Appendix B: Unit-root tests
Table II.B.1: Unit-root test results, reported p-values
Levin-Lin-Chu testa Im-Pesaran-Shin testb
BIC AIC BIC AIC
Homenurse hours* 0.0191 0.0086 0.0587 0.0315
No. home-nurse patients* 0.0007 0.0013 0.0021 0.0029
CP sick-leave** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Area sick-leave 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Average age 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009
Proportion of Men 0.0281 0.0168 0.0439 0.0255
Married or partnership* 0.0021 0.0023 0.0305 0.0275
Function score 0.3335 0.2630 0.2810 0.2069
Diff. function score 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
aRecommended for moderate sample size, T grows faster then N , H0 = contains unit root
bJustified by using sequential limit theory, works best with a large T and at least moderate N
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for specifying lags
Akaike information criterion (AIC) for specifying lags
*Linear time trend included
**CS averages subtracted from the series to relax the CS independence assumption
CS = Cross-sectional
Both test, Levin et al., 2002 and Im et al., 2003, have the null hypothesis that all
panels contain a unit root. We clearly can not reject the null for function score, and
will therefor use the first difference of function score in our analysis. All other have
low p-values for all different version the two unit-root tests, and we reject the null
and conclude that all other variables are stationary.
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II.C Appendix C: Results - different standard error
correction
Table II.C.1: Regression results - no SE adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours hours
HBR -126.5*** -136.6*** -154.8*** -147.9*** -146.0***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CP sick-leave 2.047** 1.807* 1.939** 2.277** 2.238**
(0.029) (0.053) (0.033) (0.012) (0.014)
Area sick-leave -5.882*** -6.546*** -9.581*** -9.153*** -9.584***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No home-nurse 13.21*** 12.62*** 13.58*** 13.97*** 13.29***
patients (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age 43.20*** 29.36** 18.90 18.16
(0.004) (0.049) (0.207) (0.226)
Proportion men -573.8 -604.8 -849.0 -1264.8**
(0.280) (0.242) (0.105) (0.030)
Married or 242.2 -256.7 -118.2 334.3
partnership (0.588) (0.567) (0.796) (0.512)
Substitute leader 190.5*** 174.1*** 199.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Function score 348.4*** 337.2***
(0.006) (0.008)
Org. dummies Yes
Constant 308.6** -2667.3** -1649.8 -784.9 -559.5
(0.043) (0.017) (0.136) (0.481) (0.620)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
Within R2 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.547 0.553
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table II.C.2: Regression results - HAC adjusted (robust)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours hours
HBR -126.5 -136.6 -154.8 -147.9 -146.0
(0.211) (0.217) (0.151) (0.173) (0.168)
CP sick-leave 2.047** 1.807** 1.939** 2.277** 2.238**
(0.020) (0.029) (0.039) (0.027) (0.014)
Area sick-leave -5.882* -6.546** -9.581** -9.153** -9.584**
(0.081) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
No home-nurse 13.21*** 12.62*** 13.58*** 13.97*** 13.29***
patients (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age 43.20 29.36 18.90 18.16
(0.189) (0.188) (0.389) (0.472)
Proportion men -573.8 -604.8 -849.0 -1264.8
(0.643) (0.614) (0.480) (0.404)
Married or 242.2 -256.7 -118.2 334.3
partnership (0.791) (0.780) (0.909) (0.749)
Substitute leader 190.5** 174.1** 199.8**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.028)
∆ Function score 348.4** 337.2**
(0.049) (0.045)
Org. dummies Yes
Constant 308.6 -2667.3 -1649.8 -784.9 -559.5
(0.136) (0.263) (0.302) (0.617) (0.753)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
Within R2 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.547 0.553
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table II.C.3: Regression results - HACSC, lag 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours hours
HBR -126.5*** -136.6*** -154.8*** -147.9*** -146.0***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
CP sick-leave 2.047*** 1.807** 1.939*** 2.277*** 2.238***
(0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Area sick-leave -5.882** -6.546** -9.581*** -9.153*** -9.584***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
No home-nurse 13.21*** 12.62*** 13.58*** 13.97*** 13.29***
patients (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age 43.20*** 29.36** 18.90 18.16
(0.006) (0.041) (0.175) (0.213)
Proportion men -573.8 -604.8 -849.0 -1264.8
(0.504) (0.476) (0.317) (0.131)
Married or 242.2 -256.7 -118.2 334.3
partnership (0.750) (0.746) (0.878) (0.675)
Substitute leader 190.5** 174.1** 199.8***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.007)
∆ Function score 348.4** 337.2**
(0.014) (0.018)
Org. dummies Yes
Constant 308.6** -2667.3** -1649.8 -784.9 -559.5
(0.019) (0.017) (0.144) (0.477) (0.623)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
Within R2 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.547 0.553
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table II.C.4: Regression results - HACSC, lag 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours hours
HBR -126.5*** -136.6*** -154.8*** -147.9*** -146.0***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
CP sick-leave 2.047*** 1.807** 1.939*** 2.277*** 2.238***
(0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Area sick-leave -5.882*** -6.546** -9.581*** -9.153*** -9.584***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004)
No home-nurse 13.21*** 12.62*** 13.58*** 13.97*** 13.29***
patients (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age 43.20*** 29.36** 18.90 18.16
(0.004) (0.039) (0.205) (0.241)
Proportion men -573.8 -604.8 -849.0 -1264.8
(0.474) (0.467) (0.310) (0.110)
Married or 242.2 -256.7 -118.2 334.3
partnership (0.753) (0.745) (0.878) (0.686)
Substitute leader 190.5** 174.1** 199.8***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.008)
∆ Function score 348.4*** 337.2***
(0.002) (0.003)
Org. dummies Yes
Constant 308.6*** -2667.3** -1649.8 -784.9 -559.5
(0.002) (0.021) (0.185) (0.541) (0.665)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
Within R2 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.547 0.553
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table II.C.5: Regression results - Fixed-b, lag 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse Home-nurse
hours hours hours hours hours
HBR -126.5*** -136.6** -154.8** -147.9** -146.0**
(0.004) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
CP sick-leave 2.047** 1.807* 1.939** 2.277** 2.238**
(0.024) (0.057) (0.035) (0.015) (0.013)
Area sick-leave -5.882** -6.546* -9.581** -9.153** -9.584**
(0.048) (0.063) (0.045) (0.044) (0.032)
No. home-nurse 13.21*** 12.62*** 13.58*** 13.98*** 13.29***
patients (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age 43.20** 29.36 18.90 18.16
(0.029) (0.107) (0.301) (0.336)
Proportion men -573.8 -604.8 -849.0 -1264.8
(0.539) (0.533) (0.398) (0.203)
Married or 242.2 -256.7 -118.2 334.3
partnership (0.778) (0.771) (0.890) (0.722)
Substitute leader 190.5* 174.1* 199.8**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.043)
∆ Function score 348.4** 337.2**
(0.022) (0.025)
Org. dummies Yes
Constant 308.6** -2667.4* -1649.8 -784.9 -559.5
(0.018) (0.075) (0.280) (0.598) (0.703)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 385 385
Within R2 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.547 0.553
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Over the past decades we have witnessed an explosion in the quantity and quality
of data bases holding information about individuals. The public discourse resonat-
ing this development has generated a wide spectrum of views on the phenomenon.
Portrayed by some as a curse, others see a blessing in our ability to amass individual-
level data. For science in general, and for social scientists/economists in particular,
such rich datasets provide additional opportunities to answer new relevant economic
research questions. In response to the growing availability of individual data, dis-
tinct subfields of statistics/econometrics have developed. This is substantiated in the
following quotation taken from Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 4
Processing and econometric analysis of such large microdatabases, with
the objective of uncovering patterns of economic behavior, constitutes the
core of microeconometrics.
The panel-data methodology developed in microeconometrics, for example, provides
the methodological backbone of a project which tries to asses an innovative care
intervention (home based reablement HBR) offered in Norwegian municipalities. Our
effort to address a new research problem in the context of health economics involves
a large dataset. The insight into the economic aspects of the care strategy that we
provide today might be considered by policy makers in designing an economically
viable and sustainable future care sector. We believe that society might benefit from
the use of a large set of individual patient data in the case at hand.
This paper documents the construction of the dataset we used in the HBR study.
Focussing on the various dimensions of the construction process - institutional mat-
ters, legal aspects, organizational issues, IT-problems and statistical issues - we hope
to provide a guideline/orientation for researchers planning this type of work in the
future.
Moreover, by means of this effort we try to increase the replicability of the re-
search performed under the HBR project. Reviewing the relevant literature, we found
that many papers do not give sufficient attention to the process in which data were
collected/generated (Bersvendsen et al., 2019). Probably due to constraints set by
journals and/or editors the process of data generation often remains a black box for
outsiders. By providing an informative description of the data production process,
we aim at eradicating this typical deficit.
Finally, we intent to provide a unique view of the statistical technique of data im-
putation as a solution to an apparent dilemma experienced by many researchers.
Owners of sensible private information (individual data) have to adhere to legal
rules protecting the private sphere of individuals when data are made available to
researchers. Therefore data are anonymized. The datasets received by the researcher
often allow, at best, for suboptimal statistical inference. Thus the information avail-
able for the policy maker will not be optimal. The subsequent decision making may
not be in the best interest of society. We demonstrate how statistical imputation
techniques can be used to reconstruct a research dataset with the goal to improve the
precision of statistical inference.
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III.1. INTRODUCTION
Among economist and econometricians, the extra benefits of precise and rich panel
data are well known. Being able to control for individual heterogeneity, increased
efficiency and the possibility to study dynamics are all desirable benefits of panel data
(Baltagi, 2013, p. 6). The panel data literature has predominantly been focussed on
micro panels with a large number of cross-sections (N) and a small time dimension
(T ). With an increased availability of data, there has been a movement towards
models with both large N and T . The fairly new models by Pesaran, 2006, Bai,
2009 and Chudik and Pesaran, 2015, which adjust for unobserved common factors
potentially correlated with the regressors, are good examples for such large N and T
models. The properties of both old and new statistical estimators, are typically only
known in the asymptotic case (Green, 2003; Baltagi et al., 2008).
The dataset we constructed is large in terms of both N and T . It was created
based on information held in several separate Norwegian health registers. Norway is
in a rather rare situation that key services as schooling, social welfare, and health,
are exclusively provided by the public sphere. All national register data is therefor
often mandatory, of high quality, and covers almost the entire Norwegian population.
These features definitely characterize the four health registers that delivered the data
which, after being merged, constituted an unique individual monthly panel covering
the time-period from 2011 to 2015.
Although initially created to answer cost questions regarding a new rehabilitation
intervention referred to as HBR, the data could certainly be used to find solutions to
a variety of research problems. Even though Norway has amassed interesting data,
the extraction and merging processes are cumbersome. In our case, not all necessary
support systems were in place. Thus new routines had to be designed in order to
generate the dataset. Certain data operations/transformations and manipulations
could only be carried out by the organizations owning the data. The activities of
those organizations have to be coordinated. In essence, the researcher relies to a
large degree on the willingness and the ability of the data owning organizations to
cooperate and share their resources.
The time elapsed between the first application to the availability of the final work-
able dataset amounted to almost three years. There is definitely room for organisa-
tional improvements. After all, in the current institutional setting characterizing the
research landscape, such a time-consuming process might be viewed as prohibitive
(or at least as a disincentive) for a researcher. The latter issue has recently been
elaborated on in Norwegian print media1.
A part of finding the right balance, legal requirements needed the dataset to be
anonymized. In the course of this process some observations had to be deleted or sup-
pressed. An algorithm based on four variables was used to mark observations for sup-
pression, and thereafter the associated service data where deleted for the suppressed
observations. Creating a univariate missing data pattern. Since one can observe the
four variables used in the algorithm, the missing value process is defined as missing at
random (MAR). Meaning that, conditional on observed data, the probability of data
missing does not depend on unobserved data. From a theoretical point of view MAR
1www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt
83
III.2. DATA COLLECTION AND ANONYMIZATION
is a desirable property and most imputation techniques and their implementations
(statistical software) assume such a pattern (Buuren et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2014;
Stata 15 Base Reference Manual 2017).
We tried to counter the negative statistical effects of data suppression by apply-
ing imputation techniques. Below we will document the accuracy of conventional
imputation techniques in a big-data context. In a comparison of various imputation
techniques Kleinke et al., 2011 found that standard methods like fully conditional
specification (FCS), with the likes of Predictive Mean Matching (PMM), where hardly
outperformed by new imputation techniques specifically designed for panel data. Thus
we choose this method as our principal imputation strategy. Depending on the nature
of the variables being imputed adequate variants of the PMM have been employed
(Raghunathan et al., 2001).
The operational characteristics of the imputation techniques to be employed were
carefully assessed. All test imputation proved accurate for the mean and standard
deviation. The accuracy is so high that for instance on binary variables, the mean
and standard deviation is identical up to the fourth decimal. However, all techniques
underestimate the frequency of service usages, resulting in an overestimated ”within”
standard deviation. With a large dataset, it is argued, that it is beneficial to have only
one complete dataset. Interestingly, with great variable insight, simple interpolation
proved to work remarkably well for ceratin variables. Test results for the latter,
showed that one is able to perfectly estimate the true value in 97% of the case with
a 50% missing rate. When applied, the imputation strategy is used on 1.9% of the
total 7,951,682 observations on 154,839 patients.
Documenting the process of constructing the dataset, we naturally focus on the
HBR context. However, the process could be replicated for other new interventions of
special interest, like new home-based e-health services. Apparently the value-added
of our contribution can be derived from the fact that the process described below
can be implemented in a wide range of health care related research problems. Future
researchers can benefit from the experiences we outline below.
In Section III.2, both the data collection and the anonymization process are ex-
plained in detail. Section III.3 documents how adequate imputation strategies were
identified. In each case a careful discussion of test results allows for an assessment of
the quality of the imputation process leading to the complete dataset. A short sum-
mary of the complete dataset is given in Section III.4. A short discussion in Section
5 finalizes the paper.
III.2 Data collection and anonymization
III.2.1 Bird’s eye view of the data collection process
Norway has several health registers containing individual health data on both the
primary- and specialist care level. These data repositories have been assembled at
high cost by the society. Data from selected registers constitute the basis of our in-
vestigation into the short- and long term effects of HBR, which in Norway is provided
84
III.2. DATA COLLECTION AND ANONYMIZATION
by municipalities. To be specific, we rely on data from the following health registers,
(i) Registry for Individual-based Nursing and Care Statistics (IPLOS), (ii) Norwe-
gian Patient Registry (NPR), (iii) Register for Control and Payment of Primary care
Reimbursement Scheme (KUHR) and (iv) Statistics Norway (SSB). By connecting
multiple data records from these sources, a unique panel-data set is created. Since
measurements are taken at an individual level, the analyst can keep track of an indi-
vidual’s use of various health-care services over time. The different health registers as
well as the information extracted from them is described in detail in Section III.2.1.1.
The extracted population, contains data points collected over 5 years, from 2011
up to and including 2015, in selected municipalities. Since none of the registers listed
above holds information concerning a patient’s use of HBR, the Norwegian personal
number (P.no) of persons who had received HBR had to be collected ”manually” by
the author. Due to the apparent difficulties/cost caused by collecting HBR data in
such a way for all Norwegian municipalities, only observations from selected admin-
istrative entities have been included in the study.
Apart from feasibility considerations, a set of explicit criteria governed the munic-
ipalities selection process. In particular we applied (i) a binary treatment criterion,
(ii) a size criterion as well as (iii) an experience criterion. Under (i) only municipali-
ties that have implemented the HBR strategy alongside a conventional care strategy
qualify for inclusion. Under the size criterion (ii) fairly populous municipalities be-
come candidates for selection. Thereby we aim at a high potential variation on the
municipality level. Finally, to avoid capturing predominantly transient phenomena,
the experience criterion (iii) favors the inclusion of municipalities that have gathered
sufficient experience with administering the care strategy itself and that have accumu-
lated ”know how” concerning the management of the respective HBR units. Taking
these criteria as well as feasibility considerations into account, the following 10 Norwe-
gian municipalities were selected: Arendal, Bærum, Bergen, Drammen, Kristiansand,
Oslo, Sandefjord, Trondheim and Tromsø.
III.2.1.1 Health registers and data
Various types of health related data flow from different stakeholders to various health
related data registers. These registers operate under the auspices of the Norwegian
Directorate of Health (NDH). They serve different purposes and, to some degree, play
different roles in the Norwegian health system. Each register has its own data process-
ing unit2. The three registers that became central data repositories for our project
will be described below. In each case, we present a short profile of the institution and
describe the data we received from the respective register3.
Registry for Individual-based Nursing and Care Statistics (IPLOS): The purpose of
this register is to collect and manage data from Norwegian municipalities on persons
who have applied for, receive or have received health and care services. The reporting
to IPLOS is mandatory for municipalities. In our context, the essential to point out
2For the relevant information see Norwegian Parliament proposition 106 L (2015-2016)
3A detailed introduction to the registers - written in Norwegian - can be found here
85
III.2. DATA COLLECTION AND ANONYMIZATION
that the register relies on pseudonyms rather than on personal numbers (P.no) to
identify individuals4.
IPLOS uses data to monitor, to assure quality of service, to plan development
and overall management of the health and care services. Data is also collected to
provide a basis for research. In short, IPLOS contains three types of information on
individuals: (i) background information such as gender, age, municipality of residence
etc, (ii) information to assess service needs, mainly living situation and function score,
and (iii) service information. For (iii), IPLOS contains 26 different service types. Due
to anonymization issues, we could not access specific data on all the 26 different types.
Instead, the information has been aggregated (grouped) into 3 variables. The first
variable, measured in hours, contains service type 1, 2, 3, and 15. The first three
types are different versions of home care and type 15 is traditional home service such
as home-nurse services. All service types measured in amount of days are summarized
into the second variable. It includes three different short-term institution service types
18, 19, 20 as well as service type 21 referring to stays in a long-term institution. The
third variable is binary, indicating whether an individual received one or the other
service type.
Norwegian Patient Registry (NPR): According to the NPR regulation, the motives
for creating the registry coincide with those outlined in the IPLOS context. The main
difference, however, is that NPR is designed for specialist care. That is, NPR mainly
collects and interprets data provided by Norwegian hospitals. In addition, NPR data
is used in a national activity based funding mechanism for somatic services. The
hospitals are financed by the amount of Diagnosis-related Groups (DRG) points,
which are administered by NPR.
The information held in the register resembles the information contained in IPLOS
to some degree. But, as one would expect, there is a stronger emphasis on detailed
medical information. Our project relied on NPR data concerning hospital stays (num-
ber of days spend in a hospital per month) and visits to polyclinics (number of visits
per month) differentiated according to somatic or psychiatric. Moreover, we drew on
information about a patient’s main diagnosis group.
Register for Control and Payment of Primary care Reimbursement Scheme (KUHR):
While NPR and IPLOS are both defined as health registers, KUHR is not. KUHR has
been established to administer the national finance system for general practitioners
(GP) and other health professionals, who provide services and receive reimbursements
founded on the Norwegian National Insurance act. The compensation for GPs and
physiotherapists is based on a set of detailed activities defined by sperate codes. The
service provider links these codes to a patient’s ID and transfers the data to KUHR
which is responsible for storing and managing this information. We requested infor-
mation concerning different activities of GPs and physiotherapists from KUHR. The
categories were adequately aggregated per individual on a monthly basis.
HBR is targeted toward recipients of home care services, which in Norway is mainly
provided by municipalities. IPLOS is the health register containing all data from
services provided by municipalities, and therefore it is the natural ”starting point” for
4In 2018, IPLOS has been replaced by a new register called municipal patient and user register.
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creating the dataset. Data from NPR and KUHR need to be connected to the sample
drawn from IPLOS. Connecting the registers in this order, and merging data volumes
characteristic for our case, is not common and posed substantial difficulties. Studies
based on health register data in Norway typically take a data sample from NPR, and
thereafter merge/match the sample with data from other registers. Several routines
and technical solutions are available to support such a protocol. Similar solutions do
not exist for the case in which the initial sample is extracted from IPLOS. The root
of the complications lies in the fact that NPR and KUHR both use the Norwegian
P.no as the identification key, whereas IPLOS uses pseudonyms.
In addition to data from IPLOS, NPR, and KUHR some socio-demographic vari-
ables were collected from Statistics Norway (SSB). As will be pointed out below, SSB
also played a key role in the process of merging the data coming in from IPLOS, NPR,
and KUHR.
As pointed out above, the three national data registers have been designed to serve
different purposes, and they clearly differ in many respects. One of those differences
becomes apparent to the researcher as (s)he applies for data. Since KUHR is not
classified as a health register in the strict sense, researchers applying for data from
the registry face ethical requirements that are less stringent than those formulated by
IPLOS and NPR.
III.2.1.2 Application process
When confronted with the idea of combining data from the said registers, a senior
adviser in one of the health registers initially responded by stating ...that is not
possible5. Thus, from the outset of the project phase, it was clear that by trying to
combine data from IPLOS, NPR, and KUHR we were moving into unknown territory.
To our knowledge there was no precedence for the type of data merger we were
trying to facilitate. Complications were anticipated but the spectrum of problems
we encountered was, by far, broader than what we expected. The complications we
experienced were basically caused by institutional factors and by technical modalities.
With respect to the former, we understand that there may be good legal and/or po-
litical reasons to design and maintain three different health related registers. However,
seen from the perspective of the researcher relying on the registers as a data source,
the heterogeneity of the institutions poses a hinderance. There is, for instance, no
uniform application protocol. Administrative aspects of application procedures vary,
so do legal and ethical requirements. Moreover, also our post-application experiences
suggests that the rules regulating the different registers do not necessarily facilitate
the cooperation between the registers. To the outsider it appears that the registers
were not primarily designed to work together.
To exemplify the effect of such conditions on the progress of the project, we docu-
ment the time line of the process from the first application to the final delivery of the
workable dataset in Table III.1. A glance at the table reveals that the entire process,
took almost three years.
5Taken from phone conversation.
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Typically a significant amount of administrative work had to be completed in
periods between the key events listed in Table III.1. The whole process could have
been shortened substantially, if NPR had not used 11 months to transfer the data
to SSB. According to the invoice from NPR, the institution used exactly 24 hours to
complete the project during the time period marked by the signing the contract and
the time of data delivery. Because of this delay, the data merger and anonymization
process assigned to SSB had to be postponed.
The details given in the table should allow for a sufficient estimate of the cost
in terms of waiting time and frustration experienced by the researchers. Evidently,
these cost are not attributable to administrative aspects alone. Rather, they arose
out of the interplay between administrative and technical factors. Since it maybe
instructive/constructive for researchers trying to merge data from the said registers
in the future, we devote the subsequent section to technical challenges and their
solutions.
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Table III.1: Time line of the application process
Date Event
22.09.15 Application send to The Regional Committees of Medical and Health
Research Ethics (REK)
11.11.15 REK verdict: application not approved
19.02.16 Application to Norwegian Center for Research data - data protection
service (NSD) and updated REK application submitted
07.04.16 REK application approved
04.05.16 NSD application approved and forwarded to The Norwegian Data Pro-
tection Authority (NDPA) for further consideration
10.06.16 Application for KUHR data send
14.07.16 NDPA application approved
17.07.16 Application for NPR data send - submission of a missing document
delayed the NPR process by 2 monhts
21.07.16 Application for IPLOS data send
29.07.16 Application for SSB data send
22.08.16 KUHR application approved
25.08.16 IPLOS application approved
03.10.16 SSB assigns the case worker responsible for data merger and
anonymization
07.12.16 Signed agreement send to SSB
15.12.16 NPR application approved
05.01.17 Signed agreement send to NPR - waiting for NPR case-worker
09.02.17 KUHR data send to SSB
13.02.17 HBR data send to SSB
08.11.17 NPR data send to SSB
09.03.18 SSB delivers complete dataset to researcher (1st time)
04.04.18 SSB delivers data (2nd time), after correcting an error discovered by
researcher
16.04.18 SSB delivers data (3rd time), after correcting an error in the second
version discovered by resarcher
31.05.18 Last meeting with SSB; discussion of potential suppression errors in
latest dataset
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III.2.1.3 Data linkage
When data are transferred from the municipalities to IPLOS, they are sent with P.no
as the identification key. Before IPLOS can receive the data, the P.no has to be
converted into pseudonyms. This is done by a credible pseudonym administrator
(CPA), which is The Norwegian Tax Administration in the case of IPLOS. According
to the Norwegian health register law, the CPA shall be independent of both the data
processor and the data owner. The Norwegian Directorate of Health is the owner
of IPLOS data, but the data process responsibilities have been delegated to SSB.
NPR and KUHR do not operate with these pseudonyms. Since the conversion of
pseudonyms to IPLOS is not reversible, the P.no’s in the data records from KUHR
and NPR need to be substituted by adequate pseudonyms before connecting with
IPLOS.
Figure III.1: Data flow and connection process
As Figure III.1 illustrates, the data connection and flow is decomposed into two
processes. In process 1, NPR, KUHR and SSB send data on the respective requested
variables for all registered inhabitants directly to the CPA for replacing P.no with
pseudonymes. This is done only for the designated municipalities. The records from
these registers that do not match with the IPLOS population are dropped. Process
2 only differs in that the researcher sends the HBR data to the CPA because it has
been collected manually.
Process 1: IPLOS uses an encryption software called RegKrypt. This software
should always be used when connecting other data sources with IPLOS. RegKrypt
will encrypt a comma separated file with register data and generate an xml file that
is sent to IPLOS for connecting the data. NPR, KUHR and SSB will run RegKrypt
on a computer in a safe zone, i.e. a zone that is isolated from the internet. RegKrypt
will then encrypt the data on the individual level with an encryption key from IPLOS.
This encrypted file is then transferred to a computer connected to the internet via the
sender module RegBestilling through a web-address at CPA. The part of the file that
contains the P.no will then be decrypted by CPA and replaced with pseudonyms. The
CPA does not have the possibility to decrypt other data than P.no. Thereafter the
file is sent to IPLOS where an administrator will decrypt the file and merge the NPR,
KUHR and SSB data with IPLOS data. This administrator is working for SSB since
SSB has the data process responsibilities on the behalf of The Norwegian Directorate
of Health. A more detailed description in Norwegian can be found at SSB’s webpage6.
6https://www.ssb.no/innrapportering/offentlig-sektor/_attachment/127052?_ts=
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Process 2: To deliver the collected HBR data, we had to follow a protocol similar
to the one described above. However, some details concerning the collection of HBR
data should be outlined. There where three variables related to HBR users that had
to be collected directly from the municipalities’ patient journals: i) P.no for all the
HBR user and ii) the date on which the patient’s HBR treatment began and iii) the
date on which the respective treatment was terminated. One researcher travelled to
all municipalities included study. In each location, he met with the contact person for
the respective municipality. Each contact person hade prepared a data file with the
necessary information. This file was uploaded to the researcher’s computer which uses
BitLocker encryption. Here the files where encrypted with the VeraCrypt software
for safe storing. The resulting files where deleted once delivered to IPLOS and the
anonymization dialog with IPLOS was finalized.
III.2.2 Data storage
Eventually, the dataset was stored at the data base service for sensitive data 2.0
(TSD). This IT-platform is used to collect, store and analyze sensitive research data
in a secure environment. TSD has been developed and is operated by the University
of Oslo (UiO). It is a part of NorStore, the national infrastructure for handling and
storing of scientific data. For more information concerning TSD, the reader is referred
to UiO’s webpage7. In particular, TSD provides a two-factor log-on system and is
used by different research environments, including university hospitals. But before
the final workable dataset could be transferred to TSD, it had to be transformed to
satisfy crucial legal requirements aiming at the anonymity of those individuals whose
data were to enter the research process.
III.2.3 Anonymization
The verdict of The Norwegian Data Protection Authority requires the dataset to be
anonymized prior to delivery to the researchers. SSB handled the anonymization task
as a part of the data process agreement with IPLOS. SSB operates on the basis of a
pragmatic rule of thumb: If each cluster of identifiable variables contains at least five
individuals then the dataset fulfills the anonymity requirement.
All data send from the registers had the identical panel structure that had been
specified by the researchers and accepted by SSB. The data were delivered on a
monthly time scale. Meaning each observation (line) in the dataset represents one
month in one specific year for one individual. Prior to applying an anonymization
algorithm, SSB had to merge the data it received from the registers and the researcher.
As data realizations coming from other registers are not necessarily concurrent in time
with IPLOS data, SSB generated empty observations for all time periods where an
individual did not have IPLOS services. As a result, there are 60 observations (5 years)
associated with each individual independent of the number of observed IPLOS periods.
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added. Prior to this process the HBR group was indicated via dummy variables and
HBR days during a month were added. Observations following an individuals death
month were deleted, and therefore exceptions from the 60 observation rule may occur.
Once these tasks were completed, an anonymization algorithm could be applied.
This algorithm proceeds in two steps. First, it identifies clusters of less then 5 individ-
uals in the space spanned by four identifiable variables: HBR group (yes/no), Gender,
Hospital area and Age. Apparently it was impossible to achieve anonymity with the
raw detailed age information. Therefore, the informational content of the original
variable had to be reduced by imposing a coarse scheme of 15 age groups. The cluster
step was replicated for each of the 60 time periods. Each of the observations that fell
into a cluster was marked by a dummy variable. In the second step, all service data
where deleted for all observations marked on the previous step.
As mentioned above, ”empty observations” had been generated to facilitate the
process of merging data from the various sources. If these observations still were
empty after merging, they were interpreted as being associated with individuals who
were not in need of health services at the given point in time. In some incidences such
”empty” records were found to lie in clusters of less than 5 individuals. Thus, they
were labeled accordingly. SSB considered the knowledge that an individual coming
from the IPLOS population is healthy in a given month as extra information and
therefore insisted on labeling such observations for deletion. Out of the 8,561,088
total observation, 180,036 (2,1%) observations where marked and service data where
deleted in 144,979 cases. This implies that there are 35,057 marked observations that
originally were ”empty” observations. In the dataset handed to the researcher, the
pseudonym-identification key had to be replaced with an ID variable.
III.2.3.1 An exemplification of the anonymization process
The anonymization process is best illustrated by help of an example. For ease of
notation and readability, the example is restricted to two individuals observed in the
IPLOS register, for two years (2014 - 2015). Moreover, we assume quarterly data. In
the first step, SSB creates a panel data structure from the IPLOS observations, as
presented in Table III.2. The entries in the different service columns are just chosen
for illustrative purposes.
Table III.2: Initial panel
ID YEAR QTR IPLOS
1 2014 2 3
1 2014 3 3
1 2015 4 20
2 2015 1 10
2 2015 2 10
Observe that individual 1 had three quarters of IPLOS services, while individual 2
used services in two quarters during 2014-2015. Individual 1 had two separated spells
of IPLOS services, with one quarter in the end of 2015 and the rest in 2014. Once a
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panel data structure has been created from IPLOS data, data from NPR and KUHR
can be added. Table III.3 illustrates how this has been done by SSB.
Table III.3: SSB production step
(a) Panel with surrogate observations
ID YEAR QTR IPLOS
1 2014 1 -
1 2014 2 3
1 2014 3 3
1 2014 4 -
1 2015 1 -
1 2015 2 -
1 2015 3 -
1 2015 4 20
2 2014 1 -
2 2014 2 -
2 2014 3 -
2 2014 4 -
2 2015 1 10
2 2015 2 10
2 2015 3 -
2 2015 4 -
(b) Full panel after merger
ID YEAR QTR IPLOS NPR KHUR
1 2014 1 - - 2
1 2014 2 3 - -
1 2014 3 3 - 1
1 2014 4 - - -
1 2015 1 - - -
1 2015 2 - 1 -
1 2015 3 - 4 -
1 2015 4 20 - -
2 2014 1 - - -
2 2014 2 - - 1
2 2014 3 - - -
2 2014 4 - 2 -
2 2015 1 10 - -
2 2015 2 10 - -
2 2015 3 - 3 -
2 2015 4 - - -
Since NPR and KUHR observations can potentially occur in other time periods
than IPLOS, SSB first had to create the full time line for all individuals included in
the IPLOS sample. This is seen in Table III.3a, where the gray observations illustrate
the SSB generated observations/rows. Once these rows were generated, SSB could
easily add data from NPR and KUHR into new columns since they can use ID and
time as common keys. This is illustrated in Table III.3b where imaginary NPR and
KUHR columns have been added. Once these columns have been added, SSB can run
its anonymization algorithm described above. The main idea behind the algorithm is
to identify clusters with less then 5 individuals on the basis of four observed variables.
Every observation which is identified by the algorithm is marked by the help of the
binary variable ”suppressed”. A value of 1 on this variable indicates that this record
was ”scheduled for deletion”. Eventually all entries except those on variables used by
the algorithm, were deleted. After deletion, the dataset could be transferred to the
researcher.
Table III.4 shows the state of the data upon completion of the anonymization
process, i.e. the state in which the dataset was handed over to the researcher. The
nature of the outcome generated by the anonymization process can be assessed by
comparing Table III.3b and Table III.4. For example, the suppression indicator for
individual 1 in 3rd quarter of 2014 is set equal to 1 in Table III.4. Referring to
the same observation in Table III.3b, one can see that IPLOS data were deleted. As
pointed out above, 180,036 observations are marked with ”suppressed = 1” in the final
dataset. Exactly 144,979 of these observations resemble the case of individual 1 in the
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example. The rest of the suppressed observations, 35,057 in total, are observations
for which no data are deleted. To illustrate this case, we focus on individual 2 in the
3rd quarter of 2014 in Table 2b and Table 3. Here the individual is still suppressed,
although originally no service entries had been observed in the given period. The
researcher only sees Table III.4, and therefore the researcher does not know with
certainty whether or not some data entries were deleted in these two examples. A
value of 1 on the suppressed indicator only means that the respective observation
was marked by the algorithm. This event is independent of the health state of the
respective individual.
Table III.4: Panel dataset after anonymization
ID YEAR QTR IPLOS NPR KHUR SUPPRESSED
1 2014 1 - - 2 0
1 2014 2 3 - - 0
1 2014 3 - - - 1
1 2014 4 - - - 1
1 2015 1 - - - 1
1 2015 2 - 1 - 0
1 2015 3 - 4 - 0
1 2015 4 20 - - 0
2 2014 1 - - - 0
2 2014 2 - - - 1
2 2014 3 - - - 1
2 2014 4 - 2 - 0
2 2015 1 10 - - 0
2 2015 2 - - - 1
2 2015 3 - 3 - 0
2 2015 4 - - - 0
The dataset delivered by SSB contained three flaws that had to be corrected. First,
the observations of six unique patients occurred twice, since they had been registered
with two different genders. For these observations, one set was deleted. The selection
was randomized, controlling for the general gender distribution within the patients
age group. Secondly, there were duplicated observations for nine patients. They had
been registered with two different death months. The records of these patients had
to be checked to find out which of the two different death months showed registered
service data. The version in which some service data had been registered in the death
month was kept. Cases in which some service data were registered in both death
months did not occur.
The third problem was caused by a programming error. It had been agreed that
SSB would generate observation lines only for the months up to and including a
patient’s month of death. No records of the patient should exist in the aftermath
of her/his death. The dataset delivered showed clear evidence that this concept had
not been properly realized. For example, one patient could have died in April 2012.
As agreed, there were no observations during the remainder of 2012. However, the
94
III.3. IMPUTATION STRATEGY
same patient was registered again from 2013 to 2015 with empty observations from
January to April, or until the month of registered death. Thus, there where additional
observations for every deceased patient in every year following her/his death. The
number of extra months per year depended on the month in which the individual had
died. All of these records had no service data attached to it. They where merely an
artifact due to an unfortunate programming error on behalf of SSB. Evidently, they
had to be deleted. After eradicating these errors, the total number of observations was
reduced to 7,981,709. This includes the ”empty observations” with the interpretation
as ”healthy observations” explained in Section III.2.3.
III.3 Imputation strategy
III.3.1 Delete extreme suppressed
The special characteristics of IPLOS data will be presented in Section III.3.3. Here,
we point at a key characteristic. All patients’ IPLOS data are characterized by a slow
moving dynamics, i.e. the IPLOS data only vary slightly in time. Actually, just by
scrolling trough patient records that have more then 90% of observations suppressed,
one can see a clear pattern. If data have been observed early in the 60-month time
horizon and some at a later stage, then it is possible to impute missing data with
fairly great accuracy. Usually, the former and the latter observations indicate identical
IPLOS services. Moreover, patients do not tend to drop out of the IPLOS service.
Knowing this, all suppressed observations should most likely have the same IPLOS
value. If the two observations are different, then it is highly likely that there has only
been one change. To predict the time at which the change occurs is, however, more
difficult to predict. The latter aspect constitutes the key weakness of the imputation
strategy in general.
After careful inspection of the dataset and consideration of the findings in Sub-
sections III.3.3.1 and III.3.3, all patients that have at least 93% of their observations
suppressed were dropped. Proceeding in this way, we secured at least 4 observations
for all suppressed patients, which will be sufficient to impute sensible estimates of
function scores and IPLOS service. The number of potentially problematic patients
fairly small, and it should not affect the average mean and variation. It should be
emphasized that the 93% cut-off value is a subjective assessment based on first hand
knowledge and insight into the data. Table III.5 shows the changes in sample size,




Table III.5: Deleting patients with 93% or more observation suppressed
N NT
Before deleting extreme 155,380 7,981,709
HBR data deleted 489 29,340
Non-HBR data delete 52 687
HBR data remaining 1,741 104,460
Non-HBR data remaining 153,098 7,847,222
Total after deleting 154,839 7,951,682
As documented by Table III.5, the HBR group is heavily affected by the deletion
strategy outlined above. Most patient data have been deleted from this group. In
total, 541 patients constituting 30,027 observations have been dropped. Of those, a
subset of 489 patients belongs to the HBR group. The total amount of patients drops
by 0.35% and observations are reduced by 0.38%. After deletion, we were left with
a total of 7,951,682 observations. Of those 150,584 (1.89%) were suppressed and had
to be imputed.
III.3.2 Creating test data
For the purpose of choosing and testing different imputation techniques, we created
a ”test dataset”. It was created in two steps. In the first step, all patients with
complete records in the original dataset were extracted. All patients with either one
or more suppressed observations were deleted. In all, 6,800 patients were deleted,
which left us with a test dataset containing 7,559,867 observations based on 148,039
patients. In the second step, 50% of the observations (i.e. 3,779,933) where randomly
marked to simulate suppression. Thereafter, service data for all observations where
duplicated into a set DC , and those service data in DC that had been randomly
marked as suppressed were deleted. To assess the performance of a given imputation
technique, we applied it to DC and compared the respective imputation outcomes to
the true values found in DT .
For the group of 6,800 patients with at least one observation, the mean suppression
rate is 38.4%. The chosen missing rate of 50% may therefore seem a bit excessive.
However, for the HBR patients, who form a sub-group of those 6,800 patients, the
missing rate is 58.3%. As seen in Section III.3.1, the overall percentage of suppressed
observations is only 1.89%. Under a conventional approach these observations would
simply be dropped prior to data analysis. The extra effort of developing or choosing an
imputation strategy would thus be avoided. However, in the current case, the 40.5% of
the suppressed observations occur in the group of interest: the HBR patients. All HBR
patients have at least one observation suppressed. To just drop all suppressed data
would lead to an excessive loss of HBR related information. Therefore an imputation
strategy that aims at minimize the loss of HBR data is needed. The missing rate of
50% chosen for the test data, constitutes a reasonalbe compromise between the true
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overall and the HBR specific missing rate.
III.3.3 IPLOS data
The anonymization algorithm was applied each month t, independent of s where is
s ∈ T and s 6= t. Since patients may die the sample size can vary each month.
Therefore, running the algorithm each month could lead to a variation in whether a
patients’ observation is suppressed or not. So it is apparently possible that for a given
patient a series of suppressed observations is followed by a sequence of non-suppressed
observations, which again maybe followed be a series of suppressed observations. That
is, we might find ”gaps” in observed data. Since a patient can have several sequences
of suppressed observations, one would like to study the average length of these ”gaps”.
Lets define j different spells, with the spell pattern being a) first spell is not
suppressed, b) second spell is suppressed, c) third spell is not suppressed, and d)
fourth spell is suppressed and so on. In such a series of spells the patient’s first
observation, January 2011, cannot be suppressed. But this may not necessarily be
true. Therefore, two datasets have to be created which are similar in the sense that
they contain only patients who have at least one suppressed observation. One set
contains patients whose initial observation has been suppressed while the other is
constituted by patients whose initial observation has not been suppressed. When
January 2011 is suppressed the spell pattern will be i) first spell is suppressed, ii)
second spell is not suppressed, iii) third spell is suppressed, and iv) fourth spell is not
suppressed and so on.
Table III.6: Key statistics for spells
(a) Initial observation NOT suppressed
All HBR Other
Average no. spells 4.85 7.20 3.61
Average length 5.54 4.02 7.37
(b) Initial observation suppressed
All HBR Other
Average no. spells 4.67 5.03 5.53
Average length 4.35 4.91 4.08
Basic estimates of the mean number of spells and the mean length of a spell are
presented in Table III.6. The data under scrutiny have been split into two sets,
as explained above. Table III.6a presents statistics for the case in which the first
observation is not suppressed while Table III.6b refers to the opposite situation. As
seen in Table III.6a there is a clear difference in the number of spells between HBR
patients and other patients. Indicating that, HBR patients who are not suppressed in
January 2011 have a greater tendency to move back and forth between not suppressed
and suppressed. This is as expected, since the probability of becoming suppressed
should increase if a patient has received HBR. In the opposite case seen in Table
III.6b, the difference between the two groups are minor.
When the first observation is not suppressed, the expected spell length for non-
HBR patients exceeds that for HBR patients by 3.35 months. In particular, this
means that for a HBR patient whose initial state is ”not suppressed” we can expect
that suppressions will not occur in the subsequent 4 months. Suppressions will be
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observed for the next 4 months, followed again by a period of 4 month period in which
suppression is relevant. This cyclical pattern extents to the end of the sample period.
When a HBR patient’s first observation is suppressed, then we can expect a spell to
last one month longer.
In general, the number of months suppressed and observed, is not worryingly large,
especially since the variation of IPLOS data in time is low. To illustration this, we
study complete IPLOS observations only. Meaning, that out of the 7,559,867 test
data observations, 4,203,157 are not-suppressed IPLOS observations registered on a
total of 145,230 patients. Those are used to assess the dynamics of IPLOS data.
Information about the underlying dynamics is essential for choosing an adequate
imputation technique.
First, is the absolute frequency of IPLOS sequences, where IPLOS sequence means
the time interval for which a patient has been continuously registered as a IPLOS
patient. If such a time interval exists, then we know that a continuous history of
IPLOS observations exists for the patient during her/his existence in the sample. If
two of such intervals, which are by definition non-overlapping, exist, then we know
that the patient has been registered in IPLOS for two uninterrupted periods. For the
time between the two intervals we know that the patient was not registered in IPLOS
and therefore no observed IPLOS data exist. If l non-overlapping IPLOS sequences
exist for an individual, then we can conclude that we have l consecutive sub-histories of
function scores. Since the observation period is finite, these sub-histories will become
shorter and shorter as l increases.
The concept of ”IPLOS sequence” can be illustrated in the following way. Lets say
a patient is registered in IPLOS at time tr where 0 < tr < T . By sample definition,
all patients included in the dataset should be registered as an IPLOS observation at
least once, but tr might vary. Let ρ denote number of registrations and δ denote the
number of de-registration event occurring in the sample period. Both ρ and δ is ∈ Z
where is ρ > 0 and δ ≥ 0. Possible IPLOS sequences are listed in Table III.7 below.
Table III.7: Explanation of IPLOS sequence
Sequence no: ρ δ Comment:
1 1 0 Patient was registered at time tr and continued to be
registered until T .
1 1 1 Registered at time tr the patient was subsequently de-
registered prior to T .
2 2 1 Registered at tr the patient was de-registered, then reg-
istered again to stay in IPLOS until T .
2 2 2 Registered at tr, left IPLOS once, was registered again,
left again and was out prior to T .
3 3 2 ...






Using the definitions illustrated in Table III.7, for 88% (127,574) of the patients
we observe IPLOS sequence 1. The mean time-span of sequence 1 for patients whom
do not die, is 25.7 months. Actually, sequence 1 and 2 combined covers 98% of the
patients. This finding indicates that changes in a patient’s IPLOS registration status
are a relatively rare event. For the intended imputation exercise, this feature could
be beneficial.
III.3.3.1 Function scores
As seen above, there is little variation in IPLOS observations when a patient is initially
registered at the IPLOS register. Studying the frequency of change in function score,
also reveals an interesting pattern. On average, for more than 94% of the patients,
the function scores change at most two times throughout the observation period. This
measure differs across the different function scores. Considering all function scores,
the respective ratio ranges between 91% - 99%. The latter highlights the fact that the
velocity of function scores is extremely low. One might even doubt the informational
value of these scores with respect to changes a patient’s health state.
Based on the above findings, and keeping in mind that each missing ”gap” is on
average between 4 - 5 month long, the choice of a simple linear nearest-neighbour
interpolation routine for the function scores seems reasonable. The time variable is
used as the independent variable. In the nearest-neighbour approach, one assigns a
known value of the function score - either the last one available before or the first one
known after the missing value - to the case that has to be imputed. The value that
is closest in time to the record that needs to be imputed is chosen. With ties, the
last score known is used. Applying this simple technique to the test data described in
Section III.3.2, produces remarkably good results. The interpolated function scores
actually match the respective true values one-to-one at each point in time in 96% of
all cases. The 4% failure rate can be attributed to cases in which the timing of the
imputed change in the function score was off by one period. Table III.8, compares
the monthly mean and within standard deviation (SD) of interpolated cases to their
true values. As expected the differences are minor.
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Table III.8: Comparing imputed function scores with true values (test data)
Function score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
True mean 1.551 1.974 1.572 1.896 1.424 2.261 1.655 1.515 1.829
Imputed 1.554 1.979 1.575 1.900 1.427 2.265 1.659 1.518 1.833
mean
True 1.676 1.811 1.698 1.726 1.671 1.871 1.699 1.694 1.820
within SD
Imputed 1.667 1.803 1.690 1.718 1.662 1.863 1.691 1.686 1.811
within SD
(a) Score 1 - 9
Function score
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
True mean 1.186 1.404 1.732 1.243 1.190 1.435 1.298 1.316
Imputed 1.188 1.407 1.735 1.245 1.193 1.438 1.300 1.319
mean
True 1.647 1.693 1.718 1.639 1.640 1.659 1.637 1.649
within SD
Imputed 1.638 1.685 1.710 1.630 1.632 1.651 1.628 1.641
within SD
(b) Score 10 - 17
III.3.3.2 IPLOS service data
IPLOS service data, referring for example to the use of either home-service hours or
institution days, follow a pattern similar to those of the functions scores discussed
in Section III.3.3.1. Month-to-month variation for IPLOS service variables is often
simply due to the apparent difference in the number of days per month. Thus intrinsic
minor differences have to be expected, for instance, in the context of stays in a long-
term institutions.
Using the interpolation routine described in Section III.3.3.1 on IPLOS service
days and hours per day - thereafter multiplying imputed values with days per month
- provides remarkably good results. Using the same test data, the comparison between
the imputed home-service hours and the respective true values reveals exact matches
in 82% of all cases. This is 14% lower than the result for function scores. However, the
mean mismatch among the non-perfectly matched observations (28% of the cases),
is just 16 minutes per month. Performing the same comparison, but allowing the
imputed value to match within 2 months difference with the true value, increases the
accuracy to 88% and the mean overestimation drops down to 6 minutes.
When interpolated institution days are compared with their true counterparts
the relative frequency for an exact match equals 96%. The mean difference is an
underestimation of less than a day per month. For the binary variable indicating
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”other” IPLOS services, the same interpolation routine has been used - just not on
a per-day basis. Implementing this strategy lead to an outcome in which 99.9%
of all imputations were exact. These high precision test results are also mirrored
in Table III.9. Only minor differences surface in the comparison focussing on the
monthly mean and the within SD. In fact, for home-service hours, the monthly mean
difference between the true values DT and the imputed values DC , amounts to less
then 2 minutes.
Table III.9: Comparing imputed IPLOS service use with true values
Home-service hours Institutions days Other services
True mean 10.450 3.044 0.329
Imputed mean 10.474 3.064 0.329
True within SD 20.268 4.817 0.267
Imputed within SD 20.164 4.792 0.266
The imputation technique described above is also used for HBR patients, however
not during the HBR treatment periods. If the routine is used for periods of HBR
provision, one would risk to impute zero hours in some of these months. Such an
imputation outcome would not be reasonable, because a HBR patient, by definition,
has to receive some home-service in the treatment period. Under the imputation
technique considered so far, such an unreasonable outcome could materialize if a
HBR patient has zero observed hours in the month before or after the treatment
period. This problem is solved by using various interpolation rules for different cases.
If hours are observed before and after the HBR period, then the rule outlined above
is used. However, if one observes zero hours before and non-zero hours after the HBR
period, then backward interpolation is used. In the opposite case, we rely on forward
interpolation. One could argue that this strategy would underestimate hours during
the HBR period, since the expected increase in treatment intensity during the HBR
period. This is a valid argument. Although, a check run on the non-suppressed HBR
periods suggests that this is not the case. However, due to the lack of complete HBR
period specific observations, there is no good way of testing this potential weakness.
For the last case - zero hours before and after the period - predictive mean matching
(PMM) introduced by Little, 1988, inspired by Rubin, 1986, was applied. Above all,
there exist 23 patients receiving HBR from whom no information has been suppressed
and zero service hours have been recorded. Again, this should not be possible and
is most likely due to incorrect IPLOS registration. These patients have also been
imputed by PMM. The variable list used in PMM can be found in Table III.11.
III.3.4 NPR and KUHR data
The favorable pattern seen in IPLOS variables does not hold for NPR and KHUR
variables, and therefore different imputation techniques are needed. Before decid-
ing on imputation techniques two factors plays a key role, missing-data mechanism
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and pattern of missing-data. Rubin, 1976, developed a typology for describing the
missingness mechanism regarded as a probabilistic phenomenon. One of the terms
introduced, missing at random (MAR), allows the probabilities of missingness to de-
pend on observed data, but not on missing data (Schafer and Graham, 2002). Such
a mechanism is desirable as most imputation techniques assume MAR. In the cur-
rent case, MAR could be assumed as the missingness is solely due to four observed
variables and the time variable, which is also observed.
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Figure III.2: Illustration of the univariate missing pattern. VariablesX1 -X5 are all observed
and used in the anonymization algorithm. All observations marked as suppressed, due to
variables X1 - X5, can be structured in the bottom (gray area). Suppression automatically
deletes service data Y1 - Yk.
Arranging the dataset such that rows correspond to observations and columns
correspond to variable, one can illustrate the missing pattern (Schafer and Graham,
2002). Figure III.2 presents such an illustration for the current case and shows a
univariate missing pattern. Such a pattern is beneficial, as one can avoid more tedious
multivariate imputation techniques. Time dummies are included in the imputations,
and that would capture any potential seasonality pattern. In the case of perfect
prediction during imputation of categorical data, the augmented regression approach
by White et al., 2010 is implemented. For all imputations, seed is set to 1,234. Not
suppressed observations from test data is shortened with No supp. in tables.
III.3.4.1 NPR indicator variable
A patient can receive specialist care if and only if (s)he is registered as an NPR ob-
servation. The imputation of NPR data independent of the binary NPR observation
variable, could lead to constellations in which NPR service variables would contain
some data even if the indicator equals zero. Such an unreasonable outcome needs
to be avoided. Attempts were made to impute some of the NPR service variables
irrespective of the restriction that the NPR indicator variable equals one. This solu-
tion overestimated the amount of observations, with the overestimation being in the
region of half a million observations. The strategy is therefore to first impute the
binary NPR indicator variable, and thereafter impute NPR service data conditional
on the indicator variable being equal to one. This approach is feasible due to the
univariate missing pattern.
For the binary NPR indicator variable, the most intuitive choice of imputation
technique is the logistic regression imputation method. An alternative method, PMM,
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heavily depends on standard linear regression assumptions. For instance, one has to
assume that the missing variable is continuous. However, as described in the Stata
manual (Stata 15 Base Reference Manual 2017), PMM uses linear regression to obtain
linear predictions. These linear predictions are used as a distance measure to form a
set of possible donors (often called nearest neighbors) consisting of complete values.
PMM then randomly draws a value from these donors into the missing. One has
to specify how many nearest neighbors (knn) to include in the donor set. Since all
potential donors to the NPR indicator variable only have the value 0 or 1, PMM will
not be able to impute other values. Therefore, PMM should produce logical estimates.
PMM is generally a cumbersome procedure, and can therefore be time consuming.
As an example, we tried to run PMM for the NPR indicator variable on the complete
test dataset (Section III.3.2). After running for eight days, the procedure did not
produce results. The indicator variable had therefore to be tested on a smaller dataset.
Such a smaller test dataset is created just as described in Section III.3.2, however one
randomly draws 20,000 patients and their associated observations. The smaller test
dataset includes 1,022,145 observations. As before, 50% are randomly deleted to
mimic suppress observations.
Table III.10: Test results for NPR indicator variable imputations
All Equal 1
Mean SD Within SD NT N T-bar
True value, small 0.2640 0.4408 0.3823 269,819 18,800 14.35
Logistic regression 0.2635 0.4406 0.4190 269,377 19,629 13.72
PMM, knn=1 0.2630 0.4403 0.4184 268,860 19,626 13.70
PMM, knn=5 0.2638 0.4407 0.4190 269,644 19,633 13.73
True value 0.2643 0.4410 0.3831 1,998,251 139,081 14.37
Imputed, logistic 0.2643 0.4410 0.4195 1,998,221 144,928 13.79
Covariates included: HBR days, gender, age group, marital status,
function scores, IPLOS services, education level and time dummies
knn: number of nearest neighbors
Table III.10 compares imputed values from different imputation techniques with
the true value on key statistical measures. The PMM version is presented with two
different nearest neighbor options (knn), 1 or 5. All three alternatives produce ap-
proximately identical mean estimates which in turn are virtually identical to mean of
the actual values. There is a slight variation on the fourth decimal level. Findings
on the mean can directly be translated into estimated standard deviation, where all
three imputation alternatives produces estimates of the true value that only varies
on the fourth decimal. All imputation techniques overestimated the estimated within
standard deviation, which is also reflected in the imputed number of patients (N) re-
ceiving NPR services. The sum of NPR observations (NT ) is fairly close to the true
value. Estimation of T-bar (N/NT ), or the average number of times a patient visits
specialist care, is underestimated. The number of patients receiving NPR services is
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overestimated by more than 4%. The same tendency to overestimate holds for the
within standard deviation. This overestimation is observed for all three alternatives.
Therefore, capturing the within patient changes seems to be the main weakness of
the techniques considered. All techniques perform equally well. Since the logistic-
regression imputation technique is less costly from a numerical/ computational point
of view, it became our method of choice in the context at hand.
The second last row in Table III.10 presents the true NPR observation indicator
variable for the large test dataset. Test results for the imputation by logistic regression
on the large test data are presented in the last row of Table III.10. The imputed
number of observations, mean and standard deviation are all remarkably close to
the actual values. The within standard deviation as well as the number of patients
are overestimated. This outcome is inline with the previous presentation. The NPR
variables cannot take any value unless the indicator variable is equal to one. Thus,
all NPR service variables are set to zero whenever the imputed predictor variable is
equal to zero.
III.3.4.2 NPR variables
As mentioned previously, all NPR imputation are conditioned on the indicator vari-
able. All NPR service variables are ordered by definition, and their values are positive
integers. Therefore, ordered logistic regression imputation method is used for these
variables. Poisson regression has also been tested, but ordered logistic regression
outperformed the latter on all measures. For the NPR sector variable, a categorical
variable, multinomial logistic regression imputation is used. For all variables, M im-
putations (complete datasets) are generated under the same imputation model. The
imputations are indexed by m = 1, 2, ...,M . In the remainder, M will be typically set
to 5, and test results are presented for m = 1, 3, 5.
The outcome of the imputation experiment is documented in Table III.11. Ap-
parently the previously observed pattern in Section III.3.4.1 is also visible here for
all other NPR variables. The imputation techniques produce satisfactory estimates
for mean, standard deviation, minimum/maximum and number of observations. For
some variables the techniques produce a maximum value which is lower than the true
value. The reason for this is that the maximum values have been randomly deleted
when creating test data. All imputed maximum values are equal to the maximum of
the non-suppressed observations in our test data. This mismatch will not have any
affect when applying the imputation techniques to the original dataset. The maxi-
mum values will then be included and one does not expect that any of the suppressed
observations will exceed these values. The same drawbacks discussed earlier also oc-




Table III.11: Imputation test result for NPR variables
Mean SD Within
SD
NT N T-bar Min. Max.
NPR number of episodesa
True value 2.1075 2.2977 1.8026 1,998,251 139,081 14.37 1 130
No supp. 2.1089 2.2973 1.7583 1 122
Imputed m=1 2.1124 2.2942 2.0566 1,998,211 144,928 13.78 1 122
Imputed m=3 2.1126 2.2984 2.0619 1,998,211 144,928 13.78 1 122
Imputed m=5 2.1129 2.2967 2.0594 1,998,211 144,928 13.78 1 122
NPR number of episodes - only somaticb
True value 1.8575 2.0572 1.6218 1,362,250 132,825 10.26 1 57
No supp. 1.8577 2.0571 1.5693 1 46
Imputed m=1 1.8999 2.0859 1.8588 1,385,601 144,065 9.62 1 46
Imputed m=3 1.9002 2.0831 1.8571 1,385,102 144,039 9.62 1 46
Imputed m=5 1.9013 2.0882 1.8907 1,385,614 144,039 9.62 1 46
NPR number of policlinic visitsa
True value 2.0949 2.3372 1.8124 1,709,573 132,496 12.90 1 130
No supp. 2.0954 2.3357 1.7626 1 122
Imputed m=1 2.0953 2.3254 2.0694 1,710,057 142,166 12.03 1 122
Imputed m=3 2.0965 2.3264 2.0703 1,710,251 142,180 12.03 1 122
Imputed m=5 2.0955 2.3249 2.0703 1,710,214 142,194 12.03 1 122
NPR number of policlinic visits - only somaticb
True value 1.8566 2.1690 1.6838 1,097,045 123,141 8.91 1 57
No supp. 1.8561 2.1686 1.6225 1 46
Imputed m=1 1.9030 2.2156 1.9457 1,115,804 139,964 7.97 1 46
Imputed m=3 1.9047 2.2137 1.9429 1,115,394 139,952 7.97 1 46
Imputed m=5 1.8979 2.1992 1.9307 1,116,883 139,941 7.98 1 46
NPR sum days length of staya
True value 8.8044 8.9174 6.3364 497,518 111,317 4.47 1 31
No supp. 8.7783 8.9079 5.8192 1 31
Imputed m=1 8.7661 8.9177 7.1096 496,250 131,943 3.76 1 31
Imputed m=3 8.7511 8.9059 7.1060 497,498 131,866 3.77 1 31
Imputed m=5 8.7502 8.9020 7.1070 497,793 132,020 3.77 1 31
NPR sum days length of stay - only somaticb
True value 6.4748 6.4989 5.1547 403,610 105,657 3.82 1 31
No supp. 6.4639 6.5011 4.6571 1 31
Imputed m=1 6.3320 6.2410 5.0385 408,253 126,632 3.22 1 31
Imputed m=3 6.3426 6.2546 5.0519 409,518 126,561 3.24 1 31
Imputed m=5 6.3260 6.2342 5.0298 410,259 126,798 3.24 1 31
Continued on next page
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Table III.11 – Imputation test result for NPR variables - Continued
Mean SD Within
SD
NT N T-bar Min. Max.
NPR main diagnosis groupc
True value 8.5922 6.5219 5.2224 1,361,819 132,819 10.25 1 27
No supp. 8.6000 6.5238 4.9872 1 27
Imputed m=1 8.5576 6.5423 5.8846 1,355,441 144,029 9.41 1 27
Imputed m=3 8.5569 6.5456 5.8907 1,356,315 144,008 9.42 1 27
Imputed m=5 8.5540 6.5374 5.8811 1,356,326 144,002 9.42 1 27
NPR sectord
True value 1.3865 0.7881 0.6340 1,691,110 136,208 12.42 1 4
No supp. 1.3856 0.7873 0.6091 1 4
Imputed m=1 1.4028 0.8019 0.7271 1,698,309 144,679 11.74 1 4
Imputed m=3 1.4029 0.8024 0.7277 1,698,736 144,673 11.74 1 4
Imputed m=5 1.4028 0.8020 0.7276 1,698,845 144,696 11.74 1 4
a Ordered logistic regression imputation method
b Same as a, also include imputed values for total amount of service type as factor variable
c Ordered logistic regression imputation method, poisson also tested and m-logit not feasible
d Multinomial logistic regression (m-logit), with NPR main diagnosis ad factor variable
Covariates included: HBR days, age group, material status, function scores, IPLOS services,
gender, education level and time dummies
Studying the m different imputations in Table III.11, one finds marginal differences
in estimated mean, standard deviation and within standard deviation. When working
with multiple imputed data, Rubin’s combination rule is used to combine M results
to one set of results. According to this rule, the total point estimate is the average
of the M complete datasets. However, the sampling variance associated with the
combined parameter estimates is not that simple. The sampling variance is estimated
as a combination of within-imputation variability and between-imputation dataset
variability. To be specific let U (m) denote the point variance from the mth (m =
1, 2, ...,M) dataset8. The within-imputation variance component, W is the average














where Q(m) is the mth specific point estimate and Q̄ the average point estimate over
M complete datasets. According to Rubin’s combination rule, the total variance, TV ,
is given as







8The exposition relies on the notation established in Carlin et al., 2003.
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Thus the total variance takes the form of a weighted sum of the within-imputation
variance (W ) and the between-imputation variance (B), where the weight on B de-
creases in the number of complete datasets available. Therefore, in the standard
approach one would generate as many complete datasets as possible to keep the effect
of B on the total variance as small as possible. In our case, we have seen that there is
hardly any variation in the imputed means and standard deviations (cf. Table III.11).
Thus the within-variation B is already close to zero. Considering this argument and
recalling the extraordinary numerical/computational imputation costs in our case,
one could hardly justify the generation of more than M = 1 datasets.
Reducing the number of imputations to only one also comes with two extra ben-
efits. Firstly, it greatly reduces the need for computation power. The second benefit
comes from studying Table III.11 a bit more in detailed. As can been seen, the out-
comes of the imputation experiments for all somatic specific service types appear to be
problematic. Number of observations, mean and standard deviation are all overesti-
mated for number of somatic episodes and policlinic visit. Logically, one cannot have
any somatic service, like length of stay (LOS) and policlinic visits, if total amounts
of these services are zero. Meaning for example, that number of somatic episodes is
dependent on the total number of episodes.
To account for this relationship when using multiple imputation in Stata, one has
to impute the two variables in sequence by univariate conditional imputation methods.
However, Stata will first impute the total service type variable and then include the
imputed values of total service as a variable when imputing somatic services. The
results in Table III.11 are based on such a strategy. If M = 1, the somatic variables
can be imputed conditioned on total service larger than zero and somatic services has
to be equal to zero if total services are equal to zero. Table III.12 presents result
for the latter procedure, which clearly yields better results for the somatic specific
variables, without influencing the total service.
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Table III.12: Test result for somatic NPR variables
Mean SD Within SD NT N T-bar
NPR number of episodes - only somatica
True value 1.8575 2.0572 1.6218 1,362,250 132,825 10.26
No supp. 1.8577 2.0571 1.5693
Imputed conditioned 1.8545 2.0607 1.8264 1,358,846 143,906 9.44
NPR number of policlinic visits - only somatica
True value 1.8566 2.1690 1.6838 1,097,045 123,141 8.91
No supp. 1.8561 2.1686 1.6225
Imputed conditioned 1.8563 2.1739 1.8955 1,094,798 139,748 7.83
NPR sum days length of stay - only somatica
True value 6.4748 6.4989 5.1547 403,610 105,657 3.82
No supp. 6.4639 6.5011 4.6571
Imputed conditioned 6.3842 6.5001 5.2257 400,605 124,880 3.21
a Ordered logistic regression imputation method conditioned that total equivalent
variable larger then zero
Covariates included: HBR days, age group, material status, function scores, IPLOS services,
gender, education level and time dummies
Singling out the amount of imputed observations for somatic policlinic visits as
an example, we can see in Table III.12 an underestimation of 2,247 observations
compared with the true value. The result presented in Table III.11 show an overesti-
mation in the region of 18,349 - 19,838 observations compared to the true value. A
clear improvement, which is also seen in presented key statistics for all somatic NPR
variables.
Diagnosis-related group (DRG), is a system to classify hospital cases into one out
of 467 groups. Each of these groups comes with a payment weight based on the
average resources used to treat patients in that DRG. The monthly sum of these
DRG points per individual is one variable included the dataset. Sum DRG points
is a continuous variable with a restricted range, in particular with 0.01 points as a
lower limit. Using standard regression imputation will not be appropriate because it
could produce negative values. Such outcomes were frequently observed in tests of the
method. Two alternative likelihood based imputation techniques which in principle
should solve our problen, interval or truncated regression, failed to converge in testing.
This may be due to the fact that the lower limit of 0.01 features dominantly in the
sample. PMM may therefore be considered as another viable option. As mentioned
above, the implementation of the PMM method is extremely costly on large datasets.
We therefore establish its versatility on small test datasets.
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Table III.13: Test result for NPR DRG variable
Mean SD Within
SD
NT N T-bar Min. Max.
True value 0.5577 1.1655 1.0442 1,354,707 132,812 10.20 0.01 46.47
True value, 0.5622 1.1571 1.0362 182,772 18,016 10.15 0.01 39.23
small
No supp. 0.5677 1.1846 1.0110 0.01 39.23
PMM, knn(1) 0.5614 1.1632 1.0754 181,642 19,474 9.33 0.01 39.23
PMM, knn(5) 0.5634 1.1718 1.0813 181,590 19,477 9.32 0.01 39.23
PMM, knn(5) 0.5656 1.1748 1.0879 181,616 19,473 9.33 0.01 39.23
bootstrap
Covariates included: HBR days, gender, age group, marital status, function scores,
IPLOS services, education level, time dummies, imputed NPR main diagnosis and NPR sector
In addition, conditioned on NPR main diagnosis>0 and NPR somatic episode>0
knn: number of nearest neighbors
The first row in Table III.13 presents the true value in the large test dataset,
whereas the second row presents the true value in the reduced test dataset. There are
minor differences between the true value of two test datasets. The maximum value in
the complete test dataset is substantially larger compared to the small dataset. Since
patients included in the smaller dataset where randomly selected, such differences
can occur. This will not be an issue when imputing on the complete dataset. HBR
patients are not expected to be the patient group that will need more DRG points
than the maximum included. As in Section III.3.4.1, we test several versions of PMM.
All of them are conditioned on the fact that NPR main diagnoses is not zero. In the
DRG system, that one needs a specified diagnosis group to get DRG points. There are
hardly any differences between the different PMM versions, and knn = 5 is chosen.
For testing imputed sum DRG points, 5 complete datasets were generated where
m indicates a specific imputed dataset. The results are similar to those shown in Table
III.10. The PMM imputation strategy works well on the mean, standard deviation
and number of observations. However, the same mismatch on number of patients
and within standard deviation is found. These findings are robust to various changes
in the imputation routine as, for instance, reduction of the neighborhood, use of
bootstrapping to specify that posterior estimates of model parameters are obtained,
using sampling with replacement.
III.3.4.3 Minor adjustments in complete data imputation
All imputations routines that proved to be successful in the imputation experiments
have been used in the final imputation exercise. The final amount of suppressed ob-
servations needed to be imputed is 150,584 since the extreme cases have been deleted.
In addition to the above techniques, one minor adjustment will be applied when im-
plementing the imputation strategy. The ordered logistic regression imputation, in
some cases, produces more somatic service then given in total, which is not possible.
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When imputing the final dataset, 5,429 observations had more somatic policlinic visits
then total visit, and 2,432 observation had more somatic length of stay then total. In
these cases, a random mechanism decided whether to use the somatic number or the
total in these observations. The randomization was adjusted for the mean proportion
of somatic service by age group. For example: In age group 1, for the non-suppressed,
somatic policlinic visit was on average 48% of the total amount of policlinic visits in
that age group. In the randomization, a probability of 0.48 was given to the somatic
policlinic imputed number. This was done for all 15 different age groups. This should
have minor influence on the completed result due to the small number of observations.
Also, as age increases, the proportion of somatic services tends to increase, meaning
that the there is an increased probability for choosing the highest value. On could
therefore argue that we overestimate NPR services. This has to be kept in mind when
analyzing the data.
III.3.4.4 KUHR indicator variable
As for the NPR indicator variable presented in Section III.3.4.1, one should first
impute the binary KUHR indicator variable. Thereafter, all imputations for KUHR
service variables have to be conditioned on the indicator variable. The same potential
imputation methods considered in Section III.3.4.1 are also tested in the context of
the KUHR indicator variable. We present the results in Table III.14.
Table III.14: Test result for KUHR indicator variable imputations
All Equal 1
Mean SD Within SD NT N T-bar
True value 0.4099 0.4918 0.3705 418,996 15,465 27.09
Logistic regression 0.4104 0.4919 0.4276 419,474 19,254 21.78
PMM, knn=1 0.4100 0.4918 0.4268 419,061 19,241 21.78
PMM, knn=5 0.4096 0.4918 0.4271 418,641 19,323 21.67
Covariates included: HBR days, gender, age group, marital status,
function scores, IPLOS services, education level and time dummies
knn: number of nearest neighbors
The findings exhibited in Table III.14 match those shown in Table III.10 closely.
All the different techniques produce approximately the same results and have the
same weaknesses. Within standard deviation and number of patients are overesti-
mated. Mean, standard deviation and number of observations are more or less spot
on compared to the true value. Imputation by logistic regression is chosen since this
technique is less computer power sensitive than the PMM routine.
III.3.4.5 KUHR variables
In table III.15, the test results for all imputed KUHR service variables are presented.
Also KUHR service variables have a naturally ordered structure, and their values can
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only be positive integers. Therefore, all variables have been imputed with ordered
logistic regression conditioned on the KUHR indicator variable taking the value of
one. Imputing KUHR data is more straight forward compared to data from NPR.
The complication of an extra relationship between the variables as in the NPR case,
does not exist in the KUHR context. For all variables M whas set to 5 and m = 1, 3, 5
are presented.
Our findings outlined in Section III.3.4.2 are similar to the results obtained in
the KUHR context. The test results show that after imputation, means, standard
deviations and number of observations are all close to the true value. Number of
patients and within standard deviation for the imputed values does not match the true
value very well. Especially number of patients seems to be constantly overestimated.
For physiotherapy services the overestimation on number of patients receiving these
service are particular severe. This has to be kept in mind when using this variable. In
Table III.15, one can see that there is hardly any variation between imputed means
and standard deviations between the different datasets. Also here, we argue that the
extra benefit in terms of total variance of imputing M > 1 datasets will be marginal
(cf. Rubin’s combination rule (III.1). The between-imputation variance, B, will be
fairly small.
Table III.15: Imputation test results for KUHR variables
Mean SD Within
SD
NT N T-bar Min. Max.
GP consultation
True value 1.4158 0.8758 0.7630 1,918,345 107,448 17.85 1 25
No supp. 1.4155 0.8772 0.7482 1 25
Imputed m=1 1.4157 0.8783 0.8163 1,915,824 135,094 14.18 1 25
Imputed m=3 1.4158 0.8779 0.8164 1,914,759 135,070 14.18 1 25
Imputed m=5 1.4164 0.8784 0.8162 1,916,435 135,091 14.19 1 25
GP home visit
True value 1.2347 0.6348 0.5023 113,310 46,646 2.66 1 21
No supp. 1.2357 0.6315 0.4608 1 15
Imputed m=1 1.2384 0.6340 0.4606 113,204 54,991 2.06 1 15
Imputed m=3 1.2383 0.6344 0.4591 114,002 55,409 2.06 1 15
Imputed m=5 1.2402 0.6391 0.4641 113,341 54,998 2.06 1 15
GP contact by phone or mail
True value 1.7827 1.4247 1.2272 1,692,138 111,286 15.21 1 58
No supp. 1.7833 1.4254 1.1976 1 58
Imputed m=1 1.7864 1.4286 1.3142 1,692,716 137,450 12.32 1 58
Imputed m=3 1.7871 1.4264 1.3131 1,692,680 137,389 12.32 1 58
Imputed m=5 1.7872 1.4334 1.3192 1,692,844 137,466 12.31 1 58
Continued on next page
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Table III.15 – Imputation test result for KUHR variables - Continued
Mean SD Within
SD
NT N T-bar Min. Max.
GP office simple contact
True value 1.2812 1.0523 0.6902 286,641 68,489 4.19 1 27
No supp. 1.2804 1.0531 0.6542 1 27
Imputed m=1 1.2818 1.0591 0.7618 286,856 96,200 2.98 1 27
Imputed m=3 1.2805 1.0482 0.7565 286,757 95,985 2.99 1 27
Imputed m=5 1.2817 1.0579 0.7611 286,957 96,260 2.98 1 27
GP multidisciplinary cooperation meeting
True value 1.1137 0.4117 0.3335 69,127 21,130 3.27 1 14
No supp. 1.1126 0.4067 0.3084 1 11
Imputed m=1 1.1143 0.4133 0.2925 69,196 34,708 1.99 1 11
Imputed m=3 1.1137 0.4044 0.2823 69,471 34,870 1.99 1 11
Imputed m=5 1.1114 0.3993 0.2825 69,448 35,071 1.98 1 11
GP other services
True value 1.1412 0.4597 0.3820 278,833 77,171 3.61 1 18
No supp. 1.1421 0.4598 0.3569 1 13
Imputed m=1 1.1421 0.4579 0.3608 278,607 100,284 2.78 1 13
Imputed m=3 1.1435 0.4619 0.3664 278,380 100,295 2.78 1 13
Imputed m=5 1.1425 0.4631 0.3653 278,863 100,404 2.78 1 13
Physiotherapy consultation
True value 1.2786 0.7502 0.5934 4,832 1,400 3.45 1 13
No supp. 1.2815 0.7812 0.5826 1 13
Imputed m=1 1.2815 0.7736 0.4621 4,838 3,109 1.56 1 13
Imputed m=3 1.2851 0.8411 0.4801 4,794 3,101 1.55 1 13
Imputed m=5 1.2754 0.7801 0.4476 4,902 3,182 1.54 1 13
Physiotherapy home visit
True value 4.1350 2.6133 1.7821 54,803 4,911 11.16 1 26
No supp. 4.1590 2.6192 1.7291 1 21
Imputed m=1 4.1938 2.6434 1.7192 54,176 21,261 2.55 1 21
Imputed m=3 4.1990 2.6285 1.7054 54,364 21,389 2.54 1 21
Imputed m=5 4.1934 2.6515 1.7247 54,389 21,252 2.56 1 21
Physiotherapy other services
True value 4.2725 2.9132 2.1932 534,175 35,549 15.03 1 45
No supp. 4.2762 2.9124 2.1289 1 43
Imputed m=1 4.2834 2.9199 2.3898 532,583 99,836 5.33 1 43
Imputed m=3 4.2782 2.9171 2.3913 533,872 100,243 5.33 1 43
Imputed m=5 4.2825 2.9270 2.3976 533,163 99,981 5.33 1 43
Ordered logistic regression imputation method used on all variables
Covariates included: HBR days, age group, material status, function scores, IPLOS services,
gender, education level and time dummies
III.4 Data summary
Table III.16 presents summary statistics for some variables after the above imputa-
tion strategy has been implemented for HBR and non-HBR patients seperately. The
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number of patients and observations are the same as presented in Table III.5, but the
mean number of observations, T̄ , is also presented. None of the HBR patients dies
during the observation period and therefore each HBR patient is observed 60 months.
The non-HBR patients also contain patients living in nursing-homes at the start of
observation period. Many of those would pass away during the 5 year data period,
resulting in less observations.
Table III.16: Summary statistics for some variables
HBR ¬ HBR
Mean SD within Mean SD within
Male 0.19 - 0.40 -
Age group 9.85 - 7.20 -
East - Hospital area 0.23 0.04 0.47 0.09
North and Middle - Hospital area 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.03
West - Hospital area 0.28 0.03 0.23 0.06
South - Hospital area 0.40 0.06 0.08 0.05
Vestfold - Hospital area 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
Education 3.25 0.32 3.27 0.42
IPLOS hours 5.87 9.69 10.47 20.27
IPLOS institution days 0.35 2.59 2.96 4.75
NPR policlinic visit 0.43 1.22 0.48 1.15
NPR length of stay 0.43 2.63 0.58 2.82
GP consultation 0.39 0.74 0.36 0.63




There are some clear differences between patients receiving HBR and other pa-
tients. Those differences need to be taken into account when analysing the data. For
instance, there are fewer males and the average age is higher among HBR patients.
The HBR lower age limit is usually set to 18 years, however the typical HBR patients
are elderly people. The proportion of patients living in different hospital areas differs
between the two groups. As seen in Table III.16, approximately 47% of non-HBR
patients live in hospital area (HA) east. Which makes sense since this area contains
three major cities in Norway, one of them being the capital, Oslo. To explain the
residence-of-living proportion for HBR patients differs from the rest, we have to turn
to the history of HBR implementation in Norway. HBR is not mandatory, so munici-
palities implemented the intervention at different rates. The municipality of Arendal,
a part of HA south, was one of the first cities in Norway to fully implement HBR
after running an pilot. The opposite is true for municipalities in HA east, leading to
the clear differentiation between proportion of residence. IPLOS service data differs
between the two groups, which is expected since all 153,098 non-HBR patients are
a natural comparator to HBR. However, average monthly KUHR and NPR service
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are surprisingly equal. It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the latter
observation, but it could tell something about ”praxis” more than about a ”need for
service”.
III.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
As pointed out above, Norway has high quality register data that can be used to create
unique micro-level datasets. The current paper shows how data from three national
health registers can be merged to create a dataset suitable for answering important
cost-effect research questions concerning HBR. However, the process of merging these
registers is far from flawless, causing the need for both adaptability and patience
during the process. The key dilemma lies in finding the right balance between, legal
necessity to guarantee the private sphere of individuals versus the need to support the
policy maker with information as precise as possible. In the case at hand, we had to
accept suppressed observations to meet legal requirements with respect to anonymity
of patient data, which lead to the need for an imputation strategy to achieve (restore)
statistical precision.
The devised strategy proved to work remarkably well for IPLOS related data.
Because IPLOS data only have minor month to month variation and few sequences,
imputation via simple interpolation proved to be effective. When tested, the technique
reconstructed the true value, month by month per individual, almost perfectly for
certain variables and the relative frequency of perfect matches never fell below 0.88.
As a consequence, the monthly mean service use and within standard use between
test data and the true data hardly varied.
NPR and KUHR data, however, differ from IPLOS data and more classical impu-
tation techniques where therefore needed. In the test results presented, all imputation
techniques provide good estimates of monthly mean and standard deviation. Those
are of course key measures when working with pooled regression based estimators.
However, standard panel regression models like fixed-effect (FE) use within-standard
deviation. Unfortunately, all imputation techniques overestimated the within stan-
dard deviation. This could bias the FE estimates and increase coefficient variance,
which again can influence inference. However, in percentage, the amount of observa-
tions needed to be imputed are low and within standard deviation for the test data
is still reasonable. The latter arguments should help to minimize potential bias. As
a precaution, a series of robustness test should be implemented when analyzing the
imputed data, so inference can be trustworthy.
All test also showed an another drawback. They failed to replicate the mean
frequency of service usage. For example, as seen in Table III.11, the average number
of NPR policlinic visit occurrence per patient, is 13 over the 5 year period, whereas
the imputed value is 12. This is still close and impressive taking the complexity of
panel data structure into account. However, this will still be a weakness if one is
particularly interested in duration analysis on discrete time. The development of
imputation methods which also takes this aspect into account could be a subject of
future research.
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As presented in the introduction, statistical estimators are typically know for the
asymptotic case. For all practical purpose, meaning large sample cases. In many
countries, important economic policy-maker questions might be difficult to answer
due to lack of data or costly data collection. Norway is in a fairly unique situation as
most health services provided is public, and mandatory health registers are in place.
The infrastructure for collecting key health data for policy research therefore already
exists. However, this paper substantiates the claim, that the process in by which the
researcher obtains access to the data is cumbersome and close to impossible. We do
understand the need for legal protection of individual information. Measures taken
to achieve protection should be carefully and sensitively balanced against the need of
society to learn about itself.
The key issue is that none of the application process are identical and the health
registers have different ethical requirements. All applications for data and ethical
requirements seems not to be designed for economic research. Policy questions that
usually interest economists focus on the mean overall effect, and not at the individual
level. Economist use individual historical data, but conduct analysis on the aggregated
level and actually never meet the patient. Of course, one could randomly run into
patients, but the research has to deliberately search in the data to find this patient.
Which would in our opinion violate a researcher’s ethical standard, and should be
avoided regardless of official requirements. This ”far-fetched” potential relationship
to patients is today’s standard when defining data anonymity, and some nuances need
should be discussed.
These different ethical authorities are in our opining, originally not designed for
applying register data. They typical focus more on classical medical studies where
one needs a patient’s consent. The irony in the current case, is that in all ethical
applications send, one specifically emphasised that the data would be anonymous.
Besides the latter argument, save storage was always questioned and therefore the
final dataset is stored on a research server. Meaning, the current project ended up
with approximately the same approvals and storing as identifiable clinical data, even
though the dataset is anonymized.
With the above restrictions in mind, there is a chance that important research
questions will stay unanswered as the time-consuming process could work as a hin-
derance. Even if all applications are in place, the process in which data are delivered
to the client/researcher seems to lack efficiency. The fact that it takes 11 months of
waiting time for a 24-hour job, shows that not all systems are ideal. A prospective
researcher may benefit from our documentation in two ways: (s)he may become aware
of the problem dimension and take it into account when contemplating a planning
horizon for her (his) research. Hopefully, data owning institutions might consider the
report as feedback to their work with a client. Norway has the potential to provide
great contributions in policy-research due the many rich data registers. However, it
all depends on the goals of Norwegian policy-makers. If high quality policy-research
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The Western world is facing significant demographic change, and Norway is no excep-
tion. For the last decade, the Norwegian population growth rate has exceeded that of
other European countries, a trend that will continue in the near future (Leknes et al.,
2018). Norwegian population projections indicate that by 2060, every fifth citizen
will be 70 years of age or older. As the population of older adults grows, the number
of individuals facing age-related diseases, along with the number of diseases occurring
simultaneously within the same person, i.e., multimorbidity, will increase (Barnett
et al., 2012). In a recent paper by Eckardt et al., 2017, it is shown that health care
costs tend to increase with the number of comorbidities. The estimated cost of long-
term care to people over 65 years of age will double or triple by 2050 in countries in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Oliveira Martins and
Maisonneuve, 2007). As stated by Zweifel et al., 2009, p. 460, the aging population
jeopardizes the financial equilibrium of social health insurance.
The increasing demand for services leads to continuous pressure on many tradi-
tional homecare providers (Ryburn et al., 2009). The coming challenges will increase
the demand for all long-term services, such as nursing homes and home-based care,
and traditionally, home-based care is more cost-effective. Since the expected cost of
long-term care will increase dramatically, many high-income countries are actively
encouraging a shift from residential care to home-based care as a potentially more ef-
fective and financially sustainable approach to the challenge (Cochrane et al., 2016).
Another incentive is that older people prefer to ‘age in place’ (Wiles et al., 2011).
The forthcoming challenges will compel healthcare services to focus more on pre-
ventive measures, early intervention, the increased use of technology, rehabilitation
and healthcare services that are less manpower-intensive, and services that empower
senior citizens to self-manage chronic diseases.
In this paper, I examine the individual cost effect of one new homecare service,
home-based reablement (HBR), compared to usual care. The aim of this rehabilitation
approach is to restore or increase patients’ level of functioning, thereby increasing
patients’ self-reliance and consequently decreasing their dependence on healthcare
services. Typically, the intervention is developed as a response to the forthcoming
challenges mentioned above. HBR is not a standardized treatment, and the content of
HBR may vary; however, all interventions have the intention of restoring or increasing
an individual’s level of functioning (Tuntland et al., 2014; Whitehead et al., 2014).
HBR has gained significant international prominence in recent years (Cochrane et al.,
2013). The intervention is of special interest because the main features, such as being
time-limited, multidisciplinary, home-based, goal-oriented and person-centered, are
all features many believe future health care should have.
Existing empirical evidence on the effects of HBR is typically published in the epi-
demiological literature and was found to be inconclusive in a recent review (Bersvend-
sen et al., 2019). Increased physical functioning, mainly focusing on activities of daily
living (ADL), is the focus of most studies on HBR. A study by Lewin and Vander-
meulen, 2010 is the first study to use functional gain as the primary outcome, and
it produced some promising results. The HBR group scored significantly better on
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all physical measures after 3- and 12-month follow-ups. These results are consistent
with earlier and more recent studies examining short-term functional effects (Tinetti
et al., 2002; Parsons et al., 2013; Langeland et al., 2019). In contrast, three studies
showed no statistical significance in either functional mobility or ADL (King et al.,
2012; Tuntland et al., 2015; Senior et al., 2014). Moreover, the studies’ results on
quality of life-related measures are inconclusive, with King et al., 2012 reporting sig-
nificant effects and three other studies reporting insignificant effects (Lewin et al.,
2013a; Tuntland et al., 2015; Langeland et al., 2019). The most promising results
of HBR are shown in potential health service reduction, such as reduced probability
of residential care, emergency department visits, and hospital admissions and read-
missions (Tinetti et al., 2002; Tinetti et al., 2012; Lewin et al., 2014; Senior et al.,
2014). The latter findings should translate into both short-term and long-term cost
reduction for HBR patients.
Three related studies estimate the cost effects of HBR (Lewin et al., 2013b; Lewin
et al., 2014; Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016). There seems to be a potential long-term
cost reduction from HBR, as Lewin et al., 2013b reported cost savings but did not
report on significance. From a short-term perspective, there was also a cost difference
in favor of HBR, but this was not significant (Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016), and the
last study was inconclusive (Lewin et al., 2014). There are some key drawbacks of the
three latter studies. Either they did not report on significance or lacked important
cost elements such as hospital stay or nursing-home usage.
The present study is the first large-scale attempt to estimate the cost effects of
HBR, including services from all key Norwegian healthcare providers. This is made
possible by merging three national health registers in Norway at the individual level,
creating a unique monthly panel. The extracted population contains data collected
over 5 years, from 2011 up to and including 2015, on 155,080 individuals living in
ten selected municipalities. All service data from these registers are used to estimate
costs for different stakeholders based on national reported unit costs or financial re-
ports. The data quality is high, as all registers are mandatory and are used either in
a national pay-for-performance system or for comparing productivity across munici-
palities. The bulk of the data refers to geriatric patients above 70 years old, as the
usual HBR patient is older. Estimating the cost effect of HBR based on individual
data poses some interesting econometric challenges. Due to the individuality of the
treatment, one should allow for heterogeneous effects in a dynamic model because
current overall health costs naturally are affected by previous costs. This needs to be
addressed in a setting where variables and the error term are cross-sectionally depen-
dent. Since it is difficult to argue that the factors driving the cross-section dependence
in the variables and error term are not correlated, standard estimators might contain
bias. To avoid this problem, a recent large N and T estimator developed by Chudik
and Pesaran, 2015 is used, and an introduction to the estimator is provided.
The results indicate that HBR patients on average have lower costs after treatment
than non-HBR patients. For the main treatment variable, the estimated monthly
short-run total cost savings varies between -4,875 and -6,007 NOK. This includes
the first period of HBR and the entire subsequent period. On average, the mean
length of the main binary treatment variable is over 15 months. The short-run effect
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translates into a predicted long-run cost reduction effect between -4,637 and -6,373
NOK. Moreover, the cost reduction increases as the time horizon between the first
HBR period and the observation period increases. The effect is mainly found in
specialist health services, which is a different area from where the intervention is
implemented. Interestingly, especially for policy-makers, no effect is shown for men
when regressions are conditioned on gender. Explaining the gender difference could
be of interest for future research. All results pass a series of robustness tests.
This paper contributes mainly to two distinct literatures. First, the study con-
tributes to the small but growing literature on the cost effect of new non-medical ser-
vices such as vocational rehabilitation (Engström et al., 2017), cognitive-behavioral
group therapy for cancer patients (Sabariego et al., 2011), tele-healthcare (Witt Udsen
et al., 2017), telephone- and face-to-face-delivered counseling intervention (Berndt et
al., 2016) and nurse-based case management (Seidl et al., 2015). These studies show
the great variety of new ideas all aiming to improve current healthcare. They mainly
tend to rely on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or cluster trials. In many research
areas, RCT is regarded as the gold standard, if such a standard exists (Cartwright,
2007), but RCT if not without problems, especially in social science (Deaton and
Cartwright, 2018). In contrast, the current study views the introduction of HBR in
Norwegian municipalities as an instance of a natural experiment and studies it with
appropriate methods using data already assembled at a high cost by society. Second,
the present study also sheds light on the new literature focusing on traditional pri-
mary care, for instance, increased long-term subsidization (Costa-Font et al., 2018),
extended primary care practice opening hours (Bruni et al., 2016), the importance
of informal care (Cecchini, 2018, Urwin et al., 2019) and long-term medical costs of
Alzheimer’s disease (Sopina et al., 2019).
In the next section, the Norwegian health system and implementation of HBR is
explained. Section IV.3 presents the data and cost estimation, along with a description
of the treatment variables and matching strategy. Section IV.4 thoroughly explains
the empirical application, including the approach developed by Chudik and Pesaran,
2015. In Section IV.5, the results are presented, and Section IV.6 contains a series
of robustness tests. The paper ends with a discussion of the findings and concluding
remarks alongside implications for future research.
IV.2 The Norwegian health system and home-based
reablement
The Norwegian national government is solely responsible for providing healthcare to
the population. For instance, the share of specialist care rendered by private, for-profit
hospitals is low. In 2014, such institutions provided less than 0.2% of somatic hospital
stays and 6.8% of daytime stays1. Primary care and specialist care are organized
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ownership of hospitals. All public hospitals are associated with one of four regional
healthcare authorities (RHAs). The Ministry of Health provides each RHA with an
annual budget augmented by operational directives on general goals to be achieved.
RHAs are responsible for providing specialist inpatient somatic and psychiatric care
alongside alcohol and substance abuse treatments. When a patient is referred to or
treated at a hospital, policlinic or even a contract specialist, considerable information
is digitally registered at the treatment site. A large part of this information is sent to
the national health register named the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR), which is
operated by the Norwegian Directorate of Health (NDH). This register plays a key role
in the funding mechanism for somatic services. Hospitals combine an annual budget
and a pay-for-performance system referred to as Diagnosis-related Groups (DRG),
which is based on data from NPR. Other specialist services are funded by a budget,
but the data are still registered in NPR.
General practitioners (GPs) and private physiotherapists are organized indepen-
dently and often collaborate with peers. GPs act as gatekeepers and refer patients
to more complex care services. Although GPs and private physiotherapists are self-
employed, most are still part of the public system through contracts with municipal-
ities. The GPs are financed by three different sources, capitation per patient from
municipalities, patient payments and fee-for-services from the The Norwegian Health
Economics Administration (NHEA). The fee-for-service is a pay-for-performance sys-
tem where one is reimbursed according a set of detailed activities. The register for the
Control and Payment of Primary care Reimbursement Scheme (KUHR) is the regis-
ter designed to manage this system. Private physiotherapists have the same finance
system, except they do not receive capitation from the municipalities. If the reader
is interested in further details, Ringard et al., 2013 provides an extensive description
of the Norwegian health system.
One special feature of the Norwegian health system is the municipalities’ key role.
They are responsible for providing a wide range of primary care services, such as
rehabilitation, physiotherapy, preventive medicine, health promotion and others. Un-
doubtedly, the main health care services provided by the municipalities are long-term
care at home (home services) and nursing homes. The Registry for Individual-based
Nursing and Care Statistics (IPLOS) contains health information for individuals who
have applied for or received primary care from the municipality. IPLOS differs from
the two other registers, NPR and KUHR, as it is not used in a governmental funding
system. However, it is still a legal requirement that the municipalities use IPLOS, and
therefore, the quality is still regarded as high. Grants from the national government
and local taxes are the main sources of financing for municipal authorities. Local
municipality councils allocate these grants to all services provided by the municipal-
ity, including social care, schools, kindergartens and others. These national health
registers play a key role in creating the dataset described in Section IV.3.1.
Implementing HBR is not mandatory for Norwegian municipalities, although ap-
proximately 230 out of 422 municipalities render such services, and 10 of them are
included in this study. The ten included municipalities were chosen due to feasibil-
ity considerations (see Section IV.3.1) and based on a set of explicit criteria. Under
(i), only municipalities that have implemented the HBR strategy alongside a con-
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ventional care strategy qualify for inclusion. Under the size criterion (ii), populous
municipalities become candidates for selection. Therefore, one are aiming for high po-
tential variation at the municipality level. Finally, to avoid capturing predominantly
transient phenomena, the experience criterion (iii) favors the inclusion of municipali-
ties that have gathered sufficient experience in administering the care strategy itself
and have accumulated experience concerning the management of the respective HBR
units.
Figure IV.1: Monthly mean total cost development for HBR and non-HBR patients, 2011
- 2015, measured in NOK. The data are based on the complete sample of 155,080 individ-
uals presented in Section IV.3.1. In addition, the figure illustrates roughly when HBR was
implemented in the various municipalities considered here.
HBR shares features with other rehabilitation services and is distinguished by a re-
orientation of homecare away from treating diseases toward maximizing independence
(Cochrane et al., 2016). Typically, a multidisciplinary team, which often comprises a
nurse, physiotherapist and occupational therapist, works with the patient towards a
defined goal. In HBR, significant resources are provided to focus on intensive rehabil-
itation measures in the patient’s home for a limited period. Usual care, such as home
nurse, is the typical alternative to HBR. HBR patients will often receive homecare
service after HBR, but hopefully at a lower rate. Since HBR is not mandatory, the mu-
nicipalities are autonomous with respect to the design of the intervention. However,
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for the municipalities included in our study, there is limited variation with respect to
the inclusion criteria, duration of the intervention, and approach to implementation
of HBR.
None of the municipalities work with explicit exclusion criteria, but they tend
to administer the treatment to older, functionally impaired individuals who do not
experience severe cognitive problems. Typically, an HBR phase lasts 4 weeks, with 5
treatment days per week. While in one municipality HBR lasts 6 weeks, it lasts for
only 3 weeks – with 7 treatment days per week – in another. Thus, in total days,
there is little variation in the length of the intervention. A patient is offered HBR
as an alternative to traditional treatment. The patient then decides whether to take
the offer, meaning that patients self-select when offered HBR, but few patients refuse
HBR. All municipalities started with a pilot before implementing the service full time.
The respective implementation years vary between 2011 and 2015, as illustrated in
Figure IV.1.
The monthly mean costs of HBR and non-HBR patients are presented in Figure
IV.1. The mean HBR cost is lower but increases more rapidly. The main reason that
HBR has such a low mean cost is that most HBR patients are fairly new to services.
This means that the observed periods before HBR treatment will have close to zero
costs. This is not the case for non-HBR patients, who for instance include long-term
nursing-home patients, an expensive treatment. The difference between the groups
and how this is addressed are presented in Section IV.3.3.
IV.3 Data and cost estimation
IV.3.1 Data
Section IV.2 explained the functions of three Norwegian health registers. These data
repositories have been assembled at high cost by Norwegian society, and data from
these registers constitute the basis of this study. The three registers, IPLOS, KUHR
and NPR, have been connected at an individual level, including socio-demographic
data from Statistics Norway (SSB). The merged dataset contains observations col-
lected over 5 years, from 2011 up to and including 2015, in ten selected municipalities.
Merging these registers at such a large scale is, to our knowledge, not common and
created substantial difficulties that need to be addressed. The root of the compli-
cations lies in the fact that IPLOS is a pseudonymous register, whereas NPR and
KUHR use personal number (P.no) for identification.
As seen from the variable list presented in Table IV.14 in Appendix IV.A, IPLOS
contains data on nursing home and traditional home-based services, such as homecare
and home nurses. Detailed measures of other more specialized primary care services,
such as elderly day care and support persons, are not included due to anonymization.
Function scores, which measure ADL on 17 items, are included in the dataset. How-
ever, when a patient is not receiving services from the municipality, scores are not
observed.
Data included from specialist care, obtained from NPR, include monthly aggre-
gated service data separated into either number of episodes or sum length of stay.
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The most costly diagnoses group in a given month and the individual monthly sum
of DRG points are also provided. KUHR contains data from GPs and private phys-
iotherapists. As mentioned in Section IV.2, the latter occupations are reimbursed by
registering for a set of activities. The dataset contains monthly aggregate sums of
these activities by different categories.
HBR is implemented in the municipalities, and therefore IPLOS is the natural
starting point for the creation of the dataset. The population is all patients reg-
istered in the IPLOS at least once during the period 2011 - 2015 in the included
municipalities. None of the registers included contains information concerning a pa-
tient’s use of HBR, and P.no of individuals who had received HBR were collected
“manually”. To avoid the apparent difficulties and cost associated with collecting
HBR data in this manner for all Norwegian municipalities, only observations from
selected administrative entities have been included in this study. SSB merged all
register data after having received them.
The end result of the merging process creates a unique panel dataset, structured
such that individuals constitute the cross-section and the data are at a monthly
frequency. The sample contains 155,380 individuals, and approximately 1.4% of them,
i.e., 2,230 individuals, received HBR at least once. All individuals were observed for
60 months (5 years), but not all observations include service data. These empty
observations are considered “healthy observations” in the sense that no health service
was needed. The strategy of creating 60 observations for all individuals – irrespective
of the de facto use of health services – proved to be an appropriate response to the
technical problems caused by the need to merge data from several registers. Since
observations following an individual’s death month were deleted, exceptions to the
“60 observations rule” may occur.
Obtaining access to these data is not straightforward and requires a thorough ap-
plication process. The project was approved by The Regional Committees of Medical
and Health Research Ethics (REK) and The Norwegian Data Protection Authority
(NDPA). Necessary guidelines and verdicts from these institutions where followed.
In sum, the data used in this study are costly, both in terms of time and monetary
expenses. A potential risk in rich individual-specific datasets is the possibility of iden-
tifying individuals. SSB therefore needed to anonymize the data before delivering it
to the researcher. SSB implements a pragmatic rule of thumb: If each cluster of
identifiable variables contains at least five individuals, then the data set fulfills the
anonymity requirement. The anonymization algorithm proceeds in two steps. First, it
identifies clusters of fewer than 5 individuals in the space spanned by four identifiable
variables: HBR group (yes/no), Gender, Hospital area and Age group. This “cluster
step” is replicated for each of the 60 time periods. In the second step, the necessary
deletions are carried out before the dataset is handed over. Because of anonymiza-
tion difficulties, the age variable was replaced with 15 different age groups2 and the
municipality information was replaced with hospital area.
The anonymization algorithm from SSB marked 180,036 observations as sup-
pressed, which is 2.3% of the total 7,981,709 observations. Service data on suppressed
2Anonymization required that age had to be aggregated into 15 different age groups: 0-39, 40-59,
60-65, 66-70, 71-72, 73-74, 75-76, 77-78, 79-80, 81-82, 83-84, 85-86, 87-88, 89-90 and 91+.
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observations where deleted, and 144,979 (1.8%) of the marked observations originally
contained some service data. This implies that there are 35,057 marked observations
that were originally empty/healthy observations. Of the total 133,800 HBR obser-
vations, 89,747 were marked as suppressed. These are not necessarily related to the
HBR period when the intervention was given but often to periods before and after the
intervention. Deleted service data are equivalent to missing values, and imputation
was conducted. The methods were chosen based on several test imputations on non-
missing values and the nature of the variables. A detailed description and discussion
of the imputation procedure and data collection process are available (Bersvendsen
and Jungeilges, 2019). In the sections below, when discussing primary care, IPLOS-
related data are referenced. When discussing specialist care, data coming from NPR
are used.
IV.3.2 Cost estimation
In the current setting, cost is defined as costs related to health institutions, which
in Norway are run by the public sector. The costs are registered in accounts, and
financial reports from 2017 are the bases for estimating costs. The necessary data are
publicly available but require some institutional insight. The variable list presented
in Table IV.14 also provides the unit of measure for different service variables. The
cost estimation strategy is separated into three steps. First, estimate a cost per unit
measured in NOK for all different service variables. The second step is to multiply
observed service data by the estimated cost per unit to obtain the cost for each health
service variable in monetary terms. In the final step, these service-specific costs are
summarized into groups of interest, all with equal weight, that will act as dependent
variables. The basic rule is that all institutional costs are included and adjusted by
Norwegian VTA rules, and deviations from this rule will be noted.
Unit cost estimation for somatic specialist care services is straightforward, as NDH
produces reports on institutional cost and activity usage for specialist care3. Somatic
specialist care is financed through an activity-based system, where DRG points are
the activity driver. All somatic hospital visits, policlinic visits and stays, are given
DRG points. Therefore, to estimate the somatic service cost, one only needs an
average cost per DRG point. This is directly obtained from published NDH reports.
Psychiatric services provided by specialist care do not have an activity-based financing
system. The number of psychiatric policlinic visits and days stayed are observed in
the dataset. NDH provides the average cost per psychiatric visit and per day. Both
of these variables are observed, meaning that all unit costs for specialist services are
directly obtained from public reports. Thus, it is simply a matter of multiplying
observed data by estimated average unit costs.
As mentioned in Section IV.2, the KUHR register is a system designed to accom-
modate reimbursement requests made to the government by health institutions and
therapists. The register is owned by NDH and operated by NHEA, an external agency
of NDH. GP and Physiotherapist are reimbursed based on a set of detailed activi-
ties that each have a separate code. These activities were aggregated into different
3www.helsedirektoratet.no/rapporter/samdata-spesialisthelsetjenesten/ Press link
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categories by KUHR before being included in the dataset. However, KUHR provides
a list of which activity codes are included in the different aggregated KUHR service
variables. NHEA produces annual detailed reports4 5 presenting the total number
of reimbursements and the total sum of reimbursements per activity code in NOK,
which is the basis for KUHR service variable unit costs. To obtain the latter unit
cost, one first has to summarize the number and total amount of reimbursement for
the codes included in the specific KUHR service variable and thereafter divide these
numbers. An example is illustrated below.
Unit cost KUHR variable =
Sum amount reimbursed for included codes
Sum number of reimbursements for included codes
The main weakness in basing KUHR unit costs on reimbursement is that these
reimbursements do not cover the total institutional costs of GPs and physiotherapists.
To my knowledge, there is no estimated total cost per aggregated KUHR activity.
Increased KUHR unit costs are tested in Section IV.6.4.
The unit cost estimation for services from NPR and KUHR are national estimates
and not only based on the included municipalities. This should not be an issue, espe-
cially since all hospital areas in Norway are represented. For primary care, however,
the estimated cost is based on the included municipalities. All included municipalities
are larger cities, and they tend to organize their services differently from minor cities,
which might influence the cost.
Table IV.1: Cost per unit for each service variable
Cost group Variable Per unit in NOK
Primary care cost (IPLOS)
Hours of home-nurse and homecare 594
Days in care institution 2,627
Specialist care cost (NPR)
Total DRG points 52,442
Policlinic contacts psychiatry 3,087
Length of stay (days) psychiatry 12,483
Other GP services 238
Multidisciplinary cooperation meeting 404
GP home visit 261
GP/Physiotherapy cost GP contact by phone or mail 62
GP office simple contact 35
(KUHR) GP consultation 66
Physiotherapy consultation 279
Physiotherapy home visit 111
Other Physiotherapy services 146
Estimating the unit cost for primary care based on publicly available data requires
some understanding of the system and reporting structure. One needs to estimate
two unit costs: (i) the cost per hour for home nurses and homecare and (ii) the cost
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SSB has made data accessible on several areas, one of which is the annual financial
records for municipalities. The records are reported in different three-digit codes. As
an example, 253, is called health and care services in institutions, and 261 is called
institution facilities. Both of these codes cover all cost and user income related to
institutions provided by municipalities. Aggregate usage of institutional days is also
made public by SSB, which obtains data from the IPLOS register. In our data, the
number of days in an institution covers all types of visits, short-term visits, reha-
bilitation and long-term visits covered by the municipality. Therefore, all registered
institution days must be included when calculating unit costs. The registered cost also
includes all types of institution visits, and all data are available at the municipality
level6. One then has the following:
Unit cost per day =
Sum cost registered at 253 and 261 in 2017
Total days provided by institutions in 2017
.
The same structure can be identified for homecare and home-nursing care using the
code 254, called health and care services to patients in private residences. Aggregated
hours of use for different IPLOS services are also made public. However, the observed
amount of home-nurse and homecare hours is under code 254, but in addition, 254 also
includes two types of special services that are categorized in the other care services
variable. However, 86.3% of the hours are related to services included in the observed
hours variable are registered under 254. Thus, the average cost per hour for 254,
including the two extra services, is estimated here. This appears unlikely to affect
the ”true” average cost without the two additional services in 254 because they are
performed by the same profession7. In Section IV.6.4, an adjusted price is tested.
The unit cost per hour is therefore
Unit cost per hour =
Sum cost registered at 254 in 2017
Total amount of hours provided in 2017
.
Once all unit costs (see Table IV.1) are obtained, one can calculate costs for
different groups that can act as dependent variables. For each patient i at time t, one
estimates these overall cost groups in NOK:
Primary care costit = (Hoursit ∗ 594) + (Daysit ∗ 2, 627)
Specialist care costit = (DRG pointsit ∗ 52, 442) + (Days psychiatryit ∗ 12, 483)





where pj = unit cost for the jth KUHR variable
Total costit = Primary care costit + Specialist care costit
+KUHR costit
6For further details regarding the public data used for estimating average cost per day, see SSB
tables 11644 and 12367.
7For further details regarding the public data used for estimating average cost per hour, see SSB
tables 11643 and 12367.
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The results will be presented when using Total cost, Primary care cost and Spe-
cialist care cost as dependent variables. The results for KUHR cost will be discussed
in Section IV.6.4.
One potential weakness is related to the data quality of the health registers, which
again depends on the fact that all agents register equally. As mentioned above, NPR
and KUHR are both used in a national activity-based financing system, which has
been used for several years. Clear routines for registration in these registers exist,
and the data quality is regarded as high. It is mandatory for municipalities to report
in the national IPLOS register. However, there are less clear routines for how to
report IPLOS data. This is particularly relevant since HBR is a new service and
not mandatory for the municipalities to offer. This potential drawback should be
minor in the present study. Eight of the ten included municipalities participate in a
collaboration network that meets regularly each year. During these meetings at the
administration level, operational aspects of data registration are regularly discussed.
The other two municipalities have close relationships with either one or several of
the other eight. The activities of this network should minimize the potential bias
introduced by different interpretations of data registration in IPLOS and financial
reports sent to SSB.
IV.3.3 Matching strategy
For two reasons, I opt for a matching strategy to create a smaller and more balanced
dataset that is well suited to estimate the cost effects of HBR. First, the complete
dataset explained in Section IV.3.1 contains all patients who received some sort of
primary care during the period 2011 - 2015. The complete dataset therefore contains
patients receiving services that are not a natural logical comparison for HBR. For
example, there are patients in the complete data set who never receive any amount
of homecare or home-nurse hours, which is the target group for HBR. There could be
patients who live in long-term institutions for the entire observed period. Additionally,
the complete dataset includes young patients with serious needs, who would not be
eligible for HBR. Comparing the means of age group and gender reveals a clear
difference between the 2,230 HBR patients and the others. For instance, the mean of
age group is 9.4 for the HBR group and 7.2 for non-HBR. Additionally, the proportion
of men differs between the groups by 10% in absolute terms, where HBR had less.
Figure IV.1 also illustrates the clear difference between HBR and all other services.
The second reason for creating a relevant sub-sample is due to feasibility issues related
to estimation. For the reasons presented in Section IV.4.4, it is difficult to estimate
the regression model on the complete dataset because of computer power and Stata
matsize issues.
Of the 2,230 HBR patients in the original dataset, 489 are dropped because at least
93% of their observations are suppressed. Which such a large number of suppressed
observations, it seems meaningless to impute missing values. Fifty-two patients of
non-HBR users are also dropped for the same reason. The complete dataset begins
with 1,741 HBR patients and 153,098 non-HBR patients, for a total of 7,951,682
observations, before the matching strategy was implemented.
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Since non-HBR patients who have not received any homecare or home-nurse hours
are not a natural comparison group to HBR patients, they are dropped. The present
study is interested in estimating the cost effects of HBR, including the treatment
period. There are patients who are still receiving/receiving HBR for the first time in
December 2015, meaning that no periods are observed after HBR. These 117 patients
will not provide any information on the research question and are therefore dropped.
HBR is initially designed as a home-based service and can be received either at first
entry to home services or at a later stage. Ideally, one would match patients on a
clearly defined cutoff for both groups. Thus, the cutoff is set as the first entry into
home services, where first entry is defined as a patient with zero home-service hours 12
months before the first hours are registered. Since only a few patients received HBR
in 2011, little HBR data is lost. Having such a clear cutoff will increase matching
precision because it is possible to match 12 months of pre-cutoff data.
I then calculate the mean cost and standard deviation (SD) for the 12-months prior
to first entry on each of the three cost groups and total cost. At the defined point,
first entry has a cross-section data structure. At this point, nearest-neighbor matching
is applied. This method pairs observations with the closest m matches between the
two groups using a multi-dimensional set of variables. The number of closest matches
m is set to 1, and the specific Stata program used is nnmatch by Abadie et al.,
2004. In this program, one has to set up a dependent variable and treatment variable
along with a variable list used in the matching. Total cost is set as the dependent
variable and HBR group, a binary variable, is the treatment variable. The 12-month
mean costs and standard deviation prior to first entry are used as matching variables.
Additionally, traditional covariates such as Age group, Education, Gender, Hospital
areas, Sum observations, NPR main diagnoses, Marital status and Time are used.
The sum of observations is included in the variable list to ensure that HBR patients
are not matched with many patients who die during the period. None of the HBR
patients died during the sample period, and therefore, the sum of observations is
always 60 (5 years of monthly data) for these patients. The nnmatch command allows
for an exact option that allows one to specify a set of variables, where the aim is to
obtain an exact matching (or one as exact as possible). The variable list for the exact
option cannot overlap with the complete list of matching variables, so mean total cost
and time are dropped when using the exact option. In addition to the 1,088 included
HBR patients, the matching procedure found 927 non-HBR patients. This results in
a matched dataset with 2,015 patients and 120,808 observations.
IV.3.4 Descriptive statistics
The matching strategy seems to be satisfactory, as all socio-demographic are fairly
similar between the two groups presented in Table IV.2. There is no difference between
the proportion of males in the two groups, the no-HBR group only has a 1% larger
share. Martial status is also essentially identical in terms of both mean and within
SD between the two groups. This is a categorical variable with 5 different categories,
where 2 equals married or in a partnership and 3 indicates widow or widower. The two
groups have an essentially equal distribution in percentage terms between the different
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categories, where 40% of the observations are registered as widow or widower. The
two groups differ slightly in their proportion of residence. For non-HBR users, the
mean proportion of patients living in hospital area East is 27% compared to 23%
for the HBR group. The largest differences are found for hospital area South, where
there is a 6% larger proportion of HBR patients. There is a 2% difference between
the groups for hospital areas North and Middle. Regarding the SD within values for
HA, they are all low and fairly equal. This indicates that some patients do move, but
this is rare for both groups. More interesting, SD within is almost identical between
the two groups for all HA variables. With such little movement, the possible effect of
the mean difference should be captured by most panel data estimators.
As mentioned above, we do not observe age but 15 different age groups. The closest
integer for the mean age group for both groups was 9, meaning that the patient was
between 79 and 80 years old in 2015. The average mean age group is slightly higher
for the HBR group, but both groups still have 28% of the patients in age groups 8 -
11. Education level, a 9-level ordinal variable, is identical between the groups. The
closest integer for both of them is 3, which indicates high school, meaning a maximum
of 12 years of school. Education category 4 also indicates high school, but with one
additional year.
Table IV.2: Summary statistics
HBR ¬ HBR
Mean Within SD Mean Within SD
Primary care cost 2,180 7,810 4,437 12,154
Specialist care cost 7,794 35,851 6,194 32,224
GP and Physiotherapy cost 123 261 130 227
Total cost 10,096 37,032 10,761 35,032
Male 0.22 - 0.23 -
Marital status 2.60 0.27 2.59 0.26
East - Hospital area 0.23 0.04 0.27 0.07
North and Middle - Hospital area 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03
West - Hospital area 0.28 0.04 0.26 0.04
South - Hospital area 0.39 0.07 0.33 0.07
Vestfold - Hospital area 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03
Age group 9.34 - 8.95 -
Education 3.27 0.34 3.27 0.42
FG 1 - Social functioning 0.41 0.48 0.53 0.65
FG 2 - Cognitive failure 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.63
FG 3 - Look after health 0.67 0.80 0.87 1.00
FG 4 - Housekeeping 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.94




The monthly mean and within SD for primary care costs are both lower for the
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HBR group than for the matched non-HBR patients. The opposite is observed for
specialist care. For GP and physiotherapy costs, the mean and SD within have minor
differences. The monthly mean total cost over the 5-year period differs little. However,
the within SD variation is 2,000 NOK higher for the HBR group.
Here, I use function groups (FG) instead of 17 different function score variables.
Operating with FG is the norm for SSB when they publish reports based on function
scores. The function groups are created in the same manner as done by the SSB,
structuring 15 of the 17 different function scores8 into 5 different groups. Hearing and
eyesight are excluded because they lacked significance in a factor analysis conducted
by SSB.
Mean FGs 4 and 5, housekeeping and self-care, are similar between the two groups,
which also holds for SE within. Clear differences can be found for FGs 2 and 3,
cognitive failure and look after own health, where the means are both lower for the
HBR group. This is reasonable. One of the inclusion criteria for HBR is that patients
should have some degree of cognitive presence. The reason for this is that patients
need to be able to set their own goals. Looking after one’s own health is also expected
because HBR patients undergo a thorough program that includes several training
exercises. One intention of HBR is that patients should change their mindset to be
more self-reliant. There is also a marginal difference in FG 1, social functioning.
Table IV.3: Summary cost statistics by gender
HBR ¬ HBR
Male Female Male Female
Primary care cost 1,413 2,394 4,723 4,350
(5,724) (8,301) (12,401) (12,078)
Specialist care cost 8,633 7,558 7,455 5,811
(38,522) (35,067) (38,869) (29,916)
GP and physiotherapy cost 110 127 118 134
(246) (265) (228) (227)
Total cost 10,157 10,079 12,295 10,295
(38,974) (36,470) (41,436) (32,841)
Age group 8.32 9.63 8.17 9.18
Education 3.61 3.18 3.65 3.16
n 238 850 216 711
N 14,280 51,000 12,947 42,635
T̄ 60.00 60.00 59.94 59.96
Within standard deviation in parentheses
Table IV.3 presents the monthly mean costs separated by gender and the respective
treatment group. Interestingly, the mean primary costs are higher for females in the
HBR group and lower for specialist care compared to males. The difference in both
cost groups is approximately 1,110 NOK. The total cost differences between males
8For further details, see Appendix A in https://www.ssb.no/helse/
artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/318105?_ts=15dcac9dff0
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and females for HBR patients are minor. In the non-HBR group, there is a minor
difference between genders and mean primary costs. For specialist care, the mean
cost for males is also higher in the non-HBR group, which also results in a difference
in mean total costs between genders. There appear to be gender differences in service
usage measured by costs. Assessing whether the potential HBR effect differs between
genders is therefore of interest.
IV.3.5 Treatment variables
To identify the effect of HBR on different cost outcome measures, I create binary
treatment indicators. The effect on pre-treatment cost is not of interest because po-
tential HBR patients should not differ substantial from traditional homecare patients.
However, one of the goals of HBR is for the treatment to reduce the need for health
services, which again should translate into reduced costs. During the HBR period,
costs should actually be higher than those of traditional care because of the greater
intensity of care, meaning more service hours. A potential reduction in cost post-HBR
therefore comes at an additional cost. Since my interest here is in the total effect, the
service amount used during HBR also needs to be captured. The main treatment in-
dicator, Tit, therefore equals 1 beginning in the first month the patient received HBR
for the first time and all periods thereafter. This means that the number of periods in
which Tit equals 1 will vary because patients receive HBR at different points in time.
The mean length of time from the first period of HBR to the last observed period is
15 months. To capture the development over time, three other indicators are defined
with the same definition but with a different maximum number of periods for which
the treatment indicator can be equal 1. These time horizons are set at 6, 8 and 12





All start at the first period when a patient receives HBR for the first time. Figure
IV.2 illustrates these four different indicators. I run separate regressions for each of
the different treatment variables, and present results for all of them below.
Month
1 2 t− 3 t− 1 t+ 1 t+ 3 t+ 6 t+ 8 t+ 12 59 60
T 12it = 1
T 8it = 1
T 6it = 1








Figure IV.2: Illustrates the four different treatment indicators of interest. All start at the
same point, but their time horizons differ. Tit does not have a limited time horizon, while









The relationship between health costs and our variables of interest is assumed to be
linear. I specify the following random trend model
yit = ρyit−1 + δTit+ sitθ+ git+ai+ ηt+uit, i = 1, 2, ..., 2015; t = 1, 2, ..., 60 (IV.1)
where each individual i is allowed to have its own time trend, git (Wooldridge,
2002, p. 315). In equation (IV.1), ai captures possible unobserved area heterogeneity,
and in addition to the standard random trend model, ηt is added, which accounts
for unobserved time effects. The model also differs from the classical random trend
model in that it is dynamic. Tit is the variable of interest, sit is a 1×k row vector and
contains observed covariates varying across i and t, and uit denotes the error term.
The unobserved coefficients ρ and δ are scalars, and θ is a k × 1 vector. Given the
strict exogeneity assumption, one approach to estimate equation (IV.1) is to difference
away ai:
∆yit = ρ∆yit−1 + δ∆Tit + ∆sitθ + gi + ∆ηt + ∆uit, (IV.2)
where ∆ denotes the first difference, and exploit that git−gi(t−1) = gi. Equation
(IV.2) now resembles a standard dynamic panel model and can be estimated with
standard dynamic models. Traditionally, there are concerns with using fixed effect
(FE) estimators on dynamic panel models. Such estimators are inconsistent due to
the Nickell bias discovered by Nickell, 1981. In the current case, Nickell bias will not
be an issue because of the large T, and thus the FE estimator would still be consistent
(Judson and Owen, 1999,Baltagi, 2013, p. 155).
Table IV.4: FE estimation regression on Total cost – error term diagnostics – p-values
presented
Sub-sample Matched
1 2 3 4 5 data
Pesaran CD testa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified Wald testb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wooldrige auto correlation testc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
n 1,121 1,122 1,117 1,118 1,116 2,015
a Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test from 2004 under the null hypothesis of independence
b Modified Wald test under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity
c Wooldridge autocorrelation test under the null hypothesis of zero correlation
Covariates included: Tit, lagged Total cost, five hospital areas, marital status 2 - 5,
Education and time dummies
Table IV.4 presents the regression diagnostic for the model (IV.2) using the Tit
treatment variable. Due to feasibility issues, one cannot directly perform these tests
on the initial dataset. Therefore, 5 sub-samples were randomly selected, each con-
taining 1,124 patients. Since working with first-differenced variables, and the Pesaran
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cross-sectional dependence test does not work well with fewer than 5 time obser-
vations (Pesaran, 2004), deviation in number of patients will occur. The latter is
because different diagnostic tests is performed only on patients with 6 or more time
observations, causing the n in Table IV.4 to be less than 1,124 for the sub-samples.
As seen, I clearly cannot reject that the errors are autocorrelated and heteroscedastic
(HAC). This holds for all sub-samples and the matched data used for the analysis.
The test results presented in Table IV.4 are only for one regression setup, but they
do not change when introducing different combinations of covariates. The results
presented are for the random trend model, but the test result also holds for a classical
two-way FE model.
IV.4.2 Cross-sectional dependence
In addition to having to address HAC, the information in Table IV.4 also implies
cross-sectional dependence (CSD) in the error term,
cov(uit, ujt) 6= 0 for some t and some i 6= j. (IV.3)
That is, at each time t, the errors may be correlated across patients. There are
currently two main strands in the literature for dealing with CSD in panels with
large N: spatial models and the residual multifactor approach, also known as the fac-
tor structure approach (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011; Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012).
Spatial models use the concept of a distance metric, assuming that the structure of
CSD is related to distance and locations of units. Such a pre-defined metric is often
difficult to find, but there are studies that use this concept with an economic distance
(Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012). The alternative approach, the factor structure ap-




ift + εit, (IV.4)
where ft is an m× 1 vector of unknown common factors, λi is an m× 1 vector of
unknown factor loadings, and εit denotes the idiosyncratic error that is assumed to be
independently distributed among the regressors. This allows the unknown common
factors, economy-wide shocks, to influence all units with different intensities. Such a
factor structure approach is well suited to the current research question for reasons
elaborated in the discussion in section (IV.7). Spatial CSD can be viewed as a special
factor structure approach (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012). Bai, 2009 illustrated that
the model presented in equation (IV.1) is actually a special case of the factor structure














γ′ift = ai + ηt. (IV.6)
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The appropriate estimation technique for models with CSD largely depends on the
sources and nature of these CSDs. Especially for non-dynamic models, the key ques-




















Table IV.5: Variable-specific Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence
Sub-sample Matched
1 2 3 4 5 data
CDa pb CDa pb CDa pb CDa pb CDa pb CDa pb
∆Total cost 12.8 0.00 15.9 0.00 22.7 0.00 22.7 0.00 21.3 0.00 9.5 0.00
∆Primary cost 124.7 0.00 117.3 0.00 132.1 0.00 127.6 0.00 115.8 0.00 79.9 0.00
∆Specialist cost 2.8 0.00 4.3 0.00 8.3 0.00 9.1 0.00 9.0 0.00 8.4 0.00
∆GP/Phys cost 47.3 0.00 38.7 0.00 45.5 0.00 39.1 0.00 28.4 0.00 72.9 0.00
∆HBR Days 0.0 0.94 0.0 1.00 0.0 0.99 0.0 0.99 0.0 1.00 12.6 0.00
∆Education 0.1 0.97 0.5 0.61 0.7 0.50 0.8 0.43 0.3 0.73 2.5 0.01
∆FG 1 4.3 0.00 2.9 0.00 2.3 0.02 5.5 0.00 4.3 0.00 20.4 0.00
∆FG 2 4.0 0.00 2.5 0.01 3.1 0.02 4.0 0.00 3.5 0.00 19.0 0.00
∆FG 3 3.6 0.00 2.4 0.02 2.2 0.03 3.4 0.00 1.9 0.06 18.8 0.00
∆FG 4 4.1 0.00 1.9 0.05 1.9 0.08 3.6 0.00 2.3 0.02 23.8 0.00
∆FG 5 5.1 0.00 4.7 0.00 5.6 0.00 6.5 0.00 4.1 0.00 22.5 0.00
a The CD-statistic is distributed N (0, 1), and extreme values indicate strong correlation
b p-values, and H0 : cross-sectional independence
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The results in Table IV.5 clearly suggest that for the matched data, all variables
that potentially could be included in the regression and are CSD. This is also con-
firmed by studying the five random sub-samples, except HBR days and Education.
The latter evidence, in addition to the results from Table IV.4, clearly indicates that
there is CSD in the regressors and error terms. Assuming that the common factors
causing CSD in the error term and regressors are independent of one another, con-
ventional panel data estimators will still be consistent but naturally affect inference
(Chudik and Pesaran, 2013). In this case, one could obtain valid inference by, for in-
stance, using a nonparametric robust variance-covariance matrix discussed by Driscoll
and Kraay, 1998.
That the regressors are uncorrelated with unobserved common factors is the suffi-
cient condition for consistency, but if this is invalid, then conventional estimators may
be inconsistent (Andrews, 2005). However, in dynamic panel models, the latter argu-
ment may not hold. Phillips and Sul, 2007 show that the dynamic panel data model
with CSD estimated with FE will be inconsistent even with independent common
factors. These findings are in line with recent results from Everaert and De Groote,
2016, who also warn against using FE on a dynamic model even with large T . In
the current research setting, these considerations need to be taken into account when
estimating the model, not only because of the dynamic model but also because the
common factors are most likely not independent of the regressors. The logic behind
this assumption is presented in the discussion in section (IV.7).
IV.4.3 Heterogenous coefficients
As in most treatment effect studies, the mean treatment effect δ in (IV.2) is of interest.
Traditionally, this translates into estimating a regression model with homogenous
coefficients, such as equation (IV.1). For HBR-specific reasons, it seems logical that
the regressors have heterogeneous effects on health costs, especially because of the
micro-level data. Patients live in different surroundings, there homes differ, and they
have different relationships, previous health status and so forth. Some patients might
need more home-nurse hours because their homes are impractical, even though their
function scores might not differ. Patients will also react differently to HBR since it is
a personalized treatment with patient-specific goals.
The homogenous coefficient assumption seems implausible for many applications
and can actually cause conventional models to be inconsistent where the bias can
be substantial (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). As shown by Pesaran and Smith, 1995,
pooled and aggregated estimators are not consistent in dynamic models, even with
large N and T . They show that when regressors are serially correlated, incorrectly
ignoring coefficient heterogeneity creates serial correlation in the disturbance. Even
with T → ∞, this causes inconsistent estimates in models with lagged dependent
variables. Their mean group (MG) estimator, running N regressions and averaging
the coefficients, is consistent for large N and T .
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Model (2) in Table IV.7 with Tit is used, τ = 3
∆̃ distributed N (0, 1), H0: homogenous slopes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Pesaran and Yamagata, 2008 proposed a standardized version of Swamy’s test of
slope homogeneity for panel data under the null of homogeneity, where N could be
relatively large compared to T . They proposed a test statistic denoted ∆̃, which is
shown to have a standard normal distribution as (N,T )
j−→∞ such that
√
N/T 2 → 0
or N/T → κ for stationary dynamic models. Table IV.6 presents the ∆̃ and the
respective p-value test results, and one reject the null hypothesis of homogenous slopes
at the 1% significance level9. The results in Table IV.6 clearly provide indications
that homogenous coefficients seem unrealistic in the current setting. The result also
holds for different models, including different sets of covariates.
For illustration and not inference, I estimate model (IV.2) with FE and MG using
total cost as the dependent variable and obtain the following estimates, δ̂FE , δ̂MGi ,
ρ̂FE and ρ̂MGi . Based on these results, I estimate the individual difference between
FE estimates and individual-specific MG estimated coefficients, with the following
definitions δDiffi = δ̂
FE − δ̂MGi and ρ
Diff
i = ρ̂
FE − ρ̂MGi . The latter individual
differences, δDiffi and ρ
Diff
i , are plotted and presented in Figure IV.3 to demonstrate
coefficient variability.
One would expect that if homogenous slopes where true, there would be some
minor variations around the zero mark. However, as seen in Figure IV.3, there is
a wide spread for δDiffi and ρ
Diff
i . In particular since, the plots in Figure IV.3
do not contain the upper or lower 5% percentiles to avoid extreme values for robust
inspections. The blue dots indicate patients for which the individual MG coefficients
δ̂MGi are zero, indicating the non-HBR group. These blue dots do not occur in ρ
Diff
i
because all patients have a non-zero MG coefficient. Interestingly, when the mass is
centered close to zero, as for ρDiffi , the FE and mean MG coefficients do not differ
greatly.
9The xthst command by Tore Berscendsen and Jan Ditzen is used. Originally, the test by
Pesaran and Yamagata, 2008 is proposed for strictly exogenous regressors or autoregressive models.
However, when developing xthst simulation results show that by adding cross sectional averages to
the model, the test works for situations with cross-section dependence in the error term and variables.
The latter is therefore used when performing in the current setting. Presented results do also hold
for non-dynamic model without cross sectional averages and standard AR model.
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Figure IV.3: Difference between FE coefficients and individual-specific MG coefficients,
δDiffi and ρ
Diff
i , for model (IV.2). The covariates included in the estimation are Education,
five hospital areas, marital status 2 - 5 and quarterly time dummies
Based on the ∆̃ test results, Figure IV.3 and reasoning, I select a model with
heterogeneous coefficients with a common factor error structure.
∆yit = ρi∆yit−1 + δi∆Tit + ∆sitθi + gi + γ
′
ift + εit, (IV.7)
where i = 1, 2, ..., 2015; t = 2, 3, ..., 60.
Note that equation (IV.7) does not contain ηt unobserved time effects, as in (IV.2,
since these will be captured by ft.
IV.4.4 Estimation
Pesaran, 2006 proposed an approach to estimate panel data models with a common
factor error structure called Common Correlated Effects (CCE). The CCE estima-
tor of heterogeneous coefficients is consistent as (N,T )
j−→ ∞, provided that certain
rank conditions regarding factor loadings are satisfied. The CCE estimator was origi-
nally not proposed to cover dynamic models, and Chudik and Pesaran, 2015 extended
the CCE approach to allow lagged dependent variables as regressors. They demon-
strate that the cross-sectional averages of observed variables and their lags are able
143
IV.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
to sufficiently approximate the unobserved factors ft. This result holds under certain
conditions, the key assumptions of which are presented below.
In application, this implies that one runs N least squares regressions of equation
(IV.7), including the cross-sectional averages and the their lags of all observed vari-
ables as regressors. The number of lags must be chosen. Thereafter, one estimates
the average coefficient based on all estimated coefficients. A brief summary of the
estimator presented by Chudik and Pesaran, 2015 follows below.
Let us slightly rewrite equation (IV.7),
∆yit = ρi∆yit−1 + ∆xitβi + gi + uit, (IV.8)




In (IV.8), xit contains both sit and Tit from equation (IV.7) and therefore has
dimension 1 × (k + 1). Since the unobserved factors ft could be correlated with
the regressors, a general model for individual-specific regressors is adopted (Pesaran,
2006):
∆x′it = ri + Γ
′
ift + υit, (IV.9)
where Γi is an m × (k + 1) matrix. The regressors are also determined by some
unobserved individual fixed effect ri, and υit are idiosyncratic errors. Define Ci =
(γi,Γi)
′, πi = (ρi,βi)
′ and zit = (∆yit,∆xit)
′, and then the following six dynamic
CCE assumptions are presented:
Assumption 1: The individual error terms εit and υit are distributed indepen-
dently for all i and t. The εt vector is weakly cross-sectionally dependent.
Assumption 2: The unobserved common factors, ft, are covariance stationary
with absolute summable autocovariances and are independently distributed from the
individual errors presented above.
Assumption 3: Factor loadings γ′i and Γ
′
i are independently and identically
distributed across i and ft, for all i and t, with mean γ and Γ. They are generated
from the following random model:
γi = γ + ηγi, ηγi ∼ IID(0,Ωγ), for i = 1, 2, ..., N,
and
vec(Γi) = vec(Γ) + ηΓi, ηΓi ∼ IID(0,ΩΓ), for i = 1, 2, ..., N.
Assumption 4: The vector of coefficients, πi follows the random coefficient model
πi = π + ηπi, ηπi ∼ IID(0,Ωπ), for i = 1, 2, ..., N.
Assumption 5: Regressors and covariates are either strictly exogenous or weakly
exogenous. For the latter, certain assumptions must be fulfilled. See Chudik and
Pesaran, 2015 page 396 for further details.
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In the current case, strict exogeneity is assumed, with E(xisεit) = 0 for all s and
t.
Assumption 6: Define C = E(Ci) = (γ,Γ)
′. The (k+ 1 + 1)×m matrix C has
full column rank.
This is a key assumption, with some estimation implications discussed in Section
IV.4.5. This also means that the number of unobserved factors is no larger than the
number of observed variables, m ≤ (k + 1 + 1).
Before expressing the estimated coefficients denoted π̂i = (ρ̂i, β̂i)
′, one first has






























where z̄ωt = (∆ȳωt,∆x̄ωt)
′ =
∑N
i=1 ωizit. This is an k + 1 + 1 vector of weighted
cross-sectional averages of the observed variables in (IV.7) or (IV.8), and τ is the
number of chosen lags. The initial recommended setting for how many lagged cross-
sectional averages to include in the regression is τ = T 1/3. However, additional
simulations by Chudik and Pesaran, 2015 show that the choice of lag order depends
on the object of interest, β or ρ. In the former case, 0.75τ = T 1/3 seems to be
preferable, and this setting is therefore used in our estimation. The weights, ωi, need
to satisfy some conditions. Let w = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN ) be an N × 1 vector, and the
following conditions need to be fulfilled:








The projection matrix M̄q = IT−τ − Q̄ω(Q̄′ωQ̄ω)+Q̄′ω where IT−τ is the identity
matrix with dimensions (T−τ)×(T−τ) and + denotes the Moore-Penrose generalized





where yi = (yi,τ+1, yi,τ+1, ..., yi,T )
′. The mean group estimator, like the coeffi-







The mean group estimator in (IV.12) is the Dynamic CCE (DCCE) estimator
presented by Chudik and Pesaran, 2015. This estimator is applied separately for each
of the four different treatment variables explained in Section IV.3.5.
Since least squares is performed on all N patients, the standard least squares as-
sumptions must be satisfied at the individual level. This is especially important in the
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current case since several variables are categorical. One covariate in the DCCE setup
adds 1+τ extra variables to the regression, which will make it difficult to fulfill the full
rank assumption. The regressions can therefore not include all covariates, and sev-
eral setups need to be tested. Computing separate regressions for more than 150,000
individuals is not ideal and is time consuming. One would encounter computational
limitations, which is another argument for creating a matched dataset.
IV.4.5 Potential endogenous regressors and modeling techni-
calities
Including the function group variables in the regression will be an issue due to the
strict exogeneity assumption. The HBR treatment would affect function scores and
therefore make the function group variable endogenous. Function scores could actu-
ally work as independent variables. The relationship could also run in the opposite
direction; function scores would decide whether a patient can receive HBR. This
could potentially make the treatment variables endogenous. Either way, an endoge-
nous variable would violate the strict exogeneity assumption and potentially bias the
results. Therefore, the function group variables are not included in the regression
models. The regression model controls for unobserved time-invariant individuality
and trend. Some heterogeneity across patients is captured, and allowing for a het-
erogeneous slope would, to some degree, compensate for the loss of precision by not
being able to control for function scores.
One way to estimate a DCCE regression in statistical software such as Stata is to
first run N regressions including the τ + 1 additional cross-sectional mean variables.
The N estimates are thereafter averaged to obtain the mean estimated coefficients.
This procedure is time-consuming, especially since each N regression will contain
several variables. A faster approach is to utilize the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
(Frisch and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963) and partial out the cross-sectional averages.
Next, run N regressions on the partitioned variables. This is the procedure used by
the Stata xtdcce2 command developed by Ditzen, 2018.
Assumption 6, full column rank of C, is required for estimating individual co-
efficients. However, it is not always necessary when focusing on the overall mean
estimates, π̂. When the common factors, ft, are serially uncorrelated, the full column
rank is not needed for consistency. To assess whether the common factors in the
current study are serially correlated is difficult because they are unobserved, which
also means that C is unobserved.
The cross-sectional averages and their lags are used for approximating C. Thus,
a matrix Z, which includes all τ + 1 cross-sectional averages of zit, is used for this
approximation. Collinearity checks are necessary to ensure that Z′Z is invertible and
thus that assumption 6 is not validated. Including hospital area and marital status in
zit would cause Z
′Z to violate assumption 6 because of collinearity issues. The reason
for this conclusion requires further insight into IPLOS registration. All data updates
capturing changes in education level, marital status and hospital area are performed
once each year. Thus, changes in data will always occur in January of each year,
so at 4 possible points in time during the sample period. Martial status and area
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are categorical variables, which are captured by dummy variables in the regression
setup. There is limited movement between the different martial status categories,
and all changes occur simultaneously. The cross-sectional averages of these dummies
will nearly perfectly predict one another, causing collinearity issues because a patient
can only be in one category. For example, if a patient moves for marital status 2
to 5, the cross-sectional mean marital status dummy variable 2 would decrease by
the same amount as the increase in marital status dummy 5. These two dummies
would therefore perfectly predict one another and, by definition, make the variables
collinear. The latter argument holds for hospital areas even though few patients move
to non-included municipalities.
Education level is an ordered variable and can be included in zit. However, as
mentioned above, changes in education also occur only in January. Education level
hardly changes among the included patients, which makes sense because they are
mostly elderly. Since there are few changes, the cross-sectional averages for the
change in education level in January can actually predict changes in martial sta-
tus and hospital areas. This would violate the collinearity assumption. To avoid such
issues, cross-sectional averages of changes in education level cannot be combined with
martial status and hospital ares in the regression setup. Because of the above data
idiosyncrasies, some changes need to be made in (IV.7).
Covariates that cannot be included in zit, meaning hospital area or martial status,
are captured by cit. Because of matsize issues, neither marital status nor hospital
area dummies can be included in the same model. When adding cit, sit will be
reduced to covariates that can be included in the cross-sectional averages, HBR days
and education level. After these adjustments and adding cross-sectional averages, the
regression model can be written as follows:
∆yit = ρi∆yit−1 + δi∆Tit + ∆sitθi +
τ∑
τ=0
µi,τ z̄t−τ + ∆citφi + εit, (IV.13)
where i = 1, 2, ..., 2015; t = 2, 3, ..., 60.
where µi,τ represents the τ + 1 coefficients for the added cross-sectional averages.
The dimension of sit has been reduced to 1 × (k − l), and cit has dimension 1 × l.
Equation (IV.13) is estimated by MG to obtain DCCE estimates presented below.
IV.5 Results
The DCCE regression results are presented for three different dependent variables:
(i) total cost, (ii) primary care cost and (iii) specialist care cost, as described in
Section IV.3.2. All tables presented follow the same structure, where the results of the
different treatment indicators are presented alongside the lagged dependent variable.
For primary care cost, the results for the HBR days variable are also presented.
The results are presented for models with difference covariate settings. The long-run
147
IV.5. RESULTS











where δ̂i and ρ̂i are individual estimates obtained from (IV.13).
IV.5.1 Total costs
As seen in Table IV.7, the DCCE estimated coefficient for Tit, δ̂, is clearly significant in
all specifications. The respective p-value runs from 0.001 - 0.002, and all δ̂ coefficients
are negative, which indicates that HBR significantly reduces total health costs. The
estimated cost reduction from the first month of HBR varies from -4,875 to -6,007
NOK.
The above pattern repeats when studying the estimated coefficient, δ̂, for the
two treatment variables, T 6 and T 8. All estimated coefficients, δ̂, are significant at
the 1% level. The δ̂ coefficients vary between -2,784 and -3,630, all indicating that
HBR already has a cost reduction effect 6 months after the first HBR period. The
cost reduction effect is on average 2,225 NOK less for T 6 than for the unrestricted
Tit treatment variable. However, for T
12, the estimated cost reduction is lower and
significant at the 5% level, except in (4), where δ̂ is only significant at the 10% level.
This is surprising, and there could be a health-increasing cost event for HBR patients
between 8 and 12 months after the first HBR period compared with usual care. The
cause of this increase is unknown and should be investigated in future research.
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Table IV.7: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -4875.3*** -5860.8*** -5872.8*** -6007.0***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.405*** -0.402*** -0.401*** -0.401***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.74
∆T̄ 12 -2442.3** -2980.1** -2770.6** -2810.1*
(0.037) (0.049) (0.064) (0.061)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.406*** -0.412*** -0.410*** -0.410***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.74
∆T̄ 8 -3124.1*** -3576.6*** -3559.4*** -3530.8***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.409*** -0.420*** -0.416*** -0.417***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.74
∆T̄ 6 -2783.7*** -3574.9*** -3621.4*** -3629.9***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.411*** -0.423*** -0.420*** -0.420***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.73
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The estimated dynamic coefficient, ρ̂, is clearly significant for all models indepen-
dent of treatment variables. There is little variation in the coefficients, as all are
just above -0.4. At first glance, the negative sign seems illogical. This indicates that
the cost in the previous period reduces that in the current period. However, there
is a logical explanation for the negative sign. The dependent variable, total cost,
contains the cost of three different stakeholders of health providers, where primary
care and specialist care, is by a large margin the largest contributor. This is clear in
the descriptive statistics in Table IV.2. Specialist health services, often provided in a
hospital, are usually costly and intensive, and all are performed within a short time
span. Primary care costs are lower, and the services provided each month vary little.
Much of the limited variation observed between months in primary care is actually
explained by the number of days in each month. The variation in total cost will
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therefore mostly be due to specialist health services. Therefore, if one patient ended
an intensive hospital stay in the previous period, t− 1, the cost in the current period,
t, would definitely be less than in t− 1, which would result in a negative coefficient.
Following this analogy, one would not expect such a clear negative coefficient when
only studying primary care costs. All other included variables are insignificant at
the 5% level except for martial status dummy number 2, indicating married or in
partnership, which exhibits a higher cost compared to un-married patients.
Because this is a dynamic model, one can estimate the potential long-run effect. As
noted above, the estimated lagged dependent coefficient, ρ̂, is essentially equal across
the different treatment variables. This would mean that the long-run estimates would
follow the same development as described above, all depending on which treatment
variable is the basis for the estimates. Based on Tit, the estimated long-run effect,
ρ̂LR, will vary between -4,637 and -6,373 NOK, depending on the model considered.
IV.5.2 Primary care costs
Following the above argument regarding the lagged dependent variable coefficient, ρ,
the results in Table IV.8 do not indicate a clear significant negative coefficient. For
models (2) - (4), all estimated lagged primary care cost coefficients, ρ̂, are positive,
which holds for all treatment variables. Because of the slow development of primary
care costs, no significance is observe for the dynamic coefficient ρ̂ at the 5% level for
models (2) - (4). As an example of the slow-moving dynamics, the mean primary care
cost in December 2015 for the treatment group is only 207 NOK higher than that in
January 2015.
Studying model (1) in Table IV.8 reveals the opposite results on the lagged de-
pendent coefficient, ρ. Model (1) results in a negative coefficient and is significant
across all treatment variables. The same difference in coefficients between model (1)
and the rest can be found when studying the treatment variables. The key difference
between models (1) and (2) - (4) is the introduction of HBR days provided. This
variable captures the intensity, treatment length, and the weight of HBR provided
between different months if the treatment runs over several periods. This variable
is equal to zero whenever HBR is not provided. Controlling for HBR days seems
logical, especially when focusing on primary care, and the HBR days coefficient is
clearly significant in all models and across treatment variables. The HBR coefficient
size varies between 132 and 155, meaning that having more HBR days will increase
costs. This is expected because HBR is an intensive treatment.
Studying the estimated δ̂ related to the different treatment variables for models
(2) - (4) reveals an interesting pattern. The monthly cost savings from HBR increases
over time after the first HBR treatment. For variable Tit, the estimated monthly cost
savings, δ̂, varies between -1,227 and -1,257 NOK across models (2) - (4). This value
is almost double that of T 6, which varies between -724 and -749 NOK in monthly
cost savings. When estimating δ̂ for the indicators T 8 and T 12, cost savings increases
gradually between the two. All estimated coefficients δ̂ are significant at the 5%
level. Model (1) actually shows the complete opposite result from models (2) - (4).
However, as the former does not control for HBR days, (1) is therefore less able to
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capture the individuality of the HBR treatment. The HBR intervention is person-
centered and goal-oriented. One patient can need fewer days to complete the agreed
goal than another patient. The length of the intervention will therefore vary across
patients, and longer intervention times would entail higher primary care costs. This
variation would not be captured in a running treatment variable but is captured
when including HBR days. The latter variable could to some degree explain the
HBR patients’ function level during HBR treatment because one would expect a less
functional patient to use more HBR days. Logically, capturing the individuality of
the treatment seems important.
The long-run estimates, ρ̂LR, based on models (2) - (4) using Tit as the treatment




Table IV.8: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 974.8*** -1227.1*** -1255.9*** -1257.1***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0558*** 0.0571* 0.0486 0.0510*
(0.000) (0.057) (0.103) (0.086)
∆ HBR days 153.4*** 154.7*** 154.7***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.75
∆T̄ 12 577.0** -1014.4*** -1047.3*** -1038.7***
(0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0549*** 0.0631* 0.0551 0.0578*
(0.000) (0.065) (0.105) (0.088)
∆ HBR days 132.3*** 133.3*** 133.6***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.75
∆T̄ 8 623.8*** -893.6** -941.6*** -934.2**
(0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0831*** 0.0216 0.0196 0.0192
(0.000) (0.479) (0.516) (0.525)
∆ HBR days 135.5*** 137.0*** 137.1***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.76
∆T̄ 6 435.9** -724.1** -745.1** -748.5**
(0.045) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0699*** 0.0109 0.00791 0.00751
(0.000) (0.624) (0.719) (0.733)
∆ HBR days 139.0*** 139.8*** 140.0***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.83 0.74 0.75 0.75
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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IV.5.3 Specialist care costs
The results when specialist care cost is the dependent variable are presented in Table
IV.9. In short, the results in Table IV.9 are essentially identical to the findings for total
costs. However, the δ̂ coefficients in model (1) are in the same region as for models
(2) - (4), whereas for the corresponding total cost coefficients, there was a small jump
between (1) and (2) - (4). Controlling for HBR days caused this change10. This effect
is not observed for specialist health costs.
For the treatment variables, Tit, T
6 and T 8, all estimated coefficients, δ̂, are
significant at the 5% level. For Tit, estimated cost savings varies between -5,663 and -
5,923 NOK. Regarding the lagged dependent variable, ρ, all coefficients are significant
and approximately 0.03 smaller than those estimated for total cost. The interpretation
presented above for total cost also holds for specialist care costs.
The estimated lagged dependent coefficient, ρ̂, is fairly stable in all settings. There-
fore, as seen for total costs, the long-run estimates would follow the same pattern as
the short-run findings in Table IV.9, depending on which indicator is the basis for the
estimates. Based on Tit, the estimated long-run effect ρ̂LR for specialist care costs
will vary between -5,317 and -5,650 NOK, depending on the model considered.
10Test regressions were estimated without introducing HBR days and Education only and vice
versa. The effect was clearly caused by HBR days
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Table IV.9: Specialist care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -5922.5*** -5662.6*** -5710.6*** -5838.3***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.431*** -0.431***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.73
∆T̄ 12 -3174.4*** -3020.7** -2755.3* -2799.8**
(0.005) (0.044) (0.063) (0.059)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.433*** -0.440*** -0.439*** -0.439***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.73
∆T̄ 8 -3651.4*** -3271.2** -3231.3** -3204.4**
(0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.435*** -0.448*** -0.445*** -0.445***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.73
∆T̄ 6 -3126.0*** -3232.8*** -3239.1*** -3252.0***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.439*** -0.453*** -0.451*** -0.450***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.72
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
IV.5.4 Gender-specific regressions
To estimate whether there is a potential treatment effect difference between genders, I
conducted DCCE estimation conditional on the binary gender variable. Interestingly,
this reveals some clear differences. Table IV.10 presents the conditional regression
results for males only on total cost. None of the different δ̂ coefficients are significant
at any level, but most of the coefficients are negative. This is in stark contrast to
the earlier results presented in Table IV.7, where all coefficients were significant at
some level. This finding indicates that all previous significant treatment effects are
driven by females, as males have no significant effect. In Appendix IV.C, conditional
regression results for all dependent variables are presented by gender. Regardless
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of whether total cost, primary care or specialist care cost are considered, all of the
results have the same pattern. Females have a significant cost reduction effect from
HBR, while males do not.
The lagged dependent variables are essentially identical between genders and are
clearly significant for total and specialist health costs. HBR days are also only signif-
icant when primary care is the dependent variable for both genders. The coefficients
are, however, different between the two. One additional HBR day for males, ceteris
paribus, increases primary costs by approximately 320 NOK, which is more than 3
times higher than that for females. Interestingly, the mean hours one month prior
to the first HBR period are actually 2 hours lower for men. Mean hours in the first
month of HBR are, however, equal for both genders. Therefore, there was a larger
increase in service hours between the two time periods for men.
Table IV.10: Males only – Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it 356.4 -1067.6 -1013.7 -1248.9
(0.890) (0.771) (0.782) (0.732)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.400*** -0.405*** -0.396*** -0.398***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.77
∆T̄ 12 1810.3 947.7 922.0 662.0
(0.414) (0.780) (0.779) (0.841)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.395*** -0.404*** -0.395*** -0.397***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.76
∆T̄ 8 942.7 -893.4 -383.7 -953.8
(0.654) (0.739) (0.885) (0.721)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.402*** -0.411*** -0.404*** -0.405***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.77
∆T̄ 6 913.5 -1546.5 -1386.6 -1520.7
(0.633) (0.438) (0.487) (0.445)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.398*** -0.414*** -0.406*** -0.407***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses




To my knowledge, there is no clear alternative estimator to DCCE that could play
a constructive role in a robustness test. The simulation results presented by Chudik
and Pesaran, 2015 show that not all potential bias in the estimated coefficients is re-
moved with DCCE. They suggest some alternative bias corrections that could work as
robustness tests. These results are presented below. Since there could be uncertainty
in the cost per hour of home-nurse care and KUHR unit costs might be low, results
with adjusted unit costs are presented below.
IV.6.1 Different lags, τ , selections
As shown in Section IV.4.4, the DCCE estimator depends on the number of added
lagged cross-sectional average variables chosen, τ . Chudik and Pesaran, 2015 note
that choosing lag order is difficult in practice because it depends on several unknown
aspects. They suggest that different lag orders could be tested and investigated. This
would be especially important for the current case because the lag chosen is smaller
than the recommended setting. This was discussed in Section IV.4.4, and therefore
the recommended setting, τ = 4, should be studied in detail. The results for τ = 1, 2, 4
are presented in Appendix IV.D.
For total cost, setting the lag order to 4 hardly changes the different estimated
treatment effects. The estimated cost reduction from HBR is well within the same
range as presented previously, which holds for all different treatment variables. Re-
garding inference, all δ̂ for Tit and T
6 and are significant at the 1% level, which is
equal to the previously presented results. Regarding the estimated coefficient, δ̂, for
the T 8 variable, the significance level changes to 5% for models (2) - (4), where the
original results were significant at the 1% level. For estimated δ̂ reflecting the T 12
variable, the significance level goes from 5% to 10% for models (2) and (3). The
latter is also the least convincing of the previously presented results. Regarding the
estimated lagged dependent variable coefficients, ρ̂, they are essentially equal and all
clearly significant. The results for lag settings 1 and 2 do not change the inference
from the original results. All δ̂ coefficients for all the different treatment variables
are close to the original results, with one exception. For the main treatment variable,
Tit, the estimated cost reduction is approximately 1,200 higher with only one lag for
models (2) - (4). As seen in the presented results, there is a shift between model (1)
and the other models for all lag settings, but the difference is less pronounced for
τ = 4.
Changing lag settings for DCCE estimation using primary care cost as the de-
pendent variable reveals the same pattern as presented above. For all lag settings,
the signs of the estimated coefficients change after controlling for HBR days. The
estimated treatment effect δ̂ in models (2) - (4) increases as the time horizon for the
treatment variables increases. All δ̂ coefficients for models (2) - (4), regarding the
lag setting, are in the same region as presented above, and the minimum significance
level is 5%. HBR days are also significant in all settings, and the coefficient is almost
the identical to that in the τ = 3 setting. The estimated lagged dependent coefficient
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ρ̂ is still not significant.
Regarding specialist health costs, all estimated δ̂ coefficients are in the same gen-
eral range as the previous results. The exception to this rule is for τ = 1. Here, the
estimated cost reduction of HBR is higher overall, especially for the main treatment
variable, Tit. This is the same finding as discussed earlier for total costs. The esti-
mated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, ρ̂, is essentially identical for all
considered values of τ , which also holds for the significance level. In conclusion, the
presented results seem to hold for all dependent variables for different settings of τ .
IV.6.2 Jackknife bias-correction
Simulations provided by Chudik and Pesaran, 2015 show that the DCCE technique
outperforms regular estimators for δ and the lagged dependent coefficient, ρ. However,
not all potential biases might be removed through DCCE estimation. They show that
jackknife bias correction works well but tends to slightly over-correct, and their sup-
plementary material shows that this holds for different simulation settings. The root
mean square error (RMSE) for the ρ parameter is also reduced with the adjustment,
which holds for all combinations of N and T . However, the simulation results are dif-
ferent for regressors, such as δ in equation (IV.13). For the regressors, the simulation
results showed that the DCCE estimator almost removes all bias in the estimated
coefficient and that the jackknife adjustment only slightly improves the results. This
improvement comes at a cost, as the related RMSE actually increases in the jack-
knife result. This would affect the p-values and, naturally, inference. Therefore, the
jackknife result is used as a robustness check for the estimated lagged dependent co-
efficient ρ̂ and related inference. Since RMSE increases with the jackknife adjustment
for δ, this adjustment only acts as a robustness test for estimated coefficients δ̂. As
a robustness test regarding inference for δ̂, I employ bootstrap-corrected standard
errors. These results are presented in Section IV.6.3.
Table IV.11 presents the results for total cost estimated with the jackknife-adjusted
DCCE with a lag order of 3. The results for the two other dependent variables and for
τ = 4 are presented in Appendix IV.E. As seen in Table IV.11, for all 4 models and
across all different treatment variables, the estimated lagged dependent coefficient ρ̂
is clearly significant. All coefficients remain negative but are, however, slightly lower
than the results presented earlier in Table IV.7. The results presented in the latter
table show that the ρ̂ coefficient varied from approximately -0.40 to -0.42 depending on
which treatment variable was under scrutiny. With jackknife-adjusted estimates, these
coefficients vary between -0.46 and -0.51. This would lead to a reduced potential long-
run effect. Based on the simulation results obtained by Chudik and Pesaran, 2015,
the latter results are over-adjusted but still closer to the true value than the results
without the adjustment. Tables IV.E.1 and IV.E.2 present the jackknife-adjusted
estimates for primary care and specialist health care costs. In the latter case, there
are few changes in the lagged coefficients relative to the previously presented results,
and they are all clearly significant.
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Table IV.11: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3, Jackknife adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -6305.7*** -5351.0 -7036.2* -7211.7***
(0.004) (0.102) (0.011) (0.009)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.487*** -0.464*** -0.480*** -0.481***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -2166.1 -3545.2 -2285.2 -2392.1
(0.200) (0.139) (0.303) (0.281)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.489*** -0.486*** -0.491*** -0.492***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3173.2** -5080.4** -3750.3* -3736.8*
(0.046) (0.017) (0.053) (0.054)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.490*** -0.501*** -0.496*** -0.497***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3169.4** -3290.7* -4089.1* -4121.7**
(0.023) (0.074) (0.019) (0.018)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.484*** -0.510*** -0.493*** -0.493***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Studying the different treatment coefficients, as presented in Table IV.11, reveals
greater differences between the 4 models compared to the earlier results. All coeffi-
cients are similar to the previously presented results in Table IV.7, with two excep-
tions. For T 8 in model (2) and Tit in model (1), the jackknife-adjusted coefficient
estimates are 1,500 and 1,430 NOK lower, indicating a higher cost of HBR compared
to the initial results. However, this does not change the fact presented earlier that
HBR seems to reduce total costs. For primary care costs only, the jackknife results,
shown in Table IV.E.1, remain similar to the original results. This also holds for
specialist health care costs presented in Table IV.E.2.
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IV.6.3 Wild bootstrap standard error correction
As a robustness check for treatment effect inference, I compare the initial p-values
with p-values based on wild bootstrap-adjusted standard errors. Because of feasibility
issues, wild bootstrap-adjusted standard errors are only considered using the treat-
ment variable Tit, with τ = 3. Applying the bootstrap technique to the DCCE model
is time-consuming. For example, running the 4 models for one dependent variable and
only one treatment indicator requires more than 14 hours for 50 repetitions. These
estimates are calculated using the Stata 15 multicore version; 50 repetitions may be
sufficient to capture the trend.
Table IV.12: Comparing initial and wild bootstrap-adjusted p-values for the main treat-
ment indicator, Tit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total cost
Initial results p-value 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.000 0.003 0.096 0.039
Primary care
Initial results p-value 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
Specialist care
Initial results p-value 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.000 0.025 0.027 0.152
Models 1 - 5 are identical to earlier models. Wild bootstrap is conducted with 50 repetitions.
Lag order, τ , is set to 3
Table IV.12 provides a comparison with the p-values of the initial model, with the
same values reflecting the wild bootstrap-adjusted standard errors. All initial results
had a p-value lower than 0.01, hence an significance level of 1%, for all models and
dependent variables. The wild bootstrap results show the same significance level with
5 exceptions. In 3 of these cases, models (2) and (3) with specialist care costs as the
dependent variable and model (4) with total costs as the dependent variable, adjusted
based p-values, still indicate a significance level of 5%. The largest difference is found
for model (4), where specialist care cost is the dependent variable. If one were to base
inference on the bootstrap-adjusted p-value for the latter case, the conclusion would
have been the opposite of the to initial results. However, the latter case exhibits an
abnormal trend and therefore argues that the initial results hold and thus pass the
robustness test.
IV.6.4 Sensitivity analysis
As mentioned in Section IV.3.2, costs reported in the publicly accessible data for
homecare and home nurse contain two additional types of services. They constitute
13.7% of all home hours registered in public databases. The results presented above
are based on estimated unit costs when these two additional services, care salary
for private persons and assistance outside institution, are included. One could argue
that these services are performed by less-experienced employees with lower wages
and that they therefore lower the overall estimated unit cost per hour used. As a
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robustness test to address this potential error, I estimate the DCCE regression on
total and primary care costs with increased unit costs per hour. The increased cost is
estimated by including the cost of the two additional services but not including the
hours. The same cost is therefore divided by 13.7% fewer hours, hence the increased
unit cost. This change yields in a unit cost per hour of 688 NOK compared to 594
NOK initial value. Appendix IV.F presents the results with the increased unit cost,
and the presented results do not change.
Presented in Section IV.3.2, the estimated unit cost of KUHR services, GP/ phys-
iotherapy, is based on reimbursement rates. This income is only one of several income
sources for GPs and physiotherapists and would therefore not cover all costs asso-
ciated with these services. Unofficial estimates by KUHR approximate that these
reimbursements cover 30% - 40% of total GP/physiotherapy costs. As a test, KHUR
cost is increased by 65%, and thereafter, DCCE estimation is conducted on adjusted
total cost, which includes this increase. The results from the latter setup are pre-
sented in Table IV.13. The results with this adjustment are essentially identical to
the earlier results in Table IV.7. The results are not sensitive to changes in the unit




Table IV.13: Total cost with 65% increase in KUHR unit cost, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total ∆ Total ∆ Total ∆ Total
cost adj. cost adj. cost adj. cost adj.
∆T̄it -4866.8*** -5837.5*** -5849.0*** -5983.6***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Total cost adj. -0.406*** -0.403*** -0.402*** -0.402***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.74
∆T̄ 12 -2439.0** -2971.4** -2762.5* -2802.0*
(0.037) (0.049) (0.064) (0.061)
∆ Lagged Total cost adj. -0.406*** -0.413*** -0.411*** -0.411***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.74
∆T̄ 8 -3120.4*** -3565.2*** -3547.2*** -3518.8***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
∆ Lagged Total cost adj. -0.410*** -0.420*** -0.417*** -0.417***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.74
∆T̄ 6 -2774.8*** -3564.6*** -3609.5*** -3618.4***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Total cost adj. -0.411*** -0.424*** -0.421*** -0.421***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.73
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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IV.7 Discussion and conclusion
The analysis above estimated institutional service cost differences between patients
receiving HBR and those receiving traditional services. The choice of using the DCCE
estimator instead of standard panel data estimators mainly relies on one key argument
relating to the common factor in equation (IV.4), ft. This (these) unobserved common
factor(s) is (are) arguably closely related to the potential reason that the regressors are
cross-sectionally dependent. The argument is best explained with a concrete example
of one potential unobserved common factor. In January 2012, namely at a single point
in time, the Norwegian government implemented a national health reform called The
Coordination Reform. This reform affected basically all health stakeholders in Norway
and, therefore, the dependent variables and again the regressors since I use a dynamic
model. Traditionally, one would run a two-way FE model that would include t − 1
time dummies and argue that the effect of the reform would be captured by these
dummies.
As mentioned in equations (IV.5) - (IV.6), the two-way model is a special version
of the common factor error structure. The problem with the latter solution is that
one assumes that such a reform would affect every individual equally. This is prob-
ably far from the truth, as the immediate effect would differ between municipalities
and hospitals and therefore also lead to individual differences. Another unobserved
common factor that most likely has considerable influence is how municipalities have
organized the decision-making regarding service allocation. All operate with admin-
istrative offices, which make the decisions before primary care services are executed.
All of the employees in these offices have similar backgrounds and eduction, and they
will follow certain norms. These norms, however, are likely to differ slightly across
municipalities and also across individuals.
As shown in Table IV.4, the test results for the classical two-way model clearly
indicated the presence of cross-sectional dependence. The p-values for the CD-statistic
are 0.000. Considering the same statistic for the DCCE regression results on Tit
reveals a low CD-statistic with a p-value varying between |0.43| and |0.96|. The latter
results clearly indicate that the DCCE estimator worked as intended. However, these
results do not hold for primary care costs. The CD statistic remains high in this
case, resulting in a p-value of 0.000. This finding indicates that the primary care
results might have some limitations. Future research should test whether primary
care remains CSD. There might be a deeper econometric issue related to the slow
movement in the dependent variable.
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Figure IV.4: Box-plot of individ-
ual δ̂i coefficients from model (1)
in Table IV.7 for the HBR group.
Upper and lower 5% percentiles ex-
cluded
The DCCE estimator used in this paper is
basically a version of the MG estimator. Thus,
one estimate N different coefficients and use the
mean as a consistent estimator of the true value.
Whether the mean is relevant for the current case
is debatable. As seen in Figure IV.4, there is
substantial variation in the estimated individual
treatment effect related to Tit in model (1) on
total cost. As shown in Table IV.7, the coeffi-
cient is -4,875, which includes all non-HBR pa-
tients with zero effect. The mean coefficient for
HBR patients is only -9,029, and the individ-
ual estimated coefficients, δ̂i, for HBR patients
are the basis for Figure IV.4. As seen in Fig-
ure IV.4, the median effect is actually positive at
812 NOK, which would indicate that HBR actu-
ally increases total costs. The mean HBR only δ̂i
coefficient without the upper and lower 5% per-
centiles is -3,769. The estimated overall mean
treatment effect based on the latter is still neg-
ative at -1,842 but indicates less cost reduction
than originally presented. This shows that the es-
timated treatment effect is influenced by extreme
cases. It is not the case that all HBR patients
experience a cost reduction from the treatment.
Several HBR patients actually exhibit a cost in-
crease. In total, there are 1,088 HBR patients
in the sample; 559 have a positive δ coefficient, and 529 have a negative coefficient.
Therefore, 30 less patients have cost reductions than experience increased costs ac-
cording to Tit. Policy-makers should be aware that not all patients are affected by
HBR and that there is considerable variability in the potential effects. The consis-
tency of the DCCE estimator is based on the mean. Further research could investigate
the consistency of this estimator under other alternatives, such as the median.
The results in Table IV.7 clearly indicate that HBR reduces the monthly short-run
total cost. Interestingly, the effect grows at the time horizon expends. Setting the
time horizon at 6 or 8 months after the first intervention results in approximately,
depending on the model, 1,800 - 2,500 NOK less in cost reduction relative to the case
when there is no limit on the time horizon. The latter finding is definitely the desired
pattern. However, setting the time horizon at a maximum of 12 months after the first
HBR period yields results than contradict the previous pattern. Here, the estimated
short-run coefficients are at the lowest, and the significance level has dropped to 5%
for models (1) - (3) and to 10 % for model (4). All the other results based on total
costs are significant at the 1% level. Future research could explain this drop between
8 and 12 months after intervention. This finding could explain why Kjerstad and
Tuntland, 2016 did not find any significant results after 9 months. Studying primary
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care costs alone reveals the desired pattern with increased cost reduction over time
after first HBR treatment. The estimated monthly cost reduction is, however, smaller
when studying primary care only and varies between 720 and 1,260 NOK. There is
a larger effect when studying only specialist health costs than when considering only
primary care. The findings on specialist health costs are closely related to total costs
and follow an identical pattern as total costs. Independent of treatment variable,
model, and dependent variable, the R2 is always above 0.71, which would indicate
that models have good fit.
The findings related to primary care costs in the current study are in line with
previous results. Lewin et al., 2013b estimated the 5-year cost savings from HBR
on homecare service costs in Australia. They concluded that HBR patients used
AU $12,600 less then those using conventional care. In terms of the monthly cost
reduction, this translates to AU $210, which is equivalent to 1,319 NOK11, which are
close to findings in Table IV.8 for the main treatment variable. Similar findings are
obtained in Norway by Kjerstad and Tuntland, 2016, where their estimated 9-month
cost reduction was 953 NOK, which again is close to the findings presented for the
T 8 variable. In the latter study, the findings were insignificant, and the Australian
study did not provide inference. The study by Lewin et al., 2014 did include some
hospital costs alongside homecare costs, and their estimated monthly cost savings
were AU $181, equivalent to 1,137 NOK10. The key difference between the current
study and previous efforts is that all specialist care costs and nursing home costs are
also included here. This benefits the current study because the main cost reduction
is found for specialist care, which previous studies were not able to capture.
The latter finding is especially interesting for policy-makers because HBR is pro-
moted and implemented by municipalities, hence for primary care. Thus, one agent
makes another agent better off, ceteris paribus. In Norway, these two agents collabo-
rate but report to different agencies and are not linked financially. If specialist health
care costs decline due to external decisions, these providers will fill that free capac-
ity with other patients. These providers are paid via pay-for-performance and have
incentives to fill their capacity in the short run with other services. By making one
stakeholder better off, society would actually generate more health services, meaning
increased health costs, ceteris paribus. If the overall economic goal is to reduce total
health costs, such an effect would actually work against that goal. The same argument
will hold for municipalities to some degree. If HBR is not treated as a substitute but
represents an additional service, it would actually generate more primary care ser-
vices, ceteris paribus. However, the municipalities are the only provider of primary
care and also control HBR, and adjustments should therefore be easier. Regarding
total cost, converging towards a long-run steady-state equilibrium would reduce costs
by between -4,637 and -6,373 NOK per month based on the main treatment variable.
For municipal policy-makers, the gender-specific results pose some interesting
questions. All previously discussed results are driven by females, as conditional regres-
sion on males revealed no HBR effect on costs. Designing gender-specific interventions
would generate a series of ethical questions. When speaking to practitioners, two main
11Based on the exchange rate on November 8, AU $1 = 6.2803 NOK.
164
IV.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
explanations were proposed for this finding. First, providers might not be effective
enough in setting goals for men. As most HBR workers are women, there could be
communication difficulties in motivating and discussing goals. The second explana-
tion is closely related to the first but reflect that HBR focuses on typical tasks. The
rehabilitation focuses mainly on ADLs, such as cooking, cleaning, and doing laundry.
The typical HBR patient is elderly, usually older than 70 years, and traditionally
males of that generation are not responsible for these classical household activities.
Attempting to motivate them to ”re-learn” skills that might not be intuitive for men
could therefore be difficult, and HBR would not make a difference. Future research
could investigate whether there are aspects of HBR one could adjust such that men
will find it more useful.
The present study is not without limitations, and in particular, two relate to
estimated costs. First, during the HBR intervention period, the cost per hour is
potentially higher than that used when estimating costs here. During the interven-
tion period, both physiotherapists and occupational therapists are usually involved
in providing the registered service hours. In Norway, these occupations traditionally
tend to have a higher salary than nurses and auxiliary nurses. The price per hour
used here reflects cost of the latter two occupations, as these are the dominant ones in
municipal homecare services. A slightly increased price during the HBR period would
also increase the cost of HBR. However, the cost increase would be minor because the
change would only occur for a few observations. This would probably not be suffi-
cient to change the fact that HBR seems to reduce costs, but the cost effect would be
smaller. As mentioned in Section IV.3.2, the estimated KUHR unit cost is based on
reimbursements and not the total cost relating to these services. As shown in Section
IV.6.4, DCCE regressions including a 65% increase in GP and physiotherapy costs
did not reveal any differences from the previously presented results. The potential
issues in using reimbursement as a basis for unit cost appear limited.
Because of legal rules, some service data were deleted because of anonymization
and were later imputed. To minimize the potential downside of these missing values,
an adequate imputation strategy was chosen. The strategy relied on findings from
Kleinke et al., 2011, which show that traditional imputation techniques were far from
being outperformed by newer techniques specifically designed for panel data. The
missing values follow a uniform pattern and are missing at random (MAR). The lat-
ter feature is especially desirable because most imputation techniques assume MAR.
Because of the uniform missing pattern, it was possible to impute variables separately.
The techniques adopted here were therefore based on variable-specific characteristics.
Testing the applied techniques on real data revealed a clear pattern. The imputed
results were nearly identical to the true mean and standard deviation. However, all
imputations overestimated the within standard deviation, which is the variation used
in DCCE estimation. This could lead to biased coefficients and increased standard
errors, which would affect inference. Dropping missing data and avoiding imputation
is also not a viable option because it would eliminate too much HBR data. All results
pass a series of robustness tests, indicating that potential bias introduced because of
imputed data might not affect the results. However, regardless of how good state-of-
the-art imputation techniques are, they introduce uncertainty because they are not
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the ”true” observations.
As discussed in Section IV.4.5, it is not possible to use the function group variables
in the regression because of endogeneity issues. Both groups have equal scores the
period before the first entry into the service. However, the function scores prior to
first entry are based on only the few patients who received some other service, such
as a support person. Most persons in the sample actually have a zero function score
prior to the first entry. The dataset therefore does not contain any good measure
of the function level prior to first entry. Lagged costs are potentially the best mea-
sure available in the dataset. Costs should reflect service usage, and service usage
should to some degree reflect function or sickness level. The model used controls
for all unobserved time-invariant factors and potential trends, so a large degree of
uncertainty could be captured. However, one cannot completely rule out the possi-
bility that the effects observed above are solely due to HBR itself; they might also
capture some unobserved pre-treatment functional differences or other unobserved
time-varying changes. Such a change could be motivated by HBR patients changing
their motivation for living more healthfully with increased knowledge after treatment.
The effect could therefore be caused by a change in the mental state and not due to
HBR training per se. Either way, HBR had a positive effect, what causes the effect
would just differ.
In conclusion, HBR shows some promising results in terms of cost reduction.
From a positivistic perspective, the largest estimated potential monthly cost savings
of HBR is 6,000 NOK, as shown in Table IV.7 model (4). On an annual basis, this
would be 72,000 NOK per HBR patient, which is just above 10% of the cost of one
person-year for nurses12. Technically, this means that after 10 HBR patients, one
could eliminate one full-time worker the first year after the patients received HBR,
ceteris paribus. Again, this is a positivistic view but illustrates the potential benefits
of HBR. However, realizing the potential benefits is more difficult because the main
effects is found at a different stakeholder. However, the cost reduction is most likely
insufficient to compensate for the coming demographical challenges. To do so, more
structural changes would need to occur, but HBR and its ideas are a part of the
solution. Currently, HBR has few exclusion criteria, and thus there is substantial
large variation in the individual treatment effects. Future research should investigate
what distinguishes patients with and without effects such that the potential cost-
reducing effect of HBR could be maximized.
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Marital status Divided into 5 groups
Education level Nine levels, including a category ”no or un-
known”
Age group 15 different age groups: 0-39, 40-59, 60-
65, 66-70, 71-72, 73-74, 75-76, 77-78, 79-
80, 81-82, 83-84, 85-86, 87-88, 89-90 and
91+
Year/month of death Year and month the patient died
Suppressed Binary variable marking the 180,036 obser-




HBR total observations Total number of months in which HBR has
been provided during the 5 year period
HBR total days Total number of days when HBR has been
provided during the 5 year period





Hours Hours of home-nurse and homecare
Days in care institution Includes long-term and short-term institu-
tion
Other care services Binary variable indicating whether the pa-
tient has used care services other than
those given above. A support person is
such service






GP and physiotherapist are reimbursed fol-
lowing a set of detailed activities. The
dataset contains the aggregated sum of
these activities by different categories.
Multidisciplinary cooperation meeting
GP home visit
GP contact by phone or mail





Continued on next page
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Hospital episodes Number of hospital episodes, both somatic
and psychiatry
Hospital episodes somatic Number of hospital episodes, somatic only
Policlinic contacts Number of policlinic contacts, both so-
matic and psychiatry
Policlinic contacts somatic Number of policlinic contacts, somatic only
Length of stay hospital Days of hospital stay, both somatic and
psychiatry
Length of stay hospital somatic Days of hospital stay, somatic only
Sector Five different groups of hospital stay
Total DRG points Total DRG points, can be calculated as a
cost according to the national unit cost per
DRG point
Most costly diagnosis group 27 different diagnosis groups
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IV.B Appendix B:Unit root and co-integration tests
Unit root tests
Table IV.B.1 present p-values for two panel unit root tests, Harris and Tzavalis, 1999
and Im et al., 2003. The null hypothesis is that all panels contain a unit root. As
can clearly be seen in Table IV.B.1, one rejected the null and conclude that the
variables contain a unit root. This is also as expected because we are working with
first-differenced variables.
Table IV.B.1: Unit root tests, p-values presented
Harris-Tzavalis test Im-Pesaran-Shin testa
demeanb demean + trendc demeanb demean + trendc
∆Total cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆Primary cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆Specialist cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆GP/Phys cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆HBR Days 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆FG 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆FG 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆FG 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆FG 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆FG 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion is used for lag selection
b demean first subtract the cross-sectional average from the series.
Is used to mitigate the impact of CSD
c demean + trend, same as above but also includes a linear time trend
Co-integration tests
Several co-integration tests are performed. The results from two tests, Kao, 1999 and
Westerlund, 2005, are presented in Table IV.B.2. All tests have the same common
null hypothesis of no co-integration. The p-values presented in Table IV.B.2 clearly
reject the null hypothesis, and it seems that one are working with a co-integrated
panel.
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Table IV.B.2: Co-integration test, p-values presented
Kao test Westerlund test
Laga lag + demeanb demeanc trendd demean + trende
p-values 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion is used for lag selection
b the above plus demean, first subtract the cross-sectional average from the series.
Is used to mitigate the impact of CSD
c demean, same as above but not including lag adjustment
d trend, panel-specific linear time trends in the model for dependent variable on the covariates
e demean + trend, same as above but also subtract the cross-sectional average from the series
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IV.C Appendix C: Gender-specific regression results
Male
Table IV.C.1: Males only – Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 2938.6*** -1914.9 -1938.7 -1934.1
(0.000) (0.126) (0.122) (0.123)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.105*** 0.0745 0.0700 0.0738
(0.000) (0.342) (0.372) (0.346)
∆ HBR days 325.1*** 325.7*** 325.6***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 2215.2*** -1707.6 -1717.0 -1719.8
(0.000) (0.157) (0.155) (0.154)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0905*** 0.0972 0.0941 0.0974
(0.000) (0.216) (0.231) (0.215)
∆ HBR days 307.2*** 307.4*** 307.6***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 1991.8*** -2136.6* -2171.8* -2161.0*
(0.000) (0.100) (0.095) (0.097)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.112*** 0.0807 0.0772 0.0802
(0.000) (0.306) (0.328) (0.310)
∆ HBR days 322.8*** 323.7*** 323.5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 1705.8*** -1654.4 -1660.4 -1661.5
(0.000) (0.168) (0.166) (0.166)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0933*** 0.0782 0.0744 0.0773
(0.000) (0.318) (0.342) (0.323)
∆ HBR days 299.9*** 300.2*** 300.2***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.C.2: Males only – Specialist health cost regression results – Dynamic CCE,
τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -2379.1 -1841.0 -1682.5 -1882.0
(0.359) (0.614) (0.646) (0.605)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.424*** -0.428*** -0.418*** -0.420***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -186.3 695.1 632.9 403.8
(0.932) (0.836) (0.847) (0.902)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.418*** -0.429*** -0.419*** -0.421***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -866.4 -1330.9 -776.6 -1335.7
(0.681) (0.616) (0.769) (0.614)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.425*** -0.433*** -0.426*** -0.427***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -656.2 -1659.6 -1466.2 -1588.9
(0.728) (0.399) (0.456) (0.419)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.421*** -0.439*** -0.431*** -0.431***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Female
Table IV.C.3: Females only – Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -6127.0*** -6314.4*** -6531.4*** -6529.0***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.406*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.405***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.72
∆T̄ 12 -3341.9** -3560.6** -2757.8 -2745.2
(0.013) (0.045) (0.118) (0.120)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.406*** -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.421***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.72
∆T̄ 8 -3981.1*** -4214.3*** -4202.1*** -4120.0***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.409*** -0.425*** -0.423*** -0.423***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.72
∆T̄ 6 -3308.5*** -3512.4*** -3749.0*** -3681.7***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.413*** -0.424*** -0.423*** -0.423***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.72
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.C.4: Females only – Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 389.9 -1035.1*** -1099.4*** -1099.1***
(0.223) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0514*** 0.0387 0.0261 0.0283
(0.001) (0.146) (0.334) (0.291)
∆ HBR days 106.4*** 109.5*** 109.5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 94.24 -936.3*** -982.6*** -971.6***
(0.732) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0486*** 0.0524 0.0377 0.0401
(0.001) (0.174) (0.309) (0.278)
∆ HBR days 80.20*** 82.19*** 82.55***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
∆T̄ 8 218.6 -536.1** -597.2** -587.7**
(0.411) (0.028) (0.011) (0.012)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0790*** 0.000426 -0.00392 -0.00535
(0.000) (0.989) (0.894) (0.856)
∆ HBR days 79.33*** 82.66*** 82.94***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
∆T̄ 6 20.33 -506.8** -545.7** -544.6**
(0.938) (0.040) (0.019) (0.019)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0656*** -0.00676 -0.0106 -0.0116
(0.000) (0.703) (0.537) (0.499)
∆ HBR days 92.14*** 93.93*** 94.27***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.C.5: Females only – Specialist health cost regression results – Dynamic CCE,
τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -6776.4*** -6164.9*** -6465.5*** -6449.3***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.434*** -0.437*** -0.437*** -0.436***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -3792.6*** -3647.9** -2770.2 -2779.1
(0.003) (0.035) (0.107) (0.106)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.434*** -0.449*** -0.450*** -0.450***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -4334.4*** -4055.8*** -3960.9*** -3890.8***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.437*** -0.455*** -0.454*** -0.454***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3412.4*** -3268.7** -3402.7** -3340.7***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.443*** -0.458*** -0.456*** -0.456***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
179
IV.D Appendix D: Result tables for different τ values
Total cost
Table IV.D.1: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -5227.2*** -5737.4*** -5540.8*** -5752.1***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.402*** -0.409*** -0.409*** -0.409***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -2665.0** -3135.1* -2820.5* -2850.1*
(0.035) (0.068) (0.088) (0.086)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.397*** -0.405*** -0.406*** -0.407***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3184.4*** -3167.7** -3221.7** -3252.1**
(0.005) (0.039) (0.030) (0.029)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.410*** -0.430*** -0.427*** -0.427***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3189.0*** -3826.5*** -3865.0*** -3880.4***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.408*** -0.423*** -0.420*** -0.420***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.D.2: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -4814.8*** -6085.3*** -6123.2*** -6204.3***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.409*** -0.406*** -0.404*** -0.404***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -2321.0** -3380.7** -3192.9** -3201.5**
(0.040) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.406*** -0.409*** -0.408*** -0.409***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -2383.6** -2872.9** -2827.9** -2812.9**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.409*** -0.415*** -0.413*** -0.414***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -2310.9*** -3100.3*** -3119.0*** -3107.3***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.412*** -0.423*** -0.421*** -0.421***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.D.3: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -4900.2*** -7124.8*** -7122.6*** -7196.1***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.406*** -0.409*** -0.408*** -0.408***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -2437.4** -3870.2*** -3793.2*** -3799.5***
(0.024) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.405*** -0.413*** -0.412*** -0.412***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -2618.6*** -3391.9*** -3324.5*** -3308.6***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.410*** -0.417*** -0.416*** -0.416***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -2476.8*** -3334.9*** -3299.9*** -3281.3***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.411*** -0.420*** -0.419*** -0.419***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Primary care cost
Table IV.D.4: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 1008.7*** -1026.7*** -1107.9*** -1106.4***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0458*** 0.0525* 0.0417 0.0446
(0.001) (0.072) (0.152) (0.124)
∆ HBR days 153.8*** 156.3*** 156.3***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 684.9*** -867.7** -961.8*** -957.1***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0434*** 0.0624* 0.0565* 0.0595*
(0.002) (0.064) (0.092) (0.074)
∆ HBR days 127.6*** 130.1*** 130.5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 611.3*** -840.6** -907.5** -904.2**
(0.007) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0777*** 0.0367 0.0318 0.0313
(0.000) (0.206) (0.261) (0.268)
∆ HBR days 135.7*** 136.9*** 137.2***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 423.3* -659.6** -684.6** -685.5**
(0.057) (0.043) (0.034) (0.033)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0598*** 0.0366 0.0303 0.0294
(0.000) (0.108) (0.178) (0.190)
∆ HBR days 138.3*** 140.1*** 140.2***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.D.5: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 990.5*** -1187.9*** -1215.8*** -1216.3***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0724*** 0.0439 0.0382 0.0405
(0.000) (0.131) (0.184) (0.157)
∆ HBR days 149.6*** 150.5*** 150.6***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 604.5** -1037.9*** -1073.1*** -1065.4***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0651*** 0.0450 0.0391 0.0424
(0.000) (0.168) (0.225) (0.186)
∆ HBR days 130.3*** 131.4*** 131.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 574.7*** -955.4*** -984.6*** -977.6***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0838*** 0.0176 0.0166 0.0162
(0.000) (0.538) (0.557) (0.568)
∆ HBR days 132.7*** 133.3*** 133.6***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 460.6** -761.1** -770.5** -769.4**
(0.035) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0791*** -0.00372 -0.00510 -0.00567
(0.000) (0.864) (0.814) (0.793)
∆ HBR days 137.3*** 138.2*** 138.5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.D.6: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 881.1*** -1351.8*** -1357.5*** -1357.9***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0742*** 0.0199 0.0190 0.0184
(0.000) (0.458) (0.477) (0.491)
∆ HBR days 150.5*** 150.6*** 150.6***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 594.7*** -1150.1*** -1171.5*** -1164.9***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0749*** 0.0120 0.0112 0.0110
(0.000) (0.670) (0.690) (0.695)
∆ HBR days 136.4*** 137.3*** 137.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 518.7** -985.3*** -1000.3*** -994.8***
(0.016) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0894*** -0.00310 -0.00244 -0.00364
(0.000) (0.905) (0.925) (0.889)
∆ HBR days 133.4*** 133.8*** 134.1***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 386.4* -816.1*** -821.0*** -817.4***
(0.067) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0843*** -0.0158 -0.0154 -0.0163
(0.000) (0.455) (0.467) (0.441)
∆ HBR days 136.3*** 136.5*** 136.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Specialist health cost
Table IV.D.7: Specialist health cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -6242.8*** -5468.9*** -5376.6*** -5567.4**
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.428*** -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.440***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -3311.9*** -2993.3* -2701.9* -2699.6*
(0.007) (0.078) (0.088) (0.099)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.425*** -0.435*** -0.435*** -0.435***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3683.4*** -3102.8** -3121.4** -3170.2**
(0.001) (0.039) (0.031) (0.028)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.435*** -0.457*** -0.455*** -0.455***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3455.1*** -3392.7*** -3427.4*** -3459.8***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.436*** -0.451*** -0.449*** -0.449***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.D.8: Specialist health cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -5881.9*** -6123.8*** -6179.9*** -6267.8***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.435*** -0.434*** -0.433*** -0.433***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -3087.4*** -3345.8** -3125.9** -3148.5**
(0.005) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.433*** -0.437*** -0.436*** -0.436***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3009.5*** -2832.7** -2772.7** -2775.1**
(0.003) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.436*** -0.443*** -0.441*** -0.441***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -2730.5*** -2908.7*** -2921.2*** -2919.4***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.440*** -0.451*** -0.449*** -0.449***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.D.9: Specialist health cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -5974.4*** -7164.2*** -7137.1*** -7223.5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.431*** -0.436*** -0.435*** -0.435***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -3189.2*** -3775.1*** -3654.5*** -3679.5***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.431*** -0.439*** -0.438*** -0.438***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3203.1*** -3255.6*** -3158.8*** -3165.2***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.437*** -0.444*** -0.443*** -0.443***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -2905.2*** -3214.9*** -3165.2*** -3168.2***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.438*** -0.447*** -0.447*** -0.447***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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IV.E Appendix E: Jackknife bias adjustment
Table IV.E.1: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3, Jackknife
adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 1430.4*** -1084.4 -1382.7* -1382.7*
(0.000) (0.178) (0.077) (0.077)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0830*** -0.0929 -0.0918 -0.0902
(0.000) (0.584) (0.587) (0.594)
∆ HBR days 179.2*** 184.2*** 184.2***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
∆T̄ 12 776.0** -1212.4 -1083.0 -1073.6
(0.027) (0.123) (0.154) (0.157)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0766*** -0.0581 -0.0696 -0.0680
(0.000) (0.734) (0.684) (0.691)
∆ HBR days 148.3** 152.2** 152.7**
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
∆T̄ 8 842.0** -583.2 -814.1 -807.0
(0.010) (0.436) (0.278) (0.282)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.118*** -0.134 -0.143 -0.144
(0.000) (0.429) (0.399) (0.396)
∆ HBR days 149.3** 153.4** 153.6**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
∆T̄ 6 598.6* -714.0 -621.2 -617.2
(0.062) (0.332) (0.394) (0.397)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0973*** -0.128 -0.137 -0.138
(0.000) (0.442) (0.412) (0.409)
∆ HBR days 169.6*** 164.3*** 164.6***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.E.2: Specialist health cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 3, Jackknife
adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -7909.1*** -5101.3 -6873.5** -7041.0***
(0.000) (0.105) (0.012) (0.010)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.443*** -0.421*** -0.438*** -0.439***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -3233.8* -3944.7* -2312.8 -2444.2
(0.050) (0.091) (0.291) (0.265)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.450*** -0.452*** -0.460*** -0.460***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3896.7** -4414.2** -3213.6* -3239.4*
(0.011) (0.031) (0.089) (0.087)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.447*** -0.454*** -0.452*** -0.453***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3679.6*** -2854.0 -3719.3** -3758.5**
(0.006) (0.114) (0.027) (0.025)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.443*** -0.456*** -0.452*** -0.452***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.E.3: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 4, Jackknife adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -6972.0*** -6147.9 -6727.3** -7169.2**
(0.002) (0.142) (0.023) (0.017)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.437*** -0.410*** -0.443*** -0.445***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -2602.7 -4672.8 -2220.4 -2327.6
(0.155) (0.136) (0.378) (0.357)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.434*** -0.409*** -0.455*** -0.456***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3291.2** -1812.2 -3347.2 -3378.9
(0.044) (0.558) (0.116) (0.112)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.454*** -0.416*** -0.434*** -0.435***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3562.7** -3746.1 -4852.0** -4815.2**
(0.014) (0.159) (0.010) (0.011)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.431*** -0.481*** -0.443*** -0.443***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.E.4: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 4, Jackknife
adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 1486.6*** -1103.9 -1194.6 -1195.3
(0.000) (0.293) (0.112) (0.121)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0675*** -0.0755 -0.0885 -0.0855
(0.006) (0.663) (0.605) (0.618)
∆ HBR days 172.5*** 187.0*** 186.9***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
∆T̄ 12 933.5*** -761.1 -838.4 -832.5
(0.009) (0.361) (0.266) (0.269)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0729*** -0.0455 -0.0535 -0.0519
(0.001) (0.792) (0.756) (0.763)
∆ HBR days 125.3* 142.6** 142.9**
(0.059) (0.028) (0.027)
∆T̄ 8 818.8** -345.3 -539.5 -536.1
(0.014) (0.655) (0.461) (0.464)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.117*** -0.0806 -0.0887 -0.0896
(0.000) (0.641) (0.604) (0.601)
∆ HBR days 153.1** 142.8** 143.2**
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
∆T̄ 6 594.7* -617.0 -609.6 -601.5
(0.065) (0.406) (0.402) (0.408)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0757*** -0.0808 -0.108 -0.110
(0.002) (0.638) (0.521) (0.513)
∆ HBR days 167.3*** 164.0*** 164.2***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.E.5: Specialist care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE, τ = 4, Jackknife
adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist ∆ Specialist
health cost health cost health cost health cost
∆T̄it -8512.2*** -7658.9* -7027.7** -7495.4**
(0.000) (0.059) (0.016) (0.011)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.464*** -0.434*** -0.483*** -0.484***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -3571.7** -4180.5 -2342.3 -2435.2
(0.046) (0.165) (0.347) (0.330)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.464*** -0.429*** -0.480*** -0.481***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -3994.5** -3645.4 -3251.2 -3359.7
(0.012) (0.189) (0.118) (0.105)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.466*** -0.426*** -0.457*** -0.457***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -3912.9*** -2437.3 -4392.6** -4397.4**
(0.005) (0.329) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ Lagged Specialist -0.457*** -0.451*** -0.471*** -0.471***
care cost (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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IV.F Appendix F: Increased price per hour
Table IV.F.1: Total cost regression results – Dynamic CCE – Increased home-nurse
price, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost ∆ Total cost
∆T̄it -4510.7*** -5772.2*** -5781.8*** -5916.4***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.404*** -0.401*** -0.400*** -0.400***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 -2163.4* -2904.2* -2701.0* -2739.0*
(0.065) (0.055) (0.071) (0.067)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.404*** -0.410*** -0.408*** -0.409***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 -2887.2*** -3539.0*** -3522.0*** -3492.7***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.408*** -0.418*** -0.415*** -0.415***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 -2573.1*** -3538.1*** -3585.2*** -3592.6***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Lagged Total cost -0.409*** -0.421*** -0.418*** -0.419***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ HBR days Yes Yes Yes
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV.F.2: Primary care cost regression results – Dynamic CCE – Increased home-
nurse price, τ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary ∆ Primary
care cost care cost care cost care cost
∆T̄it 1341.4*** -1329.8*** -1362.3*** -1363.9***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0557*** 0.0577* 0.0495* 0.0518*
(0.000) (0.055) (0.097) (0.082)
∆ HBR days 185.5*** 186.7*** 186.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 12 862.0*** -1104.7*** -1145.1*** -1134.6***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0542*** 0.0641* 0.0563* 0.0590*
(0.000) (0.061) (0.099) (0.083)
∆ HBR days 162.2*** 163.4*** 163.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 8 889.1*** -981.4** -1035.8** -1027.1**
(0.000) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0817*** 0.0235 0.0216 0.0211
(0.000) (0.444) (0.476) (0.486)
∆ HBR days 166.5*** 168.1*** 168.3***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆T̄ 6 654.5*** -782.5** -806.4** -808.7**
(0.005) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028)
∆ Lagged Primary care cost -0.0685*** 0.0130 0.00992 0.00946
(0.000) (0.561) (0.654) (0.668)
∆ HBR days 170.5*** 171.3*** 171.5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Included in, sit, cross-sectional averages added:
∆ Education level Yes
Included in, cit, cross-sectional averages not added:
∆ Marital status 2-5 Yes
∆ 5 hospital areas Yes
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
195
